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MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY



IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATIONS BY EACH OF

(á) CANADIAN ARCTIC GAS PIPELINE LIMITED FOR A

RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT MIGHT BE GRANTED ACROSS

CROWN LANDS WITHIN THE YUKON TERRITORY AND
THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, and

(b) FOOTHILLS PIPE LINES LTD. FOR A RIGHT-OF-WAY
THAT MIGHT BE GRANTED ACROSS CROWN LANDS
WITHIN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF A PROPOSED MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE

and

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT REGIONALLY OF THE CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENT ABANDONMENT OF THE ABOVE PROPOSED PIPELINE


(Before the Honourable Mr. Justice Berger, Commissioner)

Yellowknife, N.W.T.
July 7, 1976

PROCEEDINGS AT INQUIRY

Volume 159

CANADIAN ARCTIC GAS STUDY LTD. JUL 20 1976 LIBRARY



1	APPEAR	ANCES:		
2	Mr	Ian G. Scott, Q.C.,		D D E E
	Mr.	Stephen T. Goudge,		to the promise line in
3		Alick Ryder and Ian Roland	for	Mackenzie Valley Pipeline
4	A Admin W	101111010110		Inquiry;
5		Pierre Genest, Q.C.	,	
6		Jack Marshall, Darryl Carter and		Mr. Sheles
7			for	Canadian Arctic Gas Pipelin Limited.
,	Mr.	Reginald Gibbs, Q.C	. ,	HIMI CCC.
8		Alan Hollingworth a		Foothills Pipe Lines Ltd.;
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				Canadian Arctic Resources
11				Committee;
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13	Mr.	Gerry Sutton	for	Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood, and
14				Metis Association of the Northwest Territories;
				Northwest Territories;
15		John Bayly and Leslie Lane	for	Inuit Tapirisat of Canada,
16	HIDS	nestre name	101	and The Committee for
17				Original Peoples Entitle- ment;
		Ron Veale and		and the field of t
18	Mr.	Allen Lueck	for	The Council for the Yukon Indians;
19	Max	Cargon Mompleton	for	Environment Protection
20	PIL.	Carson Templeton	101	Board;
21	Mr.	David H. Searle, Q.C	.for	Northwest Territories
22				Chamber of Commerce
23	Mr.	Murray Sigler	for	The Association of Munici-
				palities;
24	Mr.	John Ballem, Q.C.	for	Producer Companies;
25	Mrs.	Joanne MacQuarrie,	for	Mental Health Association
26		347 M835 Vol. 15		of the Northwest Territor ies.
27		M835		
28		Vol. 15	9	
29		CANADIA GAS ST	UDY I	RCTIC
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Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty In Chief Yellowknife, N.W.T.

July 7, 1976.

(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT)

DAVID M. WEINSTEIN, and

DAVID BOORKMAN, Sworn:

WAYNE B. TRUSTY, resumed:

MR. STEEVES: Mr. Commissioner,

the witnesses have been sworn. On the immediate left is a witness whose name is not on the summary of evidence Mr. Joseph Henry Weinstein. Next to him is Mr. David Weinstein. Next to him is Mr. David Boorkman, and on the far right of the table, Mr. Trusty, who is known to all.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STEEVES:

Q May I begin by asking you, Mr. Boorkman, whether or not the testimonial qualifications set out in the statement under your name are true and correct.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Yes, they

are.

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Q And I ask the same question of you, Mr. David Weinstein.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: Yes.

Q And Mr. Joseph Weinstein,

are you 31 years or age?

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Yes.

 $$\mathbb{Q}$$ And do you hold a degree of Bachelor of Arts from Westlane University in



	political science?		
4		A	I do.
;		Q	And do you hold a degree
4	of Master of Arts in tea	ching	from Harvard?
5.		A	I do.
6		Q	And were you employed
,	after graduation		
3		A	I have also a degree in
a i	city planning.		
10		Q	Sorry.
11 !		A	From California, Berkley.
12		Q	Can't read my own writing
10	and were you employed after your under-graduate period		
14	as a		
15.		A	Teacher.
16		Q	as a teacher?
17		A	Yes, I was.
13		Q	Two years in the public
15 1	school system in Californ	nia?	
20		A	Right.
21		Q	And have you acted as a
22	consultant to the City of	f Oak	land in the State of
23	California in part of the	e mode	el city's program?
24.		A	Yes, to the model city's
25	program for education and	d for	economics as well.
26		Q	And have you taught for
4.	one semester at the University	ersity	of California?
		A	Yes, one quarter in housing
24		Q	In housing; and have you

acted as a consultant to various governmental authorities?



A Yes.

Q And have you since 1974 been concerned as research director for URSA, of a study made by that firm generally described as the Alaskan Impact Study?

A Yes, the Alaskan Arctic

Q And has that study been put in evidence before the Federal Power Commission in Washington?

A Right, and I was a witness in support of that.

Q Now, Mr. Boorkman , are there any typographical errors in the evidence? WITNESS BOORKMAN:
A Yes, there are. I think

one of my testimonies --

Impact Study.

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THE COMMISSIONER: May I have a copy of this, now that we are about to begin?

MR. STEEVES: Oh, I'm sorry.

A On page 1 of my testimony the third paragraph on the first page begins our testimony. In the first line it should be, instead of

"its Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act," it should be

"the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act."

On the next line there are two places where "it" should read "the". Integration of "the" natives into Alaska society, the impacts of the Acts are



Weinstein, Weinstein

1		Boorkman, Trusty In Chief
4		On page 10 of our testimony
) a	in the first paragraph a	t the top of the page in the
:	4th line, the wo	ord "officials" is repeated.
5	The first can be stricker	n.
		On page 21 of our testimony
7	the second paragraph, the	e 3rd sentence about
<u>.</u>	the middle of the paragra	aph,
C,	"State Commissioner	of Labor ordered that all
1)	resident Alaskans"	
111	instead of "residence".	
12		Page 29 of our testimony, the
13;	last paragraph, the last	line there should be an "and"
14:	between the word "public"	" and "private and public"
15:	so it should read,	
16	"a variety of pri	vate and public goods and
17 :	services."	
18		There may be others, but those
19	are the ones I've found	to date.
20		Q Mr. Trusty, are there any
21	errors or corrections in	your evidence?
22		WITNESS TRUSTY: Yes sir, there
23	are.	
24 /		Q Tell us what they are,
25	please.	
26 ;		A On page 8 of my testimony
27		ne top of the page the words,
28	"for each community" show	uld read "for the major communi

"Further, there are master plans for the major

ties". So the sentence would read then,

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communities."

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O Is that it?

A Yes.

Q Mr. Boorkman, would you

commence reading the testimony?

past few years the socio-economic environment of
Alaska has changed rapidly. The major cause of this
change has been the construction of the Alyeska Oil
Pipeline. However, in order to understand the changes
which have occurred because of the Alyeska construction,
it is important to understand the socio-economic context
within which these Alyeska impacts have taken shape.
There are many forces of socio-economic change currently
at work in the state, and not all of them are directly
tied to the Alyeska project. And even the pipeline
activities themselves must be viewed within a clear
sense of the socio-economic context of the state if they
are to be understood.

of this testimony, describes some of the socio-economic impacts associated with the construction of the Alyeska Pipeline, while Part III describes the overall context which has shaped these impacts. Part II is a factual presentation of what has happened in Alaska over the past two years, while Part III contains a description of the unique Alaska socio-economic environment. The final section of this testimony, Part IV, summarizes the importance of Alaska's socio-economic environment in



determining the Alyeska related impacts, and spells out some of the reasons why pipeline impacts in Alaska and the Northwest Territories could vary considerably.

Our testimony does not deal with the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Though the Settlement Act has had a crucial role in accelerating the social, political and economic integration of the natives into Alaskan society, the impacts of the Act are distinct from the impacts caused by Alyeska construction. The purpose of this testimony, on the other hand, is to describe the specific Alyeska-related impacts, and to place them in Alaska's overall socio-economic context.

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(IMPACTS OF THE ALYESKA PROJECT IN THE CONTEXT

OF ALASKA SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT BY

BOORKMAN & D. WEINSTEIN MARKED EXHIBIT 649)

(RELATING ALASKA EXPERIENCE TO N.W.T. AND THE

ARCTIC GAS PROJECT MARKED EXHIBIT 650)



Alyeska impacts. This section

- of the testimony describes some of the pipeline related
- impacts which have occurred in Alaska during the past
- 4 two years. The impacts discussed have been organized
- according to the following subject matter categories:
- 6 A. Population
- B. Employment and unemployment
- 8 C. Labor shortages and labor costs
- 9 D. Revenues and expenditures
- 1 F. Impacts on public and private goods and services
 - l. housing
- l 2. utilities
 - 3. public safety
 - 4. education

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- F. Inflation, and,
 - G. Small village impact

economic impacts associated with the construction of the Alyeska pipeline, this section emphasizes impact in the Fairbanks area, since Fairbanks has served as the major supply point for much of the pipeline project and has, therefore, been a focal point for socio-economic impact as well.

Population. Historically in Alaska, periods of rapid economic development have been characterized by large scale population in-migration. because of the economic opportunity created by the "boom" periods and because of the unique lure of Alaska to residents of other state; the various economic "boom" periods have accelerated the normal in-migration of



people into the state. The Alyeska induced boom has been no exception.

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According to a year-long survey of in-migrants to Alaska conducted by URSA for the U.S. Department of Labor in 1975, the magnitude of in-migration increased dramatically during Alyeska construction. If the number of in-migrants who responded to URSA's four surveys is extrapolated and averaged over all of 1975, one can estimate that as many as 56,000 people in-migrated to Alaska during 1975. These people were not tourists, nor were they Alaska resident, nor individuals travelling to Alaska on business. Rather, they were people in-migrating to Alaska because they had a new job in Alaska, or because they were dependents of these new employees or new job-seekers.

In addition to URSA's survey of population in-migration, the Alaska Department of Labor has estimated that Alaska's statewide population increased from 330,365 to 404,634 or 22.5% from July 1, 1973 to July 1, 1975. Similar population increases have occurred for the three cities most affected by Alyeska -- Fairbanks, Anchorage and Valdez.

The population of the Fairbanks
North Star Borough increased from 38,091 on July 1, 1973
to 63,350 on July 1, 1975, an increase of 66.3% in only
two years. Valdez, the terminus of the Alyeska pipeline
also mushroomed from a population of 1,173 in January,
1974 to 2,071 in July 1974 and finally to 6,670 in July,
1975 -- an increase of 469% in one and a half years.



Finally, Anchorage has also grown significantly from 149,440 in September 1973 to 179,883 in September 1975 -- an increase of 20.4%.

These population increases are well-known, but in and of themselves they are not very useful statistics. However, as explained more fully in later sections, these increases have caused serious problems. First, there has been a significant lag between population increases and corresponding increases in revenues. This revenue shortfall has led to inadequate budgets and inadequate expenditures for public goods. Second, the revenue shortfall has meant that public services simply have not kept up with population growth. Electricity, sewage systems, telephone service, police and fire protection -- none has expanded in proportion to the increase in population. By American standards, Alaska is an extremely unpopulated state and has the limited service delivery capability of an unpopulated -- it should be an undeveloped nation. It has not been able to absorb the huge numbers of inmigrants and to provide all of its population -- both old-time residents and new in-migrants with an adequate level of public services.

It is extremely well publicized that Alyeska has greatly increased employment in Alaska. During the second quarter of 1975, the peak direct Alyeska workforce reached a high of 24,400 workers. Moreover, given the employment multiplier of 1.5 commonly used in Alaska, it is

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estimated that Alyeska created a peak of approximately 61,000 jobs in Alaska (24,400 direct jobs and 36,600 secondary and indirect jobs).

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Moreover, in addition to this
. Tyeska induced increase in employment, unemployment
in Alaska has also risen because of Alyeska. This has
occurred for two reasons. First, as explained in the
previous section, tens of thousands of unemployed people
have in-migrated to Alaska in search of work, during
the years of Alyeska construction. In URSA's recently
completed in-migration study for the U.S. Department
of Labour it was found that fully 35 percent of inmigrant adults were unemployed.

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Second, the Alyeska project
has also caused large numbers of resident Alaskans to
enter the labour force for the first time, for example,
natives, housewives, students. These resident Alaskans
who have entered the labour force but who have been
unable to find work have joined the ranks of the unemployed
for the first time.

break down unemployment in the in-migrant and resident categories, but rather include both residents and in-migrants in overall totals. Statewide, although pipeline employment and total employment reached record levels during the past year, the number of unemployed workers rose from 16,400 in January, 1975 to 22,900 in January 1976. The statewide unemployment rate also increased from 10.8 percent to 12.2 percent during the same period. Even in Fairbanks where pipeline activity has been the most intense, the total number of unemployed workers also increased last year though the unemployment rate dipped slightly from 1974 to '75.



official state unemployment totals actually understate

though in fact without jobs, are not officially counted

by the state as being unemployed. In order to be

officially listed in unemployment totals, one either

the actual unemployment rate. Many unemployed in-migrants,

It should be noted that the

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has to have had been laid off in Alaska from a job in a covered industry, that is in an industry in which 9 unemployment insurance is paid or one has to register 10 for work at a state employment office. Obviously, 11 unemployed in-migrants would not have been laid off 12 from a covered industry in Alaska. 13 Labour shortages and labour 14 The high paying construction industry in Alaska costs. 15 has drawn and is drawing qualified workers from other 16 lower paying industries. Just as capital in Alaska

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at the same time, important jobs going unfilled. Both the private and the public sectors have been effected by the high labour turnover rate in Alaska. With respect to the private sector, there appears to be a shortage of real estate appraisers in Fairbanks. Both banks and appraisal companies have stated that there is a two to three week waiting period before one can even obtain an appraisal. This delay extends the period of time needed to buy or

is being channelled into areas of the highest opportunity

cost, oil and gas construction, many employees in lower

paying businesses are also leaving their jobs when oil

or gas related jobs become available. Thus, in Alaska

there is an anomalous situation of high employment and



sell a house and therefore exacerbates the bottlenecks in the supply of housing. Moreover, private construction firms that perform non-pipeline work are having difficulty hiring craftsmen to perform work necessary to bring buildings into compliance with the local code requirements. Many workers appear to be doing jobs that are beyond their ability or training.

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been effected. The Fairbanks Health Center has had difficulty in attracting and keeping good clerical help, since the state wage scale is lower than the wages offered by the pipeline contractors. In addition, the state Environmental Health Section has reported that low pay scales, low state pay scales have restricted filling of four sanitarian vacancies in the Northern Regional Office and South Central Regional Office.

As a final example, the U.S.

Postal Service in Fairbanks has had constant problems
in retaining personnel and in keeping its self-service
units in working order. The employee turnover rate
last fiscal year in Fairbanks was 42 percent and as
a result, the self-service postal units have been under
utilized because they are frequently in need of repair,
qualified repair staff is not available.

Revenues and expenditures.

Lecause of the rapid population increase, state and

local budgets in Alaska have grown enormously. However,

revenue sources have not grown rapidly enough to sustain

a desired level of public expenditures. Both state

and local governments have begun to curtail their budgets



and simultaneously to propose new taxes. The state has already spent the nine hundred million dollars that it received from the Prudhoe Bay oil and gas lease sale. In order to balance the proposed budget of six hundred and seventy-four point four million dollars in fiscal year 1977, the governor now has not only proposed substantial new taxes, but has also proposed that the payment date of certain existing taxes, paid by the oil companies be moved forward three months, from September 30,1977 to June 30, 1977, the very last day of fiscal year 1977.

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in mid '77, oil revenues will not be as high as previously estimated because in order to increase revenues last year, the state passed a 20 mill ad valorem tax on petroleum reserves. This reserves tax is merely a credit for borrowing against future severance taxes, and thus current payments by the oil companies for this reserves tax will be subtracted from the severance taxes that they pay once oil begins to flow in 1977.

This problem of a revenue shortfall can also be illustrated in the Fairbanks

North Star Borough, where increases in revenue sources have lagged considerably behind increases in population.

As stated above, the population of the Borough increased 66.3 percent between 1973 and '75. The population increased 32.1 percent between 1973 and 1974. On the other hand, property tax revenues from the Borough increase only 16.7 percent between 1973 - '74 and '74 - '75 and sales tax receipts rose 9.9 percent in this same period.



The lag between population

impact and increased revenues has aggravated the intensity of Alyeska impacts since local funding sources have not grown fast enough to keep up with the demand for more and better public services.

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Boorkman, Trusty
In Chief

The Alyeska project has also

exposed and exacerbated pre-existing weaknesses in Alaska's intra-state revenue sharing mechanisms. State revenues are currently distributed to local governments on a per capita basis. The existing per capita formula however, often does not provide adequate funds to extremely small communities, including those communities which have been affected by Alyeska construction. A bill currently before the Alaska legislature would correct this deficiency and provide a minimum grant to all communities regardless of population. Moreover, the Alyeska project has also created entirely new problems for intra-state revenue sharing. In order to assist communities most severely "impacted" by Alyeska construction, special impact assistance funds were provided by the state to certain specified communities. However these funds were far too restricted in terms of the purposes for which they could be used. The funds were primarily for operating expenses; the only capital expansion projects for which the impact funds could be

Impacts on private and public goods and services. The supply of most private and public goods simply has not kept up with demand. With respect to private goods (especially housing) the Alyeska project has both drained off needed pools of skilled labor and has also affected capital flows in other areas of the private sector. In addition, Alaska's geographical isolation from the rest of the United

used were school facilities, parks and recreational

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States and the major distances between cities within the state have traditionally created supply shortages and "bottlenecks" in the distribution of goods in Alaska.

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With respect to public goods

(electricity, sewerage, telephones, police and fire

protection, etc.) the Alyeska project has also drawn

away needed skilled labor. Many public officials

and employees have left their positions because of higher

paving opportunities in the private sector. Moreover,

the revenue shortfall described above has meant that

governmental agencies simply have not had adequate

funds to provide services demanded by the expanded

population nor to increase public salaries.

While the entire spectrum of private and public services has been strained by Alyeska construction, the more important impacts have been on housing, utilities, public safety and education. The following descriptions of the impacts within these four areas are representative of the Alyeska impact on other services as well.

As is well publicized, the clearest example of a shortage of private goods in Alaska today is housing. As in the rest of the United States, the state housing industry is primarily private. The private sector is responsible for the financing of far more homes than is the public sector and even publicly financed or subsidized homes and apartments are built by private industry. Moreover, federally subsidized housing programs are designed for cities in the lower 48 states, and often are not able to address the Alaskan housing



problems.

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In addition, the quality of housing in Alaska has always been sub-standard. The high cost of construction, the widespread poverty in Alaska (especially in rural and native communities) and the state's enormous size and small population all contribute to Alaska's ranking far below the U.S. national average in every index of housing quality.

The housing vacancy rate in Fairbanks and Valdez is nearly zero. Though the housing construction capacity of these cities (and elsewhere in Alaska) is clearly increasing, new housing starts still are falling far short of local housing needs. As projected by the April, 1975 housing market survey, for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, a total of 1,065 apartments and 665 single family homes will be needed in Fairbanks by 1977.

However, only 212 apartments and 412 single family units were begun in Fairbanks in 1975. The number of new apartments actually begun in 1975 comprised only 21% of the HUD estimated needs.

Moreover, since the great majority of housing units in Fairbanks are rental units (60% versus 40% for owner-occupied units in small (21%) percentage of estimated need for apartments is especially critical.

With respect to single family units, the number of such units actually begun in 1975 comprised 62% of the HUD estimates of need. However, this statistic makes the supply/demand imbalance appear



less serious than it is. First, the prices of the units built may not be "equilibrated with" or match the price range of the single family housing units actually needed. Second, it is likely that the HUD estimates of need seriously under-estimate the future housing demands of Fairbanks. The HUD estimates are based on projections of population for Fairbanks which, in fact, are too low. The population projected by HUD for 1977 is less than the current population.

Mr. Boorkman. I think I understood you but maybe you would just elaborate for a moment. You said the prices of the units built may not be equilibrated with or match the price range of the single family housing units actually needed. Is that to ensure there will be no competition with private industry. Have I got that right?

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A It is simply saying that the units being constructed may not match the demand, and that there is a lag between the time at which the demand occur s and when houses are built and in the intervening period the characteristics of the demand may shift. So, you're building houses for a demand whose characteristics has changed. You may have a lot of single people coming into a community when what you have been building for the last couple of years are family housing with multi-bedrooms.

Q When housing completions are to satisfy a demand that may be a year or two in the past.



A Right.

Q I understand. Sorry.

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Part

of the difference is having to do with cost of the house -- the price on the market. All these are private market units. They're not necessarily -- in fact, this speaks only to private units. It does not speak at all to publicly constructed units.

O Yes.

A In fact, Fairbanks has very few, if any. The problem of mis-match is the fact that a unit may go on sale for say \$80,000 but the family or the individual can only affor \$60,000 so there's a unit. It's vacant. It's available, but nobody can afford it. So that's the mis-match.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Yes.

You really have two kinds. When you have units that don't match the needs of the families or individuals coming into the community and you have a price mis-match -- housing that costs more than the people can pay despite the fact it may meet their space requirements.

on public subsidized housing, we say it briefly in here, but the general experience is that as I am sure it must true in Canada, that many federal programs in the United States are designed for major cities in the lower 48 and simply don't translate very well to Alaska. There have been many constraints especially in the financing through HUD's financing provisions for housing which

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have not applied and have not worked well at all in Alaska and the recent decline in the United States's commitment to subsidize housing generally has also had an impact in Alaska.

Q Sorry, I guess I wasn't thinking very clearly when you said "may not be equilibrated with". I thought there was a provision of statutes.

A That was to see if everybody was awake this morning.

System in Alaska have also been over-loaded, especially in the Fairbanks area. The newly completed sewer system in Fairbanks has the capacity to serve only the pre-boom population. There are no plans to expand it beyond this capacity. Sewer service is available only within the city limits although much of the current population and industrial expansion are located in the North Star Borough and therefore are not served by the existing sewage or water system.

In many of these areas, discontinuous permafrost is also a problem. Electrical service to the City of Fairbanks is provided by the Municipal Utilities System (MUS) while Golden Valley Electrical Assocation(GVEA) provides power to the borough. The MUS depends almost entirely on coal for its fuel but GVEA is dependent upon both coal and oil. MUS has been able to operate without interruptions this winter, primarily because its supplies have been consistent and the demand for power has been relatively

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stable since most of the local growth has occurred in the Borough, outside of the city limits.

The GVEA however has had two power outages in December and has urged its customers to purchase home generators for future emergencies. GVEA has had problems both with the supply of oil from Tesoro and the rapid increase in demand within its service area. In addition, the severe winter peak in demand for electrical service is far greater in Fairbanks than in the lower 48. GVEA and MUS must make capital expenditures large enough to supply the heavy peak winter demand for lighting and heating. However, demand during the rest of the year is far lower and much of the capacity of the electrical system is unused. In fact in April of 1975, GVEA announced that there would be a moratorium on new electrial heat installations, and GVEA's general manager attributed this decision to the winter peaking for the electric load.

Telephone service in Fairbanks is often erratic at best. The system is a relic of the town's growth during World War II. Moreover, the system was seriously damaged during the floods of the mid-sixties and has never been adequately repaired.

The Alyeska induced population growth has simply placed additional strains on an already inadequate system. The quest for new telephone connections are simply deferred and the back-log doubled in the past year.

Complaints have increased 69% while service orders completed have actually declined 20%.

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Public Safety. Crime

in particular are not totally reliable indices of criminal behaviour. The reporting techniques vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as do the emphasis which criminal justice officials in different areas give to the enforcement of various types of criminal laws.

Nevertheless, the statistics that are available indicate that, contrary to public opinion in sections of the lower 48, crime in Alaska has risen no faster than the increase in population.

In other words, there does not appear to be a crime wave caused by Alyeska construction.

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Statewide crime statistics

-- that's a typo -- are compiled by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (F.B.I.) However, there are long
delays in gathering the necessary information, and the
latest statewide crime statistics available are for
1974 only. The 1975 statewide statistics will not be
available until August of this year. However, crime
statistics up to and including 1975 are available for
specific jurisdictions within Alaska.

Current reports are available
from the Division of State Troopers (Department of Public
Safety). The State Troopers are responsible for law
enforcement in all areas of Alaska which are not
served by municipal Police Departments or federal
agencies. Their area of responsibility includes approximately 98% of the land area of the state, and 50% of the



total population. According to the annual report published by the Department of Public Safety on January 22, 1976, the number of major (Part I) offences reported to the State Troopers increased only by 24.7% from 1973 to 1975. (Part I crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft). Although statewide population statistics are not available for those areas under the jurisdiction of the State Troopers, it is probable that the population of those areas increased by approximately 25% from 1973 to 1975.

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the Troopers (minor or Part II crimes) increased more rapidly from 1973 to 1975 -- at a rate of 35.6%.

However, the increases in some of these minor categories may well be the result of changed attitudes concerning what is or is not a crime. For example, in many communities of Alaska carrying and possessing a concealed weapon has traditionally not been considered criminal activity. However, because of Alyeska-induced population growth and increased social tension, many law enforcement agencies now regard carrying and possessing a weapon as a criminal offence. Table 2 shows the growth of Part I and Part II offenses reported to the State Troopers from 1973 to 1975.

In addition, the Fairbanks

North Star Borough Pipeline Impact Information Centre
has reported on the increased number of criminal complaints filed with the Fairbanks Police Department.

Criminal complaints have increased 93% between 1973 and
1975, according to the Information Centre. However,



as stated above, the population of the North Star Borough increased 66.3% during these same two years. In addition, most of the large increases in complaints occurred in categories that had extremely few complaints in 1973 and earlier years (carrying and possessing a weapon, interfering with a police officer, and prostitution). As mentioned previously, it is very likely either that the Fairbanks community as a whole and its law enforcement personnel are now reporting activities that previously were not considered criminal, or it is likely that there have been shifts in community attitudes about the seriousness of various types of anti-social behaviour.

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Education. The one area in which Alyeska impact has not been as great as projected is education. Though the school systems in Fairbanks, Anchorage and Valdez haveall been strained, the problem has been less serious than had been anticipated.

Statistics showing the increase in students are readily available. The High Schools in Fairbanks are in double session, and enrollment in Valdez increased by 171 last year to a current level of 812. On the other hand, the increase in the number of students has been, on the average, more moderate than projected. Enrollment in the Anchorage school system has risen from 35,871 in 1973 to only 40,277 last year; and a number of children enrolled in the Fairbanks school system actually declined from 9,021 in September 1974 to 8,843 in May 1975.

Obviously a relatively small number of the in-migrants are bringing their children



The Fairbanks North Star Borough Pipeline
Impact Information Centre reports that the ratio of
new children in Fairbanks to pipeline workers fell
throughout most of '74 and '75, reaching a surprisingly;
low ratio of 1 to 131 in June, 1975. Moreover, in
URSA's own in-migration study it was found that statewide only 9.9% of all new in-migrants to Alaska were
bringing their children, far fewer than had been
anticipated.

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Inflation. Though the cost of living in Alaska has always been higher than in the U.S. as a whole, until the Alyeska boom the differential between Alaska and the lower 48 had been decreasing. However, the inflation rate in Alaska and in Anchorage in particular is now greater than in the lower 48, and thus the differential in the cost of living between Alaska and the U.S. is now increasing. The cause of Alaskan inflation during the Alyeska project has been both demand pull (for example the housing shortage) and cost push (for example, the high Alyeska wages). Moreover, though the cost of living in Fairbanks has always been higher than Anchorage, it now also appears to be increasing at a faster rate.

The data supporting these statements are incomplete, since the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (B.L.S.) does not survey either Fairbanks or the entire State of Alaska. The only complete survey is a consumer price index compiled for the Anchorage metropolitan area. According to the Anchorage C.P.I., the cost of living in Anchorage rose



	13.8% in 1974 and 11.1%	in 1975 rates far above
**	the U.S. average.	
;		THE COMMISSIONER: What was
.4.	the U.S. average?	
*,		A In 1975 it was 7%, as
<i>;</i>	I recall, and in 1974 it	was -
7		WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: For the
9	last year ending in April	l the U.S. average was 6.1%.
9		THE COMMISSIONER: That's '75.
. Ú		WITNESS BOORKMAN: But it's
2 2	not a calendar year '75.	
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respect to the cost of living in Fairbanks, the
University of Alaska's Institute for Social, Economic
and Government Research has calculated that the cost
of goods and services in Fairbanks is 12 percent greater
than in Anchorage. Similarly, Fairbanks construction
costs have been estimated by the military to be 20
percent higher than in Anchorage.

Further, as stated above, inflation in Fairbanks is also now substantially higher than in Anchorage. The Fairbanks North Star Borough Pipeline Impact Information Center has conducted market basket surveys for Fairbanks starting in September 1974. Comparing the result of these surveys with comparable market basket surveys for Anchorage, it appears that in the last quarter of 1974, Fairbanks food prices increased 6 percent, Anchorage's food costs for the same items in the same time period increased 3.7 percent. Even more dramatic is the difference between the two cities during the first six months of 1975. While Anchorage's food cost increased only 1.9 percent, the cost of food in Fairbanks increased 10 percent.

Housing, of course, is the most well known example of inflation. The impact information center in Fairbanks also conducts rental housing surveys and in a recent survey -- and a recent survey shows that between December, 1974 and December 1975, the average rents in Fairbanks increased approximately 50 percent. Moreover, the number of apartments



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to 82 in December, 1975.

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advertised for rent dropped from 112 in December, 1974

Small village impact. Alyeska project has had an impact on the small villages in the state, but no detailed survey of that impact has been conducted, only some general statistics are available. A survey of fifteen small villages, completed in June, 1975 indicated that the percentage of rural people, currently or previously employed on pipeline work is low, ranging from 22.2 percent of the total population for Allakaket to 2 to 3 percent for Nenana and Anderson. Many natives also complain about the difficulty of obtaining pipeline work, since most unions require that all employees register at the union hiring halls in Fairbanks and be present at the hiring halls when a call for employment is made.

In addition to the expense and difficulty of travelling to Fairbanks, rural natives have been dissatisfied with the lack of information concerning pipeline employment. The union hiring hall procedures and the relationship between the various federal state and private native organizations, such as the Alaska Federation of Natives, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Labour.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Boorkman,

when you say, when you refer to small village impact, and then you refer to the percentage of rural people in two villages employed on pipeline work, would rural villages in Alaska be essentially native villages?



A Yes.

Q That's the same thing,

really?

A Yes.

Despite this low percentage of rural native employees, the pipeline is having a significant effect in terms of loss of manpower and leadership. Decreased tax revenues and poor transportation services for the rural villages.

Those natives who leave their communities to seek pipeline employment often are the most talented and take with them vital skills, such as the ability to maintain the local pumphouse and/or generator. This migration of skilled native workers away from the villages, has, in some communities, resulted in a leadership vacuum, since the skilled workers who leave are also often the community leaders.

In addition, the loss of village population has created both a smaller tax base and also a diminished cash flow. Since much of the income earned on pipeline or pipeline related employment is spent in the larger cities.

Finally, the Alyeska Pipeline
has directed plane service from small rural villages
and has caused less frequent mail and freight deliveries.

Q Maybe you

wouldn't mind reading that footnote, just before we pass on.

A Yes. Statewide, a signifi-

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cant number of natives have been hired by Alyeska. It has been estimated that 5,100 individual natives have worked for Alyeska and that 8,000 total jobs have been filled by natives. These totals are the result of the four major native employment programmes now in effect in Alaska.

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One, the Alaska Plan, an affirmative action plan signed by labour unions, pipeline contractors and subcontractors and various governmental agencies.

Two, the Equivalency panels, which certify natives as qualified union journeymen or apprentices on the basis of equivalent past work experience.

Three, the two minority employment programmes signed by the Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company itself and approved by the U. S. Department
of Interior.

Four, the state operated
Alaska State Manpower Utilization system, ASMUS, which
coordinates various native employment and training
programmes and which travels to rural native villages
in order to induce natives to fill out state job
application forms.

statistics in there are statistics that are from very proliminary data gathered by the University of Alaska, and as yet no detail is available, and the reliability of them of those and the implications, I don't think are clear to date.



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THE COMMISSIONER: Average

length of employment and type of occupation.

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it's hard to tell whether the 5,100 natives versus
the 8,000 jobs implies upward mobility. Some people
are taking higher and higher paying jobs, or if it
reflects turnover where people stay on the jobs only
a short time. You could be right either way and until
we have more detailed data we shouldn't give too much
weight to those statistics.

Three, socio-economic context
of pipeline impact in Alaska. The preceding section of
this testimony describes some of the recent impact
associated with the construction of the Alyeska Pipeline.
This impact is currently posing serious problems for
the state of Alaska and it is, naturally, a major
concern for Canadians who were responsible for anticipating a socio-economic consequences of major development projects in the Northwest Territories.

Implicit questions have run
through the hearings in Yellowknife. Will the negative
impacts of the Alyeska project be repeated in the
Northwest Territories? Is serious dislocation of
the social and economic environment inevitably associated
with a major pipeline project in the north?

The questions go to the -these questions go to the heart of this Inquiry, but
it is clear that simplistic answers will serve no one.
Instead, the need is for a conceptual framework that
will make it possible to understand the underlying



reasons for what has happened in Alaska.

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This section of the testimony well discuss the factors which have created the current socio-economic impact in Alaska. It speaks to the question, what is the socio-economic context which has shaped Alveska impacts? And implicitly, it addresses the question as to whether gas pipeline impacts in the Northwest Territories will parallel oil pipeline impacts in Alaska.

environment of Alaska has been primarily shaped by the recurrent dynamic of population in-migration during boom periods in general and during Alyeska construction in particular. An explanation of this in-migration and the state's inability to plan for and mitigate its negative effects is essential if one is to understand the Alyeska impacts. This portion of the testimony describes three aspects of this in-migration. The this torical pattern of population in-migration, the current in-migration, induced by Alyeska and the influence of in-migration upon Alyeska impacts.



Historical patterns of population in-migration. Historically, the most significant factor which has characterized the socio-economic environment of Alaska is the degree to which highly visible economic development has led to major boom periods, during which thousands of people have entered the state. The population of Alaska, like any other growing area, continually increases because of normal in-migration. However, during boom periods, in-migration to Alaska has increased at a vastly accelerated rate. These major economic boom periods have been characterized by (1) a massive population in-migration in response to the boom, and (2) a levelling off phase as the boom has subsided

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(2) a levelling off phase as the boom has subsided and some out-migration has occurred.

Alaska's susceptibility to such boom-related in-migration is well-documented. At least four significant boom periods occurred prior to the discovery of oil and gas at Prudhoe Bay, and they have operated to expand the population of Alaska from an overwhelmingly native population of 33,000 in 1880, to an overwhelmingly non-native population of 302,173 in 1970.

The state's first major population boom was caused by the Alaska gold rush of 1898.

It drew thousands of new residents to Alaska and nearly doubled the state population between 1890 and 1900. The second major boom was closely tied to the rapid population to the rapid buildup of U.S. military presence



following World War II. Military population growth and the resulting civilian in-migration which it stimulated served to nearly double the Alaskan population once again. Between 1940 and 1950, the population of the state grew from approximately 73,000 to nearly 130,000.

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during the 1950s with the construction of the DEW Line and other military facilities, and the population between 1950 and 1960 jumped once again, from approximately 130,000 to 226,00 0. Finally although the military population of the state declined slightly between 1960 and 1970, the discovery and production of oil and gas on the Kenai Peninsula in the 1960s sustained the fourth major population boom in the state.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's in the Gulf of Alaska.

in-migration to Alaska is caused by a variety of factors. Alaska has a special significance for residents of the United States. It is the last frontier in America, an historic safety valve, and it continues to represent a place in which a new start can be made, and in which it is still possible to make a quick fortune. In addition, although Alaska is much less developed than other states, it does have a socio-economic infractructure that makes the state more attractive to potential in-migrants than other less developed areas. Finally, there is no constitutional way for either the Federal or State Government to control the movement of residents from other states to Alaska. Any person can



migrate to Alaska, live there for 30 days, and then for the purpose of voting in Alaska, constitutionally claim that he is an Alaskan resident.

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Alyeska-induced population inmigration. Since the discovery of oil and gas at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska has experienced two more population booms. The first was a false boom which occurred in 1970 to 1972. Triggered by the discovery of North Slope petroleum deposits, the sale of oil and gas leases, and the anticipation of imminent oil pipeline construction, the state economy experienced rapid growth and many residents of the lower 48 states in-migrated to Alaska in search of high-paying jobs. Although the initiation of pipeline construction was delayed and economic decline resulted from the delay, the false boom provided a foretaste of the Alyeska boom that was to follow. It reaffirmed the degree to which boom-related in-migration continues to be a factor in Alaska.

10 The current boom being experienced in Alaska is tied to the construction of the Alyeska Oil Pipeline. The special characteristics of Alaska, the 21 widespread publicity and immense magnitude of the Alyeska 22 project, and the prospect of high paying pipeline con-21 struction jobs have combined to attract tens of thousands 24 27 of in-migrants from other states. Massive in-migration to Alaska started when large-scale Alyeska hiring 26 27 began in 1974, and continued through most of 1975. URSA's 1. 12 survey indicates that as many as 56, 000 people may have in-migrated to Alaska in1975 alone. Moreover, it is highly likely that the period of large-scale Alyeska-



induced in-migration extended over a two-year hire up period, 1974 and '75. Thus our survey for 1975 documents only a portion of the total population in-migration caused by Alyeska.

The Alyeska induced in-migration has been aggravated by three crucial factors:

(1) local or resident hire

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- (2) the location of the union hiring halls in Fairbanks,
- (3) the lack of adequate state planning.

These three factors have operated to intensify the level of Alaska's historic in-migration problem and to exacerbate the negative impacts caused by Alyeska.

With respect to the first factor, political reality in Alaska made it inevitable that local or resident Alaskans would be given preference in the hiring of pipeline workers. Thus, the Local Hire Act was passed in 1972, mandating that for the purposes of oil and gas leases, Alaska residents were to be given preference for new jobs. The Act has been enforced primarily by the hiring of Alyeska workers out of the local Fairbanks union hiring halls. The role of the Fairbanks unions has been the second crucial factor in the Alyeska-induced population in-migration. In order to secure an Alyeska job, one has had to travel to Alaska and to Fairbanks in particular. As URSA's inmigration survey documents, tens of thousands of people have in fact in-migrated to Alaska in search of work. In all likelihood, many of these in-migrants immediately claimed that they were Alaskan residents (as required by the Local Hire Act) and then sought Alyeska employment.



Many other in-migrants sought and found secondary and indirect, as opposed to direct, Alyeska jobs, and still others found employment by filling vacancies created when existing Alaskan residents left their jobs for Alyeska-related work.

Finally, the third crucial factor which has increased the level of in-migration was the lack of adequate state planning. The state, in the Local Hire Act, insisted that resident Alaskans be given preference for Alyeska jobs; yet the state did not until it was too late create the enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure only — that only bona fide Alaska residents (instead of recent in-migrants) were actually given preferential employm ent opportunities. Moreover, by encouraging the hiring of nearly all of the Alyeska workers at the local Fairbanks union halls, the state implicitly required that residents of other states seeking pipeline work come to Alaska to qualify for those jobs.

These three factors -- the

Local Hire Act, the hiring by the Fairbanks unions,

and the lack of adequate state planning - have been

crucial in causing the high level of in-migration

during the Alyeska boom period. Each of these factors,

and the role each has played in inducing in-migration,

is discussed in greater detail on the preceding pages.

Local hire. When the Alaska State Legislature considered the thousands of jobs which were to be created by the Alyeska Pipeline, it responded in a normal political manner. It attempted



1 to ensure that as many of those jobs as possible went to existing Alaska residents. The Local Hire Act was passed by the State Legislature in 1972, and it states tha Alaska residents must be given employment preferences in projects relating to oil/gas leases. A resident is defined as one who:

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- (1) except for brief intervals of military service has been physically in the state for a period of one year immediately prior to the time he enters into a contract for employment.
- (2) maintains a place of residence within the state.
- (3) has established a residency for voting purposes within the state, and
- 74 (4) has not within the period of required residency, 15 claimed residency in another state, and
 - (5) shows by all attending circumstances that his intent is to make Alaska his permanent residence.

13 From Section 38.40.090 of the Alaska Statute.

> Despite the very specific definition of an Alaskan resident in the Local Hire Act, the enforcement of this Act has remained a problem. Theoretically, the Fairbanks union hiring halls have been obliged to give preference in hiring to all longterm resident Alaskans as defined by the Local Hire Act. However, in practice, the unions have given preference to persons who have claimed Alaskan residency, but who have not strictly met the special qualifications of the Act. For example, traditionally the prime evidence of one's Alaska residency has simply been the possession of an Alaska driver's licence, and in order



to obtain such a licence all one had to do was to give some basic personal information such as one's name, address and birth date, and then pay a nominal fee. This can be done on the day one arrives in Alaska. Moreover, for the purpose of voting in Alaska, a new in-migrant need only live in Alaska for 30 days before he can claim his constitutional right to vote as an Alaska resident. That should be "before he or she can claim his or her constitutional right to vote as an Alaska resident."

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In order to remedy this situation of recent in-migrants, claiming to be Alaska residents, the State Department of Labour, Wages and Hours Division, in March 1974, instituted a process called the "certification of residency". A certificate is given only to those Alaskans who can satisfy the five criteria for residency set forth in the Local Hire Act. Of the five criteria, the one that the Department of Labor relies on most heavily is No. 5, that the person

"shows by all attending circumstances that his intent is to make Alaska his permanent residence."

This criterion can be satisfied in a variety of ways, such as purchasing property in Alaska, moving one's family to Alaska, putting his or her children in Alaskan schools, etc. Of course, the state's reliance on this criterion has only reinforced the historical pattern of in-migration.

Although the certification process was instituted in early 1974, the state did not initially design procedures which would ensure that



only long-term bona fide residents received job
preference. However, today in order to receive preferential treatment in the hiring of pipeline workers, a
prospective worker must present his certificate of
residency card to the union. Moreover, on March 9, 1976
the State Commissioner of Labor ordered that all resident
Alaskans, no matter how low their union seniority is,
who have received a certification of residency, must be
dispatched by the unions before any non-resident is
dispatched. As of January 31, 1976, 17,099 certification
cards had been issued by the State Departmen t of Labor.

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The percentage of resident

Alaskans working on the pipeline has been substantial.

According to the Alaska Department of Labor, the

percentage of resident Alaskans working on the pipeline
increased from 28.4% in the third quarter of 1974 to 53.9%
in the fourth quarter of 1974. - Thereafter the percentage of resident Alaskans has risen very slowly,
reaching 66.7% in the last quarter of 1975.



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These statistics may be somewhat inexact however. As stated above, the definition of who exactly is an Alaska "resident" varies depending on whether one relies on a certification of residency on a worker driver's license, or on the fact that during the last election a worker voted in Alaska. In all likelihood, since initially in-migrants were able to avoid the requirements of the Local Hire Act and still claim to be residents of Alaska, the early figures overstate the percentage of Alyeska workers who actually were one-year residents of the state. Only recently have the enforcement provisions of the Local Hire Act and the certification of residency been strengthened so as to ensure that one-year residents in fact receive employm ent preference.

However, the eventual tightening of the local hire qualification process has been too little and too late. The major hire-up period for the Alyeska pipeline was in 1974 and 1975. It was during this period that tens of thousands of residents of other states entered Alaska in search of a pipeline job. Without effective enforcement mechanisms in place during these critical years, the Local Hire Act did little to reduce the influx of Alyeska related in-migrants.

Fairbanks hiring halls. If spotty enforcement of local hire provisions encouraged in-migration, the location of Alyeska union hiring halls in Fairbanks added to the problem. The majority of Alyeska construction workers have been hired at Fairbanks hiring halls; and the location of the halls and



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the use of seniority, registration and dispatch procedures have all been factors in the Alyeska in-migration dynamic.

The heavy reliance on Fairbanks union hiring halls obviously has meant that almost all pipeline jobs have been obtained in Fairbanks and not in the lower 48. In turn, the fact that pipeline employment can be found only in Alaska and in Fairbanks in particular has reinforced the historical tendency of people to in-migrate to Alaska during periods of rapid economic development.

The union halls perform the key functions in hiring workers to the Alyeska pipeline. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Project Agreement which outlines the relationship between Alyeska and most of the relevant labor unions, stipulates that pipeline contractors shall exclusively use the local unions' job referral systems. All workers are hired by union dispatch from the local union hiring hall. All but two unions 'Pipeline Welders, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Operating Engineers, Seattle, Washington) have their local head-quarters in Fairbanks.

Membership and seniority in local unions are the primary criteria that determine who is hired through the union hiring hall. Although Part 6 of Article VI of the Pipeline System Project Agreement states that union membership shall not be a factor in determining who is hired; in fact, all of the unions use some version of the tenured or "A-B-C" classification system for job referral.



In general, the first workers hired are from the "A" or highest seniority list, the second group is from the "B" list and the final workers hired come from the "C" or lowest seniority list. Most unions use the three-category or "A-B-C" classification system, although some unions classify workers according to four or more categories.

Obviously, each union has a different variation of the "A-B-C" referral system.

What is important is that unions have been able to control who is hired by specifying both where the prospective employee has worked (or lived) in the past and the minimum number of hours worked under union jurisdiction.

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who is hired for pipeline work in other ways as well.

First, most unions require that a worker register with the union in person at the Fairbanks hiring halls.

Second, when a specific job call or dispatch is made, most of the unions require that the registered person be present at the union hiring hall. The job calls are generally made at the specified times on specified days of the week. Some — but not all — of the unions will attempt to contact a worker who has been called, but who is not present at the hiring hall when the call is made. Finally, there is a maximum 48-hour limit between the time that a contractor requests a worker for a particular position and the time that the union must dispatch a worker.



by the union hiring halls have simplified and centralized the hiring procedures and have allowed the unions to supply workers as efficiently and as quickly as possible. However, these procedures have also increased the level of inter - and intra-state migration of prospective workers to Fairbanks. Because of these procedures, prospective workers must be present at Fairbanks for registration, job calls and dispatch.

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third crucial element in the recent Alyeska induced population in-migration has been the lack of adequate state planning. Governmental planning in Alaska (as in the United States as a whole) has generally been less comprehensive than in other developed nations. In general, Alaska has relied more on private entrepeneurship and decision making to allocate resources and shape economic development. State planning in Alaska has tended to be short-term and non-comprehensive.

This fact has had much to do with the type and intensity of Alyeska induced socio-economic impacts.

In Alaska, state planning initiatives have never focused on the key element underlying most of the Alyeska impacts -- boom-related in-migration. The state passed the Local Hire Act giving employment preference to Alaska residents. Yet the state failed to create enforcement provisions that would ensure that only people who had lived in Alaska for more than one year would in fact receive this employment preference. Thus, prospective workers in-migrated



to Alaska, immediately claimed Alaska residency and, in all likelihood, many eventually found pipeline or pipeline related work. Only recently have the certification of residency provisions been strengthened sufficiently so as to guarantee preferential. hiring for bona fide one-year Alaska residents.

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In addition, by acquiescing in and encouraging the hiring of nearly all Alyeska workers out of the Fairbanks union halls, the state made it essential that people seeking pipeline work had to inmigrate to Alaska and to Fairbanks in particular. If one wanted a pipeline job, he or she had to go to Fairbanks. The fact, that, because of the Local Hire Act, these recent in-migrants did not receive job preference only exacerbated the situation. Thousands of in-migrants have travelled to Alaska in search of a pipeline job, have been unsuccessful, and have remained unemployed and dependent on a variety of state social service delivery systems.

also been inadequate in other ways. State revenue sharing with local governments and state impact assistance have failed to mitigate many Alyeska impacts. For example, though the state did authorize special impact funds for communities most seriously affected by Alyeska construction, these impact funds were not adequate.

They were designed primarily for local government operating expenses; they could be used for needed capital expenditures only if they were spent on school



construction, re-locatable classrooms and for parks and recreation. Obviously, in many communities these restrictions on the use of revenue sharing funds did not fit local impact needs.

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In summary, State of Alaska planning activities have been remedial rather than preventive. Given the massive impact caused by Alyeska induced in-migration, Alaska's remedial approach has often failed to mitigate the most serious impacts associated with pipeline development. Since the level of public services in Alaska was below the level in the lower 48 even before the Alyeska construction began, the Alyeska project has exacerbated the public service deficit in Alaska.

upon Alyeska impacts. The historical phenomenon of inmigration has been repeated during the years of the Alyeska boom. Moreover, the level of this Alyeska induced population in-migration has been increased because of deliberate policies that were primarily designed to give resident Alaskans preference for Alyeska jobs. These policies (Local Hire Act and the hiring by the Fairbanks unions) together with inadequate planning by the State, resulted in tens of thousands of people in-migrating to Alaska. It is this large-scale population increase, spurred by the Alyeska induced inmigration that has caused and shaped the negative Alyeska impacts described in Part II of this testimony.

For example, historically



during periods of boom related population in-migration, the number of unemployed in-migrants has exceeded the number of new jobs created. This historical pattern has been repeated during the Alyeska boom. The number of unemployed workers throughout the state increased from 16,400 in January, 1975 to 22,900 in January, 1976. The statewide unemployment rate also increased from 10.8% to 12.2% during this same period.

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Unemployment and unemployment rates vary significantly in Alaska over the course of a year due to extreme seasonality in unemployment.

However, the increase in unemployment in Alaska due to Alyeska can be documented, no matter what time of the year one chooses. For example, from October 1974 to October, 1975 the number of unemployed workers increased from 10,850 to 14,400. At the same time, the unemployment rate rose from 6.9% to 7.9%.

Even in Fairbanks, where pipeline activity has been the most intense, the total number of unemployed workers also increased last year.

Similarly, the current mismatch between jobs that need to be filled and the skill of the available labor pool can be directly traced to inmigration. Because of the emphasis on local or resident hire, thousands of resident Alaskans have left their jobs to take higher-paying Alyeska related jobs. In turn, the vacated jobs have been filled by recent inmigrants. But many of the recent in-migrants do not have the requisite skills needed for the vacated jobs. In other words, the emphasis on local hire and the



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ensuing in-migration of people to Alaska created a mismatch between jobs and skills. Moreover, many of the people in-migrating to Alaska are travelling to those areas of the state where there are few job openings. In URSA's recently completed in-migration report for the U.S. Department of Labor, it was found that only 21% of the in-migrants entering Alaska were travelling to Anchorage while fully 33% of the new jobs were being created in Anchorage. Similarly, 31% were headed for Fairbanks while only 24% of new jobs were located in that area.

Another of the Alyeska impacts described in Part II was the shortfall or lag between population increases and corresponding increases in tax revenues. But for the massive population in-migration, Anchorage, Fairbanks and Valdez would not have experienced the sudden population increases that they underwent between 1973 and 1975. In turn, these jurisdictions would not have needed substantial increases in tax revenues were it not for their rapid population gains. The shortfall of revenue needed to pay for public services for the new residents from the lower 48 is a direct result of the population in-migration.



The Alyeska induced in-migration

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also placed new demands on all private and public goods and services. In essence, the demand curve for these goods and services was pushed outward because of the tens of thousands of new in-migrants, while at the same time, the supply curve remained constant or inelastic. The supply of such essential goods as housing, telephones and sewer systems simply could not be expanded rapidly enough to satisfy the demands of Alaska's new residents. The housing vacancy rate in Fairbanks is approximately zero, the sewer system in Fairbanks is large enough to satisfy the needs of only the pre-boom population and complaints about the Fairbanks telephone system increased 69 percent last year while service orders actually declined 20 percent.

Another aspect of the inbalance between the demand for and the supply of private and public goods and services, is the extremely high rate of inflation in Alaska. Until the Alyeska boom the inflation rate in Alaska had actually been less than the rate for the United States as a whole. However, the cost of living in Alaska is now increasing at a far higher rate than for the nation as a whole.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, the consumer price index for Anchorage rose 13.8 percent in 1974 and 11.1 percent in 1975. The C.P.I. for the U.S. in 1975 was approximately 7 to 7 and a half percent.

I'm reminded that's from

April '75 to April '76, it's 6.1 percent so it's declini:



in the United States while it's rising or it has been almost double the rate in Alaska.

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Overall, the rapid population in-migration has meant that thousands of newly arrived people have had to be provided with necessary goods and services. Moreover, the influx of unemployed in-migrants has meant that vast amounts of public monies have had to be spent on providing costly social services.

The high rate of inflation
has meant that the dollar cost of supplying all these
goods and services has escalated rapidly and the lag
between increased tax revenues and increased population
has meant that new resources of public financing have
had to be found.

Given the demand for goods and services by a vastly increased state population, it is easily understandable why state expenditures from the general fund, unrestricted revenue, grew from 204.0 million in the fiscal year 1971 to 333.3 million in the fiscal year 1975 and is projected to grow to 674.4 million in the fiscal year 1977. This growth in state expenditures has financed a rapid expansion in state and local government employment. State government employment alone has grown from an average of 10,300 in 1970 to 15,400 in 1975 and local government employment has grown from 8,100 to 13,400 during the same period.

The increase in state expenditure has also meant that the 900 million dollars that the state of Alaska received from the sale of oil and gas



leases at Prudhoe Bay would be spent quickly and in fact, as of spring, 1976, all of the 900 million dollars had been spent. Although it was logical and politically inevitable for the state to spend this 900 million dollars in lease monies for new services in a time of major impact, instead of investing the funds, or placing them in a permanent fund, the expenditure by the state accentuated the inflationary pressures generated by the Alyeska project.

Finally, the pay-off or benefit resulting from the expenditure by the state, of the 900 million dollars, was seriously diminished by the large scale population in-migration. The monies were spent providing new services or simply maintaining old ones to an expanded state population, instead of improving quality and quantity of services to an existing population.

Once again, the Alyeska induced population in-migration was responsible for diminishing the positive aspects of the Alyeska project and accentuating the negative.

In summary, virtually all of the socio-economic impacts associated with the Alyeska project, inflation, shortages of vital goods and services revenue shortfalls, are tied to recent and massive population increases. Clearly, far more than 56,000 people entered the state as in-migrants during the two year Alyeska hire boom in 1974 and 1975. To understand the Alyeska impacts therefore, it is essential to understand the historic in-migration dynamic of

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Alaska, a dynamic grounded on a boom psychology in which residents of the lower 48 have traditionally thought of Alaska as a place in which quick fortunes can be made. A dynamic accentuated by the location of hiring halls for the Alyeska project in Fairbanks and most importantly, a dynamic which was not mitigated by careful state planning before the Alyeska project began.

The impacts caused by the construction of the Alyeska pipeline can be understood only if placed within the socio-economic context of Alaska, and the most important factor in Alaska's socio-economic environment is the recurring historical phenomenon of population in-migration. This phenomenon has once again taken place during the years of peak Alyeska construction.

The level of Alyeska induced population in-migration from the lower 48 has been unintentionally, but nevertheless greatly increased because of policies which were intended to give resident Alaskans employment preference in the hiring of Alyeska workers. The Local Hire Act and the role of the Fairbanks unions made it essential that people in the lower 48 who desired Alyeska jobs in-migrate to Alaska simply because most of the pipeline jobs which were available could, in fact, only be secured in Alaska.

the problems caused by in-migration by not foreseeing that the very policy that it favoured, a poorly enforced Local Hire Act and a hiring by the Fairbanks unions would

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also cause negative impacts. Moreover, the state's remedial efforts that were designed to mitigate the impacts of the large scale in-migration, such as special impact assistance funds and the certification of else residency were either seriously flawed or implemented too late to be truly effective.

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The large scale Alyeska induced in-migration led directly to the negative impacts which were described in part two of this testimony and which are well known throughout the United States and Canada. The high rate of employment, the mismatch between the skills of the in-migrants and the skills needed to fill existing jobs, the lag between increased public expenditures and increased tax revenues, the strain placed on the supply of a variety of private and public goods and services and finally the high rate of inflation in Alaska, all can be traced to the recent population in-migration.

In short, one must be extremely careful about saying that the Alyeska project caused certain impacts in Alaska. The impacts described in part two of this testimony were critically shaped and controlled by the entire socio-economic environment of Alaska. If there had been no large scale population in-migration, the impacts associated with the Alyeska project would have been far different.

It is not correct to assume that a pipeline construction project in the Northwest Territories will necessarily produce the same impacts as did Alyeska. What is crucial in determining the



Weinstein, Weinstein, Boorkman, Trusty...

impacts of any comparable project, is the entire socioeconomic environment of the area in which the project is to be built.

economic environment of the Northwest Territories is different from Alaska's, both the impacts associated with any future construction project and the policy that should be formulated in order to mitigate possible negative impacts will also be different, thus, any analysis of pipeline impacts in the Northwest Territories must address such questions as, what is the socio-economic context in the Northwest Territories? Does the Northwest Territories have a historic in-migration dynamic similar to that of Alaska. Given past experience, will a major construction project in the Northwest Territory lead to large scale in-migration? Will the hiring for the pipeline project occur in the Northwest Territories?

Alaska to the Northwest Territories and the Arctic Gas project Mr. Boorkman has described the complex cause effect relationships that exist in Alaska with respect to the impacts that are commonly attributed to the Alyeska project. Implicit in his presentation is the fact that it is dangerous to ignore or downgrade the importance of the socio-economic setting in which a project takes place and the various dynamic elements that ultimately determine both the positive and the negative effects. The obvious danger is that of leaping to the conclusion that impacts of the kind

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and magnitude experienced in Alaska would automatically result from a comparable project in the Mackenzie Valley. More important is the fact that a failure to properly appreciate the real cause effect relationships in Alaska can lead to a failure to develop and implement the policies and procedures that may be required to ensure that an Alaska type situation does not develop in the Mackenzie Valley.

Much of the testimony that will be presented by subsequent panels will provide the basis for our view, that the Arctic Gas project will not create an Alaska type situation in the Mackenzie Valley. This is not to say that some of the same kinds of impacts will not be present. Rather, we believe that in view of the basic differences between the two regions and the projects themselves, and with the implementation of appropriate measures, the magnitude and therefore the seriousness of those impacts that could occur will be greatly reduced.

Since subsequent testimony
will deal in detail with specific impacts and mitigative
measures, I would like at this point to focus on the
question posed at the end of Mr. Boorkman's testimony
with regard to the socio-economic context in the
Mackenzie Valley, particularly the question of massive
in-migration that has been so critical in the case
of Alaska.

To properly round out the picture, I will also be noting the key mitigative measures that will be dealt with in detail at a later stage.



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Since much of the basic socio-economic context material has been presented in one form or another by other witnesses, or is relatively well known to the participants and to you sir, I will be brief.

Population and in-migration.

As Dr. Hobart pointed out, the population of the Northwest Territories has grown steadily since the early 1900's to a level about six times what it was 60 years ago. The components of this growth have included a relatively high rate of natural increase, particularly among native residents, plus in-migration from southern Canada. However, there have been very few surges in this growth due to in-migration and no declines as a result of out-migration. In fact, analyzing the period 1941 to 1955 and five year periods from 1951 through 1971, it is apparent that only in 1941 to 1951 did in-migration exceed natural increases as a component of population growth.

The in-migration that has occurred has not been insignificant relative to the total population. The key point, however, is that in-migration of new residents as opposed to transients has been geared primarily to long term development activities, for example, as Dr. Hobart pointed out, in-migration was associated with the opening of the Yellowknife and Echo Bay mines. Similarly, there was in-migration associated with the growth in the transportation sector.

In recent years the occurrance



In other words, there has not been rapid and massive in-migration of permanent residents with resultant unemployment and unmanageable pressures of the type experienced in Alaska.

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There have, of course, been resource development and other projects that have required large numbers of transient workers from the south. Evidence on this type of transient in-migration has already been placed before the Inquiry with respect to the Yukon and the building of the Alaska Highway. Similar situations existed in the case of the DEW Line and most recently the petroleum industry activities in the delta region.

Again, however, the situation has been very much different than that in Alaska.

Unlike Alaska, transient workers in the Canadian north have operated primarily from construction camps, did not establish residency status, and left the region at the completion of a project.

and critical difference in the Canadian north as compared to Alaska are many and varied. Perhaps most important is the fact that the Canadian northern frontier is contiguous to the entire country. Not only are the majority of Canadians relatively close to the northern frontier, but projects are continually being undertaken in one area or another. This is in comparison to the isolation of Alaska relative to the lower 48 states. As a result, the Canadian north does not seem to have the same romantic connotation of a last frontier, with the



corresponding tendency to attract a larger number of in-migrants from outside than justified by the size of a specific undertaking.

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Furthermore, the relative distances result in southern centres such as Edmonton performing the logistics and supply functions that in Alaska are performed by Anchorage and Fairbanks.

Apart from its effect on directly limiting in-migration to the north, the southern orientation of the supply function tends to discourage the relocation of businesses to the north, and therefore further limits in-migration.

Even though Arctic Gas will be procuring some goods and services locally, a subject that we will go into in greater detail at a later stage, the basic north-south linkages will not change rapidly.

In general, the factors that have in the past prevented massive Alaska-type inmigration can be expected to continue in the future.

In addition, Arctic Gas intends to attempt to directly limit in-migration during the construction phase by requiring that all non-residents are hired only in southern centres. This policy and related measures with respect to camps and the movement of personnel to and from the north on rotation or at the end of a construction season, will be presented in detail by a subsequent panel.

We are not taking the position that there will be no in-migration to the region as a result of the project. In fact, a subsequent panel will deal specifically with the anticipated growth of the



major communities following pipeline construction. Again, there will be policies that can be implemented by ARctic Gas and the producers to ensure that the growth rates are of manageable proportions. We are, however, convinced that the massive in-migration phenomenon experienced by Alaska will not prevail in the Mackenzie Valley. This has a direct consequence with respect to the occurrence and likely magnitude of the type of impacts that Mr. Boorkman has shown to be a result of in-migration in Alaska.

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The role of government. other crucial difference between Alaska and the Canadian north is the role of government. In recent years, government has been and will continue for some time to come to be the most dominant influence on the pattern of growth in the Northwest Territories. Self-determination in government has grown steadily but slowly in the past decade, but effective control, either directly or fiscally over most important governmental decisions remains in Ottawa. The result has been a relatively closed planned economy, characterized by a high level of government participation in any activity. Growth has been steady over time, with government expenditures the leading economic growth sector. Recently this has been due in the main to federal policies for the north . Which call for upgrading of services and the quality . of life to southern standards.

.. :: The process of government in 29 the Northwest Territories is heavily subsidized by the more affluent parts of Canada, with annual expenditures



on public services far outstripping annual revenues from all forms of taxation. The division of such revenue-producing powers that exist is such that the bulk of direct taxation revenue goes to the Federal Government. Since the pattern of growth has been so tightly controlled and carefully managed, one result has been a relatively high level of government planning capacity in both the Territorial and the Federal Governments, and in communities through the use of consultants. But more significant has been the widespread acceptance of the importance of planned growth. Therefore unlike some of the Alaskan communities, communities in the Territories even the larger more commercially oriented, are conscious of impacts of large-scale development and seem willing to forego some economic activity in order to avoid harmful impacts.

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An example of the control process in the Northwest Territories can be seen by examining disposition of land, one of the primary factors of production. Land, with the exception of a minute quantity within the boundaries of organized settlements, is almost totally controlled by one level of government or another, and private ownership is difficult to acquire. Municipal, Territorial and Federal Governments' control over all forms of development in the Territories, especially in relation to land ownership and usage both outside and along the pipeline corridor — the Area Development Ordinance — will tend to discourage, if not restrict, the number of in-migrants attracted to the Northwest Territories. Leasing or buying residential



land is much more complex and restrictive in the
Territories than in Alaska; the Federal and Territorial
Governments are major initiators and customers of
new housing and landlords of existing housing stock,
thus controlling the rental market both in availability
and price; and generally, the dominant presence of both
levels of government in most aspects of personal and
business life will not only tend to limit the number of
migrants to the Territories, but also to directly
affect inflationary level of service and other
effects.

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Another evidence of government presence in the area of planning, a considerable amount of which has already taken place to identify the type and extent of impact on the communities in the Mackenzie Valley region arising out of hydrocarbon activities in general and the gas pipeline construction in particular. Further, there are master plans for the major communities which set guidelines for land use — if a request does not conform with that plan there is little or no hope of approval. The Territorial Government planners may impose certain restrictions on growth, or impose a type of zoning even if the local zoning by-laws would not preclude a particular development.

This commitment to and emphasis on preplanning will not only identify expected shortfalls in community and other public services, but also provide the necessary lead time to take corrective action by all of the parties concerned.

Overall, the situation with



respect to the role of government and the restrictions
on the private sector in the Canadian north are in sharp
contrast to the situation described by Mr. Boorkman.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Boorkman and Mr. Trusty, for a most comprehensive discussion of what has occurred in Alaska, and tentative indication of the contrasts in the Northwest Territories.

Well, I think we should stop for coffee for a few minutes and then we'll continue the discussion.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR A FEW MINUTES)



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler

(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT)

MR. SCOTT: Mr. Lutes?

MR. LUTES: We have no questions.

MR. SCOTT: Mr. Sigler?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SIGLER:

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0 Mr. Boorkman, on page three, you give the population figures for three of the communities for Fairbanks, Anchorage and Valdez. I wonder if you could first of all fill me in on the type of system that there is for municipal government in the State of Alaska? For example, are each of those three communities municipalities?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Yes.

Do they -- I take it that each of them have an elected council for their municipal+ ity?

> A Yes.

0 I wonder if you could explain to the Inquiry how the municipal budgeting system works in municipalities in Alaska?

Well, it varies considerably. One of the things that characterizes all Alaskan communities is that because of the size of the state, the small population and the diversity of that small population over an enormous face, you have a lot of areas in which there is no local government. As a result, the State of Alaska provides more -- exercises functions and provides services that normally would be provided in the lower 48 by local government.

For instance, the State

Department of Education has a much more direct role in



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Fxam by Sigler

the running of schools than does the State of California's school system. You don't have local school districts in every community. You don't have the same local autonomy. The same is true of the budgeting process. There is less of local services provided through the local budget. As a result, the local -- is that the midnight sun?-- local government functions tend to be somewhat less important in Alaska than they are in other states.

I'm not familiar with all the details of local budgeting in those three areas. I do know that you have regional planning functions in some of the larger communities. For instance, there is a planning department for the Anchorage area which covers not just the city but the borough. There is a Borough Planning Commission in Fairbanks as well which has borough -wide responsibilities. You have a Borough Council, you have a local city government as well.

Alaska is all somewhat unique. You have boroughs which there is no real equivalent for in the lower 48. They are not countries in the sense that we have country government. In many areas, they are much larger.

They are like regional governments. For instance, the North Slope Borough in the northern part of the state which is roughly co-terminus with the jurisdiction of the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation is a new local government having a vast area -- I forget how many square miles -- it is an enormous area that is under one

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Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler

Borough Government and a Borough Assembly is the policy making body up there. You'd also have, for instance, a Borough School Pistrict.

So, I can't tell you specifically about the budgeting process in each of the communities.

There is a local budget.

Q Well say for Fairbanks.

Is it a local council there or is it a more of a regional council that governs that city?

A As I said, probably the main -- the key actor in the Fairbanks area is the Borough Assembly. The Fairbanks North Star Borough has more than jurisdiction over just the city. It's a regional area around the city and it has taxing power and it has jurisdiction over various municipal functions.

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
Q Is it an elected council that governs that?

A Yes and there is a borough mayor. Now, there is also a city government. It has a city manager, a city council. So you have, as in the United States where you do have country government, you have over-lapping juridictions.

 \mathbb{Q} Would both of them have taxing power say?

A Yes, they both do. Yes. There is a city sales tax and a borough sales tax and a property tax in the borough.

be a borough budget drawn up by the Borough Council.



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Fxam by Sigler

A Yes -- Borough Assembly.

Q As well, there would be

a City budget drawn up by the City Council?

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We made reference in our testimony to the fact that certain municipal services don't exist outside of the city -- such as, fire protection, sewage, water.

So that some services are only the responsibility of be the city government while others would the responsibility of only the Borough Government. Schools for instance are a borough-wide function. The city plays no role in developing school policy.

As in most of the rest of the United States, they have tried with somewhat erratic results in Alaska to separate functions according to the population being served. Regional functions tend to be the responsibility of a Borough Government where local municipal functions would tend to be the responsibility of the city government.

Q Was this system of boroughs and cities in place before the pipeline boom started?

A Yes, the system was in place. Not all the boroughs were in place.

Q Has the system of local government been changed any during the course of the recent --

A Yes. They've re-organized into different classes of local government than they used to. They used to have four classes of city and now they only have two. The borough in the City of



Anchorage became unified, so there had been changes but the basic system has not been altered.

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Q I'm interested particularly in Valdez in that its size is more directly related to the size of the communities we have here such as Fort Simpson.

A Yes.

Q Now, when the projected population growths of communities like Fort Simpson may be similar to the type of growth that places such as Valdez have experienced. How would Valdez be classed? Is it a town or city?

I have never been to Α Our primary focus has been Valdez nor have any of us. the Arctic Gas pipeline proposal and not Alyeska's. I believe it is a first-class city. One distinction of course is that much of the impact in Valdez is as a result of the terminal facility that they are building there which may or may not -- I don't know where you are going to have facilities in the Northwest Territories but that clearly is -- if you're talking about the major impetus for impact in Valdez which is the stupendous growth in its population, it has been because of its location as the terminus for the Alyeska pipeline system and the place from which all trans-shipment of oil will be made.


WITNESS TRUSTY: If I can just interject another point about Valdez that may be important is that the original community of Valdez was wiped out in the earthquake and the new townsite



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty

Cross-Exam by Sigler is differently located than the old townsite. So you essentially had a drastic change because of what happened in the physical plan . Now, I can't comment on whether the governmental structure changed but certainly the physical plan was changed completely. But it would have its Q 7 own city council? WITNESS BOORKMAN: Yes. Q As well in the Borough? 10 There is a city manager. 11 It has a City Council and a city manager who is the 12 chief adminstrating officer of the city council and who 13 has responsibilities for preparing local budgets and 14 setting local priorities. 15 Now, is the local budgeting 0 16 " done on an annual basis or --17 I don't know. I assume A 13 it is. It is in all other parts of Alaska that I am 19 familiar with. 20 Q So, in Alaska the municipal-21 ity would set a budget from year to year? 22 So does the State, unfortuna-A 23 tely. 24 Is there any provision 0 25 there for a 26 Of course, the capital A 27 improvement budget may be a multi-year budget. If 28 you're talking about operating --29 I'm talking about operating 0

budgets.



A Yes. Right.

Q Is there any provision

under the legislation for more long-term budgeting being done by municipalities, say two, three year operating budgets?

Α I'm guessing because as I say, I don't know and I have not been to Valdez. I would imagine they have that power. Whether or not they do it, I would be doubtful given the experience of other local governments in Alaska and the State Government itself, it's very doubtful that they do more than year to year budgeting. One of the problems that clearly occurred in Alaska was that the State Department is responsible for key social service delivery systems such as the Department of Education and Department of Health and Social Services in the pre-Alyeska impact period -say 1970 to 1973-- did not do long-term planning. They were still budgeting for the most part on a one year budget cycle and there was some talk about doing a five-year plan or at least a two-year plan but nothing much ever came of it. That of course restricted the State's ability to respond in an anticipatory way to pipeline impact and to have a preventative rather than a remedial approach.

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and the hours of work.

Now, we'll just go in the

Certainly.

Would you say that a

Yes, we were checking

order that you gave the points in evidence in chief. Turn to page 5 where you start talking about labor shortages and labor costs. I wonder if you'd be able to comment, anybody on the panel, just how much higher the workers wage scale is for say Alyeska/as compared to nonpipeline jobs with similar types of work?

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lack of long-term budgeting by government has been one

could remember the average hourly thing, to see if we we cannot. I'm sure we can find that somewhere but I think the key issue/needs to be recalled,/it's not the wage scale per se that causes the difficulties. are wages that on an hourly basis paid to a person involved in direct or indirect construction activity may be higher than municipal employees certainly, but the issue and the reason the people can make such enormous salaries in Alaska is because of the structure of the working week, or the work period. You work, as you know, in many construction jobs, seven days a week and many, many hours a day, 10 or 12 hours a day, and the overtime payments that are accrued both as straight overtime and as working on weekends where you may get double time, time and a half-double time, are enormous.

Q It's mainly by the shifts



1	A Right. Alaska's salaries
No.	tend to be higher generally than they are in the lower
, ,	48, as you know. I am reminded that the average wage
r t	scale paid by Alyeska tends to be the upper range of
5	what is paid by other firms or entities, organizations,
f	hiring in a category, construction workers, for
end	instance. It's certain select jobs that get a lot
3	of notoriety for being paid an enormous amount more
C)	than any other similar work, for instance cooks in
10	some of the service companies that provide food and
11	cook food for the pipeline workers, cooks are probably
12 '	paid I'm guessing again three to four times
13	as muc h as any other cook in the State of Alaska.
_4	But that tends to be the
15	exception rather than the rule.
16	Q Well, talking specificall
17	of a shortage that might be of interest to my client,
13	who are the municipalities in the Territories, what
19	effect has it had on the has there been a labor
2)	shortage for the Municipal Governments as well?
21	A Yes. As we said in the
22	testimony, one of the things you have are sort of a
23	double, a two-part process:
24	(1) a drawing away of local government employees.
25	There was a time I frankly don't know if this has
26	been remediated recently, but there was a time when
27	it was very difficult to keep local police in
28	Fairbanks or a State Trooper Station staffed because
29	there were tremendous aalaries to be made by working
30	for the private security forces protecting the Alyeska



1	Dipoline so thatis sourced a municipal control of
21	Pipeline, so that's caused a municipal problem. We
ن	had discussions in the preparation of our testimony
,	and our reports for Arctic Gas with members of local
4	government in Fairbanks in particular, we spent a
5	lot of time with the borough mayor and the city
6	manager and one of the things they anticipated before
7	the pipeline impact hit and one of the things that
3	certainly came true and which I think everybody who
g	looked at it predicted was that there would be a
0	drain-off of local municipal employee skilled labor
1	and the second part of the problem is, as I said it was
2	two-part, is that the people who came into the state,
.3	this enormous influx of in-migrants, often didn't have the
.4	skills to fill those vacant jobs, and I suppose in
.5	terms of long-term impact even to the extent that they
.5	did fill those vacated jobs, there's going to come a
7	crunch when Alaska residents who have been working
8	for Alyeska no longer have those jobs, when Alyeska
.9	construction is over and they go home expecting to
20	get their old job back, sort of the returning veterans,
21	syndrome where someone has taken their job and there may be
22	dislocations caused by wanting to go home to your old
23	job and finding it's been filled for three years and
24 1	people weren't very happy when they left in the first
25	place. So those kinds of things do cause problems to
26	local governments, to be sure.
27	O I was going to ask you

of the City of Fairbanks for providing police services, and you touched on it just briefly.

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A That's about all I know.



I am reminded the police chief resigned in Fairbanks.

I don't have any details.

Q Would anybody on the panel be able to relate, say, how many policemen were serving Fairbanks before the Alyeska boom, and how many police officers they require now?

A It's in our report, if we could get our report out of the upstairs library. I don't happen to have it with me.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Bring it back in the afternoon if you've got it.

report, our large yellow volume on socio-economic impact in Alaska, as I recall, had figures that were accurate as of late '73 in terms of the size of the Police Force in the city and the State Trooper Force in Fairbanks. I believe we can give you those figures. I don't have, frankly, the figures on how many people -- what the turnover rate was, but I know it was a problem.

Q Mr. Boorkman, did Arctic

Gas ask you to read the evidence of Magistrate Sprecker

who gave evidence at Whitehorse last August about his

own experience, speaking as a magistrate, not as a

sociologist or anything else?

A Yes, we saw that evidence.

Q Well, he suggested that the figures showing an increase in the crime rate, which appear to conform to the increase in population



in a rough way, might well not be truly representative because he said there was a tendency for the State

Troopers to leave law enforcement within the camps to the company itself, that is you had a kind of private law enforcement, and unless someone got murdered within the camp, the State Troopers were not brought in. His argument being that the company did not want to incur the enmity of the workers in the camps, so that matters such as theft -- I think there had been theft of many thousands of dollars worth of equipment from each camp -- were overlooked and other matters rather more serious were overlooked. I hope I'm roughly reproducing what he said, but do you have any comment on that? Is that a --

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A Yes, I think there are a couple of things that need to be said about that. One is a local impact question, and the other is probably a question of public policy, and in terms of local impact I just happen to have a reference from his testimony. On page 7223 of his testimony he indicated that the crime increase in Glennallen has not risen as fast as the population has, so in terms of local impact of the pipeline on crime rates, it's had less than a major impact. That doesn't really --

Q Excuse me, Mr. Boorkman, why don't you consider the matter over lunch, if you wish and --

A I can finish in 15 seconds:
The other question is a matter of public policy, who
you've referred to. Who is the law and what is the



law enforcement agency, and if I hear you correctly and if I remember his testimony accurately, he's suggesting that the company is setting up a private Police Force, essentially, and is setting up guidelines which may or may not be made explicit as to what crimes will be dealt with and what will be shrugged off or where people will reprimanded and warned but not have any report made to the local Police Department. I think in terms of community impacts, that has no impact on the local community. As a matter of public policy, one could certainly have an interesting discussion about whether or not one wants to delegate that function to a private company, and if so, in what cases, and what kind of guidelines need to be set out. But I don't think that there's any -- we have to distinguish whether we're talking about really seriously impacting a community in a negative way 18 1 causing a major increase in crime which appears not 19 . to have happened there, or whether or not we're concerned about the delegation of law enforcement responsibilities to a private company, and without careful regulation, I suppose and there's one other thing which I'm sure everyone here is familiar with, and that is that there was a series of articles in the Los Angeles "Times" which caused some stir in Alaska which made it sound as though everything from caterpillars to the pipe itself was being stolen with great rapidity and alarming proportions and I don't have any better data on that than anyone else because we've reported the crime statistics we were able to find, and one could argue that there is

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not all cover-up and the companies, it's not in their interest to admit all the crime that's taking place but I have watched the medias, I'm sure you have, and if 60 Minutes and some other programs have tried to probe the L.A. "Times" reports to see if they seem to be valid, and a number of those reports have indicated that they couldn't find such a crime wave as the L.A. "Times" story had indicated, and I frankly don't know. I do know that there was an L.E.A.A. -- L.E.A.A. is the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, it's the funding arm of our Department of Justice and provides monies for local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to increase the quality of criminal justice and crime prevention, and I do know they looked into the matter but as far as I know there's been no documentation of any crime wave. Which is not to say there may not be isolated incidences in which crimes have been covered up by the company, but I have no independent knowledge of those.

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THE COMMISSIONER: I appreciate that you're here to talk about community impact, but I wanted to know whether you had any comment on that, what you described as delegating law enforcement to a private company, and if this pipeline is built, this Inquiry has to lay down recommendations relating to what goes on in the camps as well as in the communities.

A On a policy position, just to state my own preference in the matter, I think that there may well be advantages to delegating certain types of security and law enforcement activities but




that clearly those would have to be very carefully guided by stipulations and policy requirements by a policy-making body. The Territorial Government, the National Government. You want to know what's happening and under what circumstances local enforcement delegation is going to happen and where it's not. You have to set up guidelines to make sure it happens a vay that in 'is consistent with public policy.

THE COMMISSIONER: O.K., well let's adjourn for lunch till 2, and then we'll carry on.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO 2 P.M.)

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1 (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT)

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MR. LUTES: Mr. Commissioner,

before cross-examination of this panel continues, I wonder if I could just get a matter onto the record.

As you are aware, the construction plan at Foothills has been amended to provide for construction from a gravel pad in the north 50 miles of the proposed Foothills pipeline. In addition there have been two other significant amendments to the construction plan. One of which provides for a conversion from methanol testing to hot water testing and the second involves the relocation of certain of our construction camps.

the National Energy Board to reflect these changes in the plan. Amendments to our application are now being prepared and should be filed by the end of this month. When the hearing was on its southern tour in Calgary, Arctic Gas advised the Commission that they intended to call a panel of construction experts at some time during the hearing. It's my purpose, really, to inquire whether the Commission wishes us to recall our construction panel to speak to these amendments, and if so whether that could be done at the same time as the Arctic Gas panel of construction experts appear

I think the reason that's appropriate is that the determination to build a gravel pad in the north 50 miles, in part, reflects our opinion that the construction across the North Slope by Arctic Gas is impractical in its present form.



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THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I

understood that your proposal now was to construct that
-- the most northerly 50 miles of the Foothills line
in summer, am I right?

MR. LUTES: It would be -- it would not be a winter operation, it would be in late -- I'm not sure whether it's late summer, I think it would be in the late months of the summer, yes.

for the reasons that drove you to that conclusion, you will argue that Arctic Gas's proposal for winter construction of the Alaska supply line from the international boundary to the delta and across the delta cannot be built in winter, and that an allweather gravel road will have to be built in any event.

Well, it seems to me that that's an important issue that goes to the question whether Arctic Gas's environmental safeguards proposed for the northern Yukon and the delta, two areas which I think are regarded as the most sensitive from an environmental point of view, along the whole route. Since it goes to the question whether their programme of environmental safeguards is sound or not, I think we should hear from your witnesses, that is to tell us why they changed their minds and then hear Arctic Gas's answer to that. I don't think I should say anything more about it. I think I should leave it to Mr. Scott and counsel of the two companies, to figure out the occasion for the calling of that evidence, but it's very important, apart from just the question of -- just



1.	the engineering questions involved. It has very great
á.,	bearing on the whole environmental programme because
3 -	if you are right, then Arctic Gas's proposed pipeline
A.	is one that cannot be built unless at any rate, it
·, .	cannot be built and the environment safeguard at the
(same time along the north coast and across the delta,
7	so we better hear about that.
8	I'll leave it to Mr. Scott
9	and Mr. Steeves and you to discuss it.
10	MR. LUTES: I think the
11	appropriate time when that might come forward.
12	MR. STEEVES: Mr. Commissioner
13	can I respectfully suggest there is something you could
14	do, which would, I think, assist in the matter. I
15	suggest that you give a direction now that all of the
16 }	parties who have any evidence to call on this issue
17	call it at a date to be fixed by counsel, so that we're
18	not getting bits and pieces.
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Oh yes.
20	MR. LUTES: That's what I woul
21	like to do.
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I
23	certainly agree with you.
24	MR. STEEVES: So, direct, if
25	you would?
26 -	THE COMMISSIONER: If there's
27	only the two of you who have any evidence
23	MR. STEEVES: Well, I'm not
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sure of that.

THE COMMISSIONER: If the others



Weinstein, Weinstein, Boorkman, Trusty

have any, I would be amazed if they didn't bring it forward at the same time. That's what I'd like you to do and I'm sure you'll discover Mr. Scott, who's paying close attention to this discussion will hold the same view.

MR. SCOTT: I am right up to date on reading the transcripts, Mr. Commissioner, I'll know tomorrow morning what's been said and will act accordingly.

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`	THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse me
4	a minute Mrs. MacQuarrie. By the way, let me just say
;	to counsel that when we come to that evidence, I am
4	interested in the reasons why Foothills changed their
5	minds, and I am interested in whatever Arctic Gas has
6	to say about Foothills' reasons. But I am not interested
7	in going back to square one and reviewing the history
3	of northern engineering at length. You can take it
9	that I have in my mind everything that has been said
10	so far about engineering and construction.
11 11	Well, Mrs. MacQuarrie, you
12	wanted to say something?
13	MRS. MaçQUARRIE: I didn't
14	want to wait until tomorrow morning when I read the
15	transcripts to be up date on just what was said. I
16	wonder, were you referring to the evidence with regard
1 7	to the construction in the winter or whatever, rather
18	than this particular panel?
] (THE COMMISSIONER: Right and
20 ;	I don't think that the well, at any rate, you know
21	what we were talking about and there it is.
22	Mr. Sigler, you were cross-
2 1	examining.
n 4 .	MR. SIGLER: Yes, before we
2.5	adjourned for the lunch break Mr. Commissioner, I was
26	asking a few questions about the providing of
27	THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse me

Mr. Sigler, I forgot to say that Professor Jackson

has obtained a movie prepared by the BBC about pot-

latching on Vancouver Island, a custom of the native



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people of British Columbia and is showing the film here this evening at 8 -- at 8:30 so you are all invited and certainly you, our visitors from the United States are most cordially invited too. It has nothing to do with the Inquiry, so you don't have to bring your notebooks.

So, carry on Mr. Sigler.

MR. SIGLER: Yes. I was

asking questions generally about the provision of police services in the municipalities, and how the general labor shortage and labor costs have affected the abilities of municipalities such as Fairbanks to provide their police services.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Could I clarify something that came up that we said we would report back on? We found a copy of our yellow volume, "The Socio-Economic Impact Analysis for Alaska". There are a couple of points on that that maybe I can make very quickly.

This data was gathered as I said at the end of 1973, fall and winter, and so some of it may be out of date. As I have said, we have not monitored all developments since then, so I can't tell you in each case what has changed and what is the same. But of the 116 municipalities in the State of Alaska, only 25 provide police services in terms of one or more full-time officers. I have mentioned the role of the Division of State Troopers and in particular in the Fairbanks area, again as of the end of 1973, the



Fairbanks Police Department had a total personnel payroll of 71. Of those 50 were sworn officers. They had an auxiliary police unit of 21 persons with its own command structure which supported the Fairbanks police. In addition, in emergencies, they draw on the police forces or law enforcement or military police services of Fort Wainwright and Eielson Air Force Base.

The F.B.I. has a local office in Fairbanks and the Bureau of Customs does as well.

There is a Trooper Detachment in the Fairbanks area which had 24 troopers, one officer, seven judicial service staff members, ll operations and four technical services personnel and that detachment had law enforcement responsibilities, not only in the Fairbanks North Star Borough but through the interior of Alaska. I can't give you the precise jurisdictional limits, but I do know they serve communities outside the Borough.

Q So then before the Alyeska boom really was underway, Fairbanks had a well established police force?

A Oh yes. Oh yes. As the second largest city in the State, it did.

Q Their police service is available to Fairbanks in '73 then were the city police plus the 24 State Troopers plus the F.B.I. who had an officer as well?

A Yes. The F.B.I. of course would have jurisdiction only in federal crimes.

Q What kind of police services were there in Valdez before the -- say at that

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time? Do you know?

A I just lost my book. I don't know. I assume that there were -- I think there was one trooper in Valdez and I am not sure about local police police -- municipal functions. Let me see if it is in here. It may not be.

It does not say in here. I am sorry. As I recall, Valdez had a small City Police Force but I can't give you a definitive answer.

Q Do you have any figures to show how many police are serving the communities say today or more recently than '73?

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A No, I don't.

Q Do you know how the

municipalities finance their Municipal Police Forces there? Are grants available for the state for that service?

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The State of Alaska has revenue-sharing in various service areas, and local jurisdictions get money from the State Government on a revenue-sharing basis, on the basis of some units which is logical to that service type, for instance highway money goes to local governments, on the basis of so much per mile of road that the local government maintains. In most social service delivery areas, it's done on a per capita basis. So Valdez would get money based on its population and for various services from police to -- I should say too, they're also going to use local funds in addition to the revenue-sharing grant they get. One of the things that's happening now is that in parts of the state they're trying to establish a special census which will have implications for revenue-sharing purposes both within the state and nationally.

asked about the labor shortage and labor costs, that it was more a matter of hours of work and shifts that were worked than the actual pay rate being that much higher. The basic hourly rate isn't necessarily any higher, but the amount of time worked by everybody leads to a higher income with overtime and number of hours they do work.



A In most areas that's

true, yes.

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What consultations, if any, Alyeska had with the say government as a large employer, or other large employers in the state prior to the project getting under way? How were the shifts established in the first place, because it seems this is the cause — the major cause of any problems throughout your evidence, is the differential in the labor costs has led to other problems especially for government in terms of keeping their own employees. Were they consulted at all ahead of time?

As I understand it, and really this question should be directed to the planners of the Alyeska Pipeline, but as I understand it, the shifts were set up in such a way as to build a pipeline as fast as humanly possible. As we all know, it was delayed a number of years and that in itself caused some dislocations that we've identified in our analysis of the false boom. So the need to build a pipeline efficiently, quickly and with the maximum amount of labor being committed, in the minimum amount of time was the motivating force for Alyeska. We're not aware of discussions that they had with local governmen ts to say what kind of dislocations are our shifting policies going to have on your municipal employees. There may have been such discussions, I'm simply not aware of them. Of course, the state was a signatory to some of the agreements that led up to the



Alyeska project, but I don't think that that could be characterized as careful impact assessment in advance and then trying to mitigate it. That's one of the thrusts of our testimony.

mentioned the high Alyeska wages and I think Mr. Boorkman talked about the fact that the wages were at the upper end, let's say, of the existing pay scale, but they weren't that unreasonable, that out of line with existing wages, that the major cause of inflation has been the overtime pay.

I'd just like to stress that the Alyeska wages were high, but they weren't really out of line with other high wages in the state, and to the extent that a wage scale is dependent on the margin of productivity of a worker or workers, the productivity of a pipeline worker is in all likelihood far higher than the productivity, the marginal value of other workers — say government worker or service station attendant, or whatever. So in many ways the high Alyeska wages were in effect justified in an economic sense.

Q But am I to take it from your evidence so far that if the work shifts had been planned differently, a lot of these problems might have been avoided?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: I'm sorry, what problems are you referring to now? Are you talking about --



Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler

arisen throughout the state, in other words if --

didn't make any more money in a pipeline related job there wouldn't be any inducement to leave your job.

I mean there are a lot of motivational factors that go into why a person leaves an existing job to take a pipeline job. One of them can be money. We tried to point out in our discussion of in-migration that another is the romance, there's no other word for it, of a pipeline project. It tends to signify something to people that may not simply be economic. It may be, "I want to be able to say to my grandchildren that I helped build the Alyeska Pipeline."

Q Surely --

A People in American history in the past would talk to their grandchildren about building railroads across the west.

Q Surely, but it's laid out in your evidence that this has been the most serious of problems, a lot of the social problems have arisen from the labor shortages and surely there must be lessons to be drawn and planning that can be done here to avoid such a problem happening here. I'd like to hear from you, not only the problem but what recommendations you might make to avoid this problem occurring here. What kind of planning can be done with foresight here to avoid this problem happening all over again?

Q O.K., I think the bottom line of our testimony is that if you have to pick out

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one ingredient, that has generated most of the negative impacts related to the Alyeska Pipeline, that ingredient would be rapid and overwhelming in-migration of people from outside the state, and the dislocations they cause in terms of inflation, in terms of demand for social services, in terms of the shifts of employment, in terms of shortages of goods and services, all the way down the line. It seems to me that the issue for a policy-maker in Canada or in any other jurisdiction facing a major development project in a fairly undeveloped part of the country should be, "How do we control the socio-economic dynamic of that project so as to avoid these major dislocations in terms of population and the demands that population causes?"

Clearly, as we tried to emphasize in our testimony, the state did not adequately, in our opinion, plan for the major impact of the Alyeska Pipeline. They didn't take as seriously as they might have the dangers of in-migration. They didn't think through as clearly as they might have the implications of putting hiring halls in Fairbanks, and they didn't really think through, I believe, the relative tradeoffs between hiring local people for pipeline work that causes the kind of shifts in Now if you're saying, "We want all the employment. pipeline workers to be Alaska residents, to be existing Alaska residents, by definition those Alaska residents, a lot of them are going to leave existing jobs and somebody is going to have to come in to fill the



1 1	Closs-Exami by Sigler
2	police jobs, the fire jobs and all the rest. You could
3 .	take another policy, which is, "We don't want Alaskans
4	to work on the pipeline, we want an outside labor
5 !	force that's hired outside the state." You bring them
6	in, have them do the job, and get out.
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11 I understood your point 0 the evidence where you say that in-migration was the major problem, but I'm trying to take about one step further and suggest to you that the big money that could be earned is the cause for the in-migration. Are you suggesting that the money hasn't attracted the people from the south, that that's not the biggest factor? You're saying to me it's the romance of working on the pipeline that causes people to go there? WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: 2 7 ,1 like to try to answer that question if I may. There's

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no question that the high wages have had an influence in attracting large numbers of in-migrants, yet two points should be made. One, the high wages, were, in fact, economically justifiable. That's the first point and that's a very major point.

The second point is that -- and the second one is related to the first. for the fact of high wages, the pipeline would not have been built. If they had offered a wage scale equal to the existing wage scales, then probably no pipeline would ever have been built.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Weinstein, that's a very important point to Arctic Gas and perhaps as well to consumers. So you're saying that we should take it as a given that this large -- this opportunity for great remuneration, it isn't wage scales as Mr. Boorkman said, but the overtime and the work scheduling that creates the opportunity for this enormous remuneration, and we've already heard from a witness called by



1 / Foothills with experience in European pipelining where they tried to pay people on a normal scale, normal hours of work and they couldn't get the pipeline built because no one wanted to work for them. The trained people went elsewhere. So, let's suppose that is a given. Mr. Sigler is really putting it to you, he says, Mr. Weinstein, Mr. Boorkman says that what caused all the trouble in Alaska," and I use trouble in a neutral sense, I hope, is --

> Pejoratively neutral. A

-- "is the high wage rates

brought all the people in."

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Now, Mr. Boorkman says, well, and there's a kind of a romance to it," and we understand that, that's what brings people to northern Canada, though perhaps not in the same numbers and not with quite the same expectations, but Mr. Boorkman said there were three things that related to Alaskan planning that gave this in-migration an impetus that it might not have had. One is the policy in relation to local hire, not thoroughly considered.

Secondly, the presence -- that is that the hiring halls flowing from that policy had to be in Fairbanks and the third was -- well, it came under the heading of failure of planning which seems to be essentially a way of compendiously wrapping up the first two.

Now, is there any -- if I have been fair to your presentation so far, picking up where Mr. Sigler is at, is there -- we would take the



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implication that we should think a little harder about
the uses of local preferential hiring policies, and we
should think a little harder about whether union halls
should be here in Yellowknife or in Fort Simpson or
Inuvik as opposed to Edmonton, Calgary, Seattle,
Vancouver, Montreal and I've taken that from what you
say. Are there any other things of a specific nature
to deter in-migration -- to deter surplus, unnecessary
in-migration that you can offer us. I think that's
what Mr. Sigler's getting at and if you can add anything
I'd be interested.

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Yes,

I would like to sort of respond to that. Part of the

policy, in fact, that the state of Alaska and the U.S.

Department of Labour have implemented include such

things as actually actively discouraging, through

announcements and publications entered at -- like the

Seattle Airport or on the ferry or other means of access

to Alaska. People coming in --

Q Isn't the Seattle Airport leaving it a little late?

would think. Let me just add that the first year that that occurred, it was -- yes, it was a futile exercise, but that combined with sort of word of mouth and the publicity that the whole Alyeska pipeline engendered in the lower 48, that by the -- we refer in our testimony here to the in-migration survey. By the time of the third quarter of 1975, which was in fact the peak



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employment for Alyeska pipeline, in-migration, in fact, dropped. For the first time instead of a parallel rise of in-migration and employment, you in fact had a drop in employment and what this says is that there is ways of combining --

MR. STEEVES: You mean a

drop of employment or a drop in in-migration?

employment continued to rise to reach the peak that
was referred to in the testimony, 224,000 some odd.

That there are ways of publicizing and some ways controlling then, the flow of in-migration.

about policy, that a government, bent a provincial government or territorial federal, could apply that there are ways of doing it with enough advanced planning that you could limit it and I think that that experience of the third quarter of '75 is one aspect of it. I think the Alaska experience was, it was late and Seattle-Tacoma Airport is a late point to intervene, but there were also newspaper — they tried a much more concerted effort of newspaper adds through out the country and they did try, but not to much avail in the first year because the romance and the — drew people there, but I think that there are ways that the state can implement to slow it down.

with your -- what I would call in our country constitu-



tional provisions to know what level of control you have on intra-provincial or provincial to territorial movement. There's a possibility to outright control where you simply don't allow people into an area, to avoid in-migration, or if that's infeasible or illegal there are ways of discouraging them and certainly you've mentioned some already.

The location of a hiring hall in Edmonton, I think in our opinion, would have a tremendous amount to do given the Alaska analogy with discouraging people who are looking for employment from coming into the area you're trying to keep them out of, because if it were made very clear that the only place you could get a job, if you were a resident of another province or of another country, for a pipeline in the Northwest Territories was in Edmonton, a community that's large enough to absorb some in-migration then that would be just the opposite of the Fairbanks hiring hall experience and it seems to us that that would be a very serious and important policy decision to make and it would have a direct bearing on in-migration.

Word of mouth, publicizing the fact that the jobs aren't to be found in the Northwest Territories, it works to the extent that it's true, and the trouble was in Alaska's case that they were putting out a message that wasn't strictly true. They were putting ads in the San Francisco and Seattle and Denver and other papers saying there are no jobs in Alaska, don't come. That was a lie, there were thousands of jobs and



in Alaska and the only place to get them was in Alaska. It's not duplisis, you know, it wasn't done for a wrong intent, it was simply not a very effective message 4 because it didn't have the ring of validity to it. 5] If you can make it true, if you can say that, in fact, 6 the only place for an outsider to get a job on this 7 pipeline is at a predetermined hiring site outside 3 of the Territories and enforce that, then it seems to 9 me that's a major difference from Alaska and one that 10 I would certainly recommend. 11 12 13 14 15 1 16 17 18 1 19 20

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THE COMMISSIONER: May I just

add a post-script to that? We are in a sense, in the same situation as Alaska in the late '60's except that Canada isn't committed to building a pipeline as I gather Alaska was in those days -- or at least the United States was with a hiatus that we all have heard about.

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But if you went back to Alaska in the late '60's, you might find the ambivalence that you find here. We have held hearings and in the larger communities of the Northwest Territories where white people live, they don't want the social disruption of in-migration, and they would like some kind of buffer between them and the influx of workers and the problems they bring with them. But you will find that businessmen and the Chamber of Commerce in each large town, they want the business. That is, not just contracts and sub-contracts related to pipeline construction, but they want those people with their cash coming into town.

The other thing -- and of course -- if the hiring halls in Edmonton -- and they are flown in and out -- their presence in larger towns like Yellowknife, Hay River, Fort Simpson and Inuvik may be limited. They may not be there very often to spend that cash. So there is an ambivalence that you find among businessman. Quite understandable.

The other thing is that everybody here is in favor of local hiring preference. To



let us suppose that the Government of Canada, in the guidelines for this Inquiry has laid that down as one of the things we are established to fulfill. So it is not up for debate. I am sure were they here, they would appreciate these considerations but -- so, the problem we face and I am speaking for counsel and their staffs because these things should be considered, is how do we combine, if we were to agree that establishing hiring halls outside the Northwest Territories was a of view sound proposition from the point of curbing in-migration -- how would we combine that with an effective policy to give local preference to people already living here who want to work.

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If you care to comment Mr. Trusty and Mr. Boorkman and Mr. Weinstein and Mr. Weinstein, you are certainly welcome to.

comment sir. Mr. Hollands will be appearing in the third panel and I hate to keep always pushing these things off but just to preview briefly, Arctic Gas has had discussions with the unions and with government and Manpower departments and so on, and work is going forward that Mr. Hollands will talk to about establishing a local Manpower delivery system in the Territories that fits with the concept of preference in the Territories. So that in a sense, it would be like mini hiring halls, but they would be right in the community to which they applied. So they would be other throughout the communities in words and there wouldn't



1: be one central hiring hall. The idea behind that is 2 to facilitate the process of local hiring without the 3 problems created by having a central hiring hall in one or more of the larger communities.

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Coupled with that is the intent of all southerners being hired only through a southern hiring hall and being refused employment if they come for a job north of the 6oth parallel. Now, obviously tied into that is the question of making sure that there is the appropriate definition of a northern resident to get around one of the problems that occurred in Alaska. I don't think that has been satisfactorily resolved yet.

> 0 Yes.

A The other comment I wanted to make is that apart from the in-migration question if I read what Mr. Sigler was asking, there is the problem of the attraction of these wages for someone who say, is currently employed in a community like Inuvik.

I personally think there is very little that can be done in a policy stance to counteract that because almost anything you conceive of trying to do involves saying, "no", certain people can't have a job even if they want one. It seems to me that that's an impractical solution.

However, I think that adequate publicity about what is really involved in pipeline earnings -- why are they as high as they are -- to counteract the kind of rumor element that builds up in



terms of what you can earn, pointing out the arduous conditions involved, the seasonality of the work, the potential loss to an individual from trading in a permanent job in which he is gaining some experience in training for a short-term job may have an effect.

Now, it would be naive to suggest the effect is too long.

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not go too much further along that line. It didn't sound altogether like what I have heard on other occasions from Arctic Gas.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: I would like to add to that. I assume that in Canada as in Alaska, it's just not politically feasible to say that we're going to hire outsiders only and have a policy against local hiring. I just don't think that --

Q Well, and this is a free country. You can't stop anybody from coming here.

I think Mr. Trusty is right. You can't develop a hiring policy that excludes people who happen to be too valuable in what they are doing now. That's a wartime regulation, but I don't think it's feasible now.

Mr. Trusty's distinguishing between people who are hired from the area in which the project is to be constructed and trying to structure that in a way that you can really ensure that they are local residents, and distinguishing them from the outsiders who will be needed.

There will need to be some outsiders that come



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in, just as there were in Alaska.

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Now, I think the other thing that can be done is to learn from the experience of Alaska and say when you do hire people locally, what type of people are you likely to draw away from existing services and industries and social service systems, and try to confront the issue of how are you going to replace them. How are you going to attract people with skills that can fill those vacated jobs? If thought is given to that early enough and a recruitment program is undertaken to bring those type of people in to fill the vacated job, I think you can

on the pipeline and when you found an adequate

I think we also have

to keep in mind that when we are talking about inmigration, we are talking about two basically different types of in-migrants. We are talking about the direct construction worker -- say the welders from Tulsa or somewhere -- who come in and take direct jobs and who we don't have to worry as much about and then there is the indirect and secondary workers who come in. understand, reading exhibits prepared in Canada and comparing them with our own, descriptions of Alaska, the multiplier effect, because of the different level of the economy in the Northwest Territories and in Alaska is significantly lower in Canada and so the number

much diminish the lag that occurred in Alaska between

the time when a State Trooper would go off to work



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of those indirect and secondary jobs and theoretically the amount of in-migration that those jobs encourage, is going to be significantly lower. So, I think it is important to distinguish between direct workers who come in from the outside and indirect people who come in generally hoping to take pipeline jobs but wind up in shoe stores and other supporting or indirect services.

Q Mr. Trusty, forgive me,
I didn't mean to interrupt you and know I shouldn't have.
WITNESS TRUSTY: No, I was


finished.

Q One of the few comforts
I get in this job is reflecting on the irony of some
things that are said, and you were listing the disadvantages of pipeline employment compared to other
employment that might be steadier and offer a greater
future, and I cut you off. Is there anything else you
wanted to add?

that to make -- it strikes me that in the Alaskan situation, by the time the kind of word of mouth transmittal of what is being earned gets to the person who might potentially take one of those jobs, it is an astronomical salary with very little consideration for what is involved in earning that salary, and a structured program to make sure people understand what is involved may very well have an ameliorating effect in terms of sucking away people from other jobs.



1 .. It would be naive to suggest that would counteract it 2 entirely or anything like that, but it could have an effect. 4 5 6 1 7 3 . 9! 10 11 12. 13 ; 14 15 # 16 18 19 i 20 21 221 23 24 26 . 27 23



CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SCOTT:

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Mr. Commissioner, Q

3 4 because the point was raised and so I won't forget it, Mr. Boorkman was dealing with a multiplier that has been used in Alaska to calculate the number of jobs that are created that are not directly pipeline-related. He indicated that a lower multiplier had been used for the construction phase in Canada. I was trying to put my hand on that last night, and I wonder if Mr. Trusty could just tell me what that multiplier is for the

> A .2.

Q .2?

That's correct. A

Now I'd like to add something here, Mr. Scott, because it goes to an exchange with Mr. Sigler yesterday about the multiplier. To make it clear, the multiplier functions in a regional economy or indeed a national economy, by the spending of incomes earned on housing, on food, on goods, whatever, to the extent that those incomes are leaked off, outside the region the multiplier goes down. It follows therefore that to the extent that Arctic Gas is successful in maintaining their work force in construction camps and out of communities, during the construction period, there should be very little multiplier effect directly related to construction We do think that there will be a much higher multiplier effect related to the operations phase and in the delta related to not only the pipeline operations but the producer activities up there, and that's why we've



1 used two multipliers -- a very low one during the construction phase, and a much higher one in assessing 3 the longer term growth phenomenon that's apt to occur. 4 There I think a much higher multiplier is appropriate 5 simply for safety reasons, if for no other, in planning. 6 I'm sorry to interrupt, 7 and I shouldn't have started on this, and I know Mr. 8 Sigler will forgive me, but is Mr. Trusty talking about 9 a job multiplier or an income multiplier? 10 Well, they're synonymous A 11 really because you can measure the multiplier effect 12 in dollars. It's more often measured in terms of jobs 13 because jobs are a much more measureable thing. 14 0 That's what your 15 1 multiplier is designed to do? 16 A It measures in terms of 17 jobs. It does not measure in terms of income. But the 13 multiplier works because the job is created, the earnings 19 are spent, those earnings create an additional job. 20 So that the mechanism, if you like, for the multiplier 21 to function is a dollar mechanism, but it really ties back very much to employment. THE COMMISSIONER: What is - 4 the multiplier in Alaska. WITNESS BOORKM AN: Α 1.5. 21 You predict a multiplier

of .2 here.

WITNESS TRUSTY:
A No sir, we don't predict,

we arbitrarily picked a very low multiplier. We did not predict it.



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Scott Cross-Exam by Sigler

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MR. SCOTT: Q Was that a conservative selection, Mr. Trusty?

Was used for, I think it was. I might add, Mr. Scott, that I don't -- if I had been picking, arbitrarily picking a multiplier for Inuvik specifically, say, I might have picked a somewhat larger one. That was applied for the entire region, so it has to take into account the fact that you have a very low infrastructure and very few communities.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SIGLER (CONTINUED):

Q That was the point I was trying to get out of you yesterday. I was trying to find out the exact reason or basis or why that multiplier was picked. I wasn't given an answer to that really.

Just because it was high or because it was low, but why was that one used?

A What?

Q One for the Territories.

A Do you understand or --


Q No, I don't.

A Well, maybe if you could --

Q What is the basis for

using the multiplier that is being used in the Territories

A Let me go through it again then. In Section 14(c), in discussing employment opportunities that would be made available through the project, we added up the direct jobs involved and we



then said, "Now, there may be some multiplier effect during construction, but since we plan to house the work force in camps removed from communities, since we plan to transport them to and from the south on their rotational leaves without stop-overs in communities, we would not expect the great majority of those workers to have a spending impact in the communities; nor would we expect them to generate demands for housing and similar things."

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However, there is apt to be some employment effect induced by the project during construction, if for nothing else because some people may in-migrate to fill jobs vacated by others who could go to work for the pipeline. So we picked a multiplier for that, and we arbitrarily picked it conservatively, because in the portion of the exhibit in which it was used we were talking about the employment opportunities and we were talking about that in a very positive sense, and we didn't want to overstate the case. So we arbitrarily picked a very low multiplier.

Now that's the point too that I mentioned. Now when we come to talk about the longer term growth implications of the project, particularly in the major communities, we then move to a multiplier that wasn't quite a multiplier in the same sense as the .2, and I'll be explaining that in some detail later, but what we essentially said is the induced effects of new activity in the communities will be equivalent to what happens in Southern Canada, so we went almost, you might say, to the other extreme in



assessing the longer term growth that will be generated in the Territories

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Q In the larger communities.

A In the larger communities particularly; we modified it slightly in the smaller communities. As I say, I'll be getting into that in detail. It's very difficult, though, without going through the entire thing to kind of summarize it. Does that help, Mr. Sigler?

Q Right. I was just kind of interrupting myself there with that question.

THE COMMISSIONER: Before you return, let me raise just one other question that occurred to me when Mr. Trusty was giving his evidence this morning. You were giving various reasons that accounted for the differing economic history of the Northwest Territories and Alaska in relation to in-migration. It occurred to me you may have overlooked one, and I'd be interested to know what your colleagues on the panel think. I was in Alaska last year and when I went to Anchorage, where I think about half the people live, and I suspect three-quarters of them live in along the coast of the Gulf of Alaska, it seemed to me the climate there resembled very much the climate of the north coast of British Columbia. In other words, are you in a reasonably temperate belt in Valdez and Anchorage? Does that in some respects --I know that Fairbanks is as cold as Yellowknife, this approach probably breaks down at that point -- but it seems to me that it's a good deal more temperate kind



1	of a climatein Anchorage, Valdez, that whole coastal
2	strip resembling very much places like Prince Rupert
3	in Northern British Columbia, a lot of rain, gets cold
4	in the winter but not nearly as cold as it does say in
5	Yellowknife or Fairbanks. Does that account for
6	in-migration to Alaska, at least a part of it that we
7	haven't seen here, because there's certainly no part
8	of the Mackenzie Valley or the Wastern Arctic that
9	has a climate comparable to the north coast of British
10	Columbia. Does anyone have any thoughts to offer?
11	WITNESS BOORKMAN: I live
12	in San Francisco and it's all too cold for me.
13	WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Another
14	thing
15	WITNESS BOORKMAN: It seems to
16	me, I'm sorry, I don't know Northern British Columbia's
16	me, I'm sorry, I don't know Northern British Columbia's climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it
17	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it
17	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Juneau, where you
17 18	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Juneau, where you get snow but it's really a marine wet damp place.
17 18 19 20	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Juneau, where you get snow but it's really a marine wet damp place. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
17 18 19 20 21	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Juneau, where you get snow but it's really a marine wet damp place. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. A I grew
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Juneau, where you get snow but it's really a marine wet damp place. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. A I grew up in Oregon so I'm not putting that damp weather down. MR. SIGLER: Q I suppose people coming from Houston to a temperate part of
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Jumeau, where you get snow but it's really a marine wet damp place. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. A I grew up in Oregon so I'm not putting that damp weather down. MR. SIGLER: Q I suppose people coming from Houston to a temperate part of Alaska are no better off than people coming from Edmonton to a less temperate part of the Territories.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	climate, I do know something about Vancouver's, and it seems to me that that's more parallel to Jumeau, where you get snow but it's really a marine wet damp place. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. A I grew up in Oregon so I'm not putting that damp weather down. MR. SIGLER: Q I suppose people coming from Houston to a temperate part of Alaska are no better off than people coming from Edmonton to a less temperate part of the Territories.

you change planes a few times and you spend 13 hours

in the air, and I $_{\mbox{\scriptsize suspect}}$ when they get off the plane

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in the middle of winter in Anchorage it's pretty cold.

THE COMMISSIONER: O.K., I'm

sorry I brought it up.

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MR. SIGLER: Q If I could go back to where I was at in terms of the labor shortages, and I still want to pursue the point a bit more as to the salaries leading to in-migration rather than just starting at in-migration as a factor.

When you attempted to answer my question you went back the same as you did in your paper, stating that the real problem was with the Local Hire Act and pointing at the government. But I still suggest to you that if the companies did more to prevent astronomical salaries being earned, like using different kinds of shift schedules for employees, this might lead to less in-migration, then surely some of the blame can go to the company.

A I think we've covered that to some degree today. I pointed out you're trying to walk a line between not drawing too many people away from existing jobs and still building a pipeline, and I'm no expert on the economics of worker efficiency in drawing people into building pipelines. I guess Arctic Gas will have witnesses who will speak to that point later on, but you're also asking us to guess about Alyeska's motivation and whether or not they did everything they could to keep the salary scale as low as possible, keep the shifting to produce the low as possible salaries and still get the pipeline built and not draw too many



people away.

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We also have another factor in there, and that's the unions. The unions' self-interest is clearly not consistent with the point you're arguing.

Q The point I'm making is that you as a panel have been pointing us towards the differences between Alaska and the Territories, but wouldn't that be the same factor here as in Alaska that you would have to pay these higher salaries?

WITNESS TRUSTY: Well, it

depends whether we have the A.I.B. or not.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, Mr.

Sigler, I took it from the evidence of these gentlemen, and no one from Arctic Gas or Foothills has disputed it, in fact they've affirmed it and reaffirmed it, that you have to offer this kind of enormous remuneration to build the pipeline because you have some trained people that you have to lure, and you can't go to the M annower Office in Fort Simpson and get them. Welders are of course the group that come immediately to mind. I don't think it's going to get us very far for you to blame Alyeska for paying these wages -- the wages aren't high, it's the shift schedules that give them a chance to make so much money; but these gentlemen have already said that 'they didn't do that they couldn't build a pipeline. Arctic Gas has all along, I think, taken that position and they haven't tried to tell us "Well, we won't pay them quite so much and then your local businesses and municipalities won't suffer in the same way. "



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kind of shift scheduling and high salaries is necessary to have the pipeline built or is it necessary to have the pipeline built within that time-frame that it is

MR. SIGLER: Perhaps I could

A I would like to make a

comment there. I think you have to distinguish between -- or at least we have to clarify our terms -- between a sort of rotational scheduling. How many weeks on and how many weeks off kind of thing and over-time rates that are paid when a worker is on the job. I can't comment to the latter at all. I don't know, you know, what kind of rates get produced -- will get produced out of the negotiation except one would suspect they will be relatively high rates, particularly compared to what prevails in the Northwest Territories.

clarify it with this panel that they feel that that

When it comes to the question of rotation schedules and that's what I take to mean by your word "shifts", we will again be going into that question later and pointing out that it is our intention to allow for flexibility for the northern resident which we will not allow for in the case of the southern transient who is employed on the pipeline. We would hope that that will go to the point of providing the option to the employee essentially, provided that once he makes an option, he sticks to it during that rotation.

In other words, if the



employmee came at the beginning and said, "I'd like to work this kind of rotation", Arctic Gas intends to attempt to accommodate that to the extent it can. We'll go into this in greater detail. The only thing we would want to guard against is having an employee come along and decide half-way through his first week that he wants a certain rotation schedule that hadn't been planned for. But it is the intention to have a flexible approach to work schedules for northern residents employed in pipeline construction.

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WITNESS BOORKMAN: Just let me comment by saying that this is an area that we are not expert in and that we'd be speculating.

Just one small related point, as you know they have no strike clause in the contracts and they had to pay for it. You know, you don't get anything for nothing in the world.

Q But what effect if any has it had in trying to build a pipeline in the year or two years that it is trying to get built in as opposed to trying to build it over a longer period of time? Was that had an effect on escalating the earnings of the people working there?

witness trusty: I think the only point to make there is that when you take a major project of this type with the investments that are involved, as soon as you contemplate spinning out that investment period, you pay a very great deal in terms of the interest on funds already committed. I would argue as an economist that it is in society's interests



Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler

Fvery time you put a piece of steel pipe in the ground and don't use it for some period of time, society is paying a certain cost for that because resources are lying unutilized. So, I would argue, as I say, that you should build it in the shortest period of time that you can, consistent with good management and manageability of the project and so on.

Now, the other thing -- well, the only thing that I was going to add is, I suspect if you calculated the interest on funds used during construction and compared it to the amount you pay in overtime, you would find that the interest factor greatly outweighs the overtime factor. But that's a guess, I should add.

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THE COMMISSIONER: I have no doubt because industry always elects to pay overtime rather than interest.

that I meant to mention earlier. The other aspect of this is that to the extent that there are demands that can be met by local businesses or industries, those industries may very well find that it is in their interests then to go into overtime situations and allow their employees the option of earning time and a-half or double time, satisfying a demand that is created that wasn't there before and probably would not be there avoid after construction and therefore expansion or duplication of facilities to meet that demand and at the same more



Boorkman, Trusty
Cross-Exam by Sigler

effectively compete for the local labor force. MR. SIGLER:

Whatever effect that has

on in-migration is another question though?

A Well, it could have. But it is a point that is to be borne in mind that there is that option for local industry as well.

Q O.K. Well if we can go on to page six and I want to get into the area of revenues and expenditures and you comment there on the growth in state and local budgets in Alaska. I wonder if anybody on this panel could tell us the source of revenues that are available for both the State Government and the Municipal Governments in Alaska. What are their revenue sources?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Are you sure you want the answer to this question?

Q Generally with respect to the State Government and this specific issue could be with respect to the Municipal Governments.

A All right, the general revenue sources for the State of Alaska are income, excise and other direct -- let me give you some relative figures. The fiscal year '73 which was the last comprehensive data I happen to have in front of me -- their three largest sources were, for the State -- income, excise and operational taxes which was 23% of all total revenues.

Q So that's direct taxation

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by the State?



Yes. Income from

have property tax --

investments, \$43 million or -- I don't have the percentage there. That would be about, I'd say, 12% and federal receipts are more than one-third of the total.

If you want to get into all the other ones, we can do it. But those are the major three. They have business licenses, permits and fees, miscellaneous licenses, revenue from State land, revenue from federal land, income from investments, a court system revenue, a special fund that comes from things like tobacco taxes and all the rest, income taxes.

Then at the local level, you

Q Well, back to the State,
what would be their revenue from royalty from resources?

A All right, they have

Q What percentage of their total revenues are royalities?

both royalties and severance taxes.

A Royalty and -- just a minute -- I will tell you. 12% royalty and I think it's four percent -- 8% sorry. The oil production tax revenue is figured on one of two basis. The easiest way of doing it is percent of value and that's about 8% of the value of the oil produced.

Q No, I want to know what percentage of that revenue is of the State revenue.

A Of State revenue?



It isn't much now.

Kenai - Cook is the only place where they are getting royalty and severance taxes so far. Once you get Prudhoe Bay -- the oil starts flowing out of Prudhoe Bay, we anticipate that once they hit peak flow out of Prudhoe Bay that the State is going to get in royalties and severance taxes \$1.2 billion a year which is twice the State budget.

Q So, it will be --

A An enormous amount of

money.

Q -- what -- 3/4 of the

State's revenues will be earned from those royalties or

A Well, if the State budget doesn't go up, 200% of the State budget will be earned.

You know 200% of the current State budget will be generated each year in revenues. It is just a staggering amount of money compared to their other revenue sources. It is fair to say the State of Alaska is not a viable institute without the petroleum revenues.

THE COMMISSIONER: It's fair

to say what?

I'm going to get into a lot of trouble. It is not self-sufficient and I said a viable economic entity were it not for petroleum development. Assuming you want to provide a comparable level of services with the people that you have in other states.

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
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	Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty
7	Cross-Exam by Sigler
1	MR. SIGLER: O.K. What are
2 '1	the revenue sources now then for the Municipal
	Governments?
4 - 1	A Property taxes and sales
5 '	taxes sales and youth taxes are the
6	Q What percentage of their
7	would you know say for Fairbanks what percentage of
9	its revenues would come from property taxes, sales
	taxes or from grants from higher levels of government?
10	A I have a copy of the
12	Fairbanks Borough budget, but I don't have it with me.
23	That information could be submitted to the Inquiry.
14	Q I wonder if could obtain
15	that and have it filed?
16	A Sure.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Maybe you
18	could leave with us too the yellow book which I gather
19	was submitted to the FPC.
20	A Yes and I believe submitte
21	into evidence here.
22	MR STEEVES: I believe the
. (copy is from your library sir
 	A We had to horrow it from
25	you. We don't have a copy.
26 1	THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, it's
0.5	from our library.

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the most recent budget I believe we have is fiscal year

'74. We may have fiscal '75 of Fairbank's Borough Budget

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We'll try and get you



We'll be happy to submit that if -- the most recent volume we have or you could write and ask them for a copy.

MR. SIGLER: On page six, you mentioned that the State:

"In order to increase revenues last year, the State;
passed a 20 mil ad valorem tax on petroleum reserves.

How did that tax work? I don't quite understand that
tax that you mentioned there.

A I am not a tax attorney but as I understand it, it is a 20% tax on the value of the estimated petroleum reserves in the ground.

I'm sorry, 20 mil .

Q It's 20 mil on the estimated value --

A --of petroleum reserves.

Q The State implemented

that directly?

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A Yes. The State legislature

passed that tax.

THE COMMISSIONER: But you said

that it was off the top.

A Yes, yes. It is a credit which will be paid back out of future payments -severance taxes. So, it's really a borrowing. It's a way of borrowing against the money you're going to get later on because the State didn't have sufficient revenues to pay its bills.

MR. SIGLER: So the State, to meet that situation is using the monies now that it



anticipates getting later on from the --

A Yes. That's right. Not all but a proportion of it.

Q That's in order to provide the basic services they have to provide now.

A Yes. As we said, they spent the \$900 million on lease sales monies and their revenue generation simply was not capable of keeping up with the demand for increased services in the pipeline boom period and so they borrowed against future revenues generated by petroleum development.

Q I take it that these revenues that they have been borrowed against -- the funds that they get from this type of borrowing from future revenues are the funds that are being used to make grants available to the cities like Fairbanks and Anchorage to have them provide the services?

A No, the majority would not be in revenue sharing to local governments. The majority would in direct State provision of services increasing the Department of Health and Social Services, adding new sanitariums, having monitors for the pipeline paying for the basic curriculum of the school system.

As I indicated earlier, the

State of Alaska, unlike most other states pays for more of the cost directly, that local government traditionally pay for in other localities. They pay for instance, 90% of the basic school curriculum -- 90% of the total cost of that basic school curriculum, so additional funds would go into that and into all the other social service delivery areas.

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there is to it?

I use the example of the Fairbanks North Star Borough as an example of the problem of a revenue shortfall, on page 6 you use that.

> Yes. A

And you mention sales tax receipts. I take it then that the Boroughs have their own direct sales taxes imposed?

Α Yes, let me get you that Let me think where it is. I can't remember figure. the pages it's on, it's in our yellow volume somewhere. I think it's a 3 percent sales tax in the Boroughs', that may be wrong, maybe 2 percent, it's in that ball park and the Borough also has property taxation powers.

How much of the Boroughs' revenue would come from property taxation, do you know?

You just asked me that, Α and I said I'd have to send you the budget.

Right. Now, you also state in your last sentence in that paragraph, the lag between population impact and increased revenues has aggravated the intensity of Alyeska impact, since local funding sources have not grown fast enough to keep up with the demand for more and better public services. Do you have any solutions or recommendations that you could propose to meet that problem from the experience of the -- that the local funding sources have had in Alaska?

- Certainly, stop in-migration. A
- 0 That's the only solution



we' re talking about is the fact that you've had an enormous growth in local population without -- and there is a lag between that in-migration of population and additional revenues being produced to provide services to meet the needs of those people, and you can either do it one way or the other. You either find additional revenues and distribute them to provide for the needs of the people and given the nature of the taxation system, that's probably going to have to happen in Alaska at the state level, or you limit the influx of people demanding those services, so that you don't have the initial part of the problem in the first place.

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In terms of local taxation,
the local sales taxes -- remember, we're not providing
most of the key services out of local revenues. Again,
let me reiterate the point that most of the key resources,
social service delivery systems that people rely on
are state funded or a much higher proportion than in
other states are state funded in Alaska.

So, the solution, in terms of the revenue generation is likely to be a state solution.

Q What about things like sewer and water services within a community? Are those provided by the state or by the municipality?

A No, that's provided by the municipalities. We describe it in here, there is a utility system, both within the city and in with the North Star Borough and as we've said there



have been real problems in expanding the system, not so much inside the city because there hasn't been a lot of growth inside the city limits, but in the surrounding Borough there's been major problems in expanding the utility systems. The telephone system's inadequate, there isn't any sewage system, there isn't any water. The Golden Valley Electrical Association is overloaded and is having power outages, and telling people to buy home generators which is an interesting thing for a power company to be telling people.

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just like to add something further to clear up a bit of the kinds of questions you're trying to get at, in trying to locate the parallel between revenue sources and services. In the U.S. many of your services are provided by a number of levels of sources of funding. In other words, you mention sewers and water. Now, depending on how successful or how a locality determines its policy, it can use local money entirely for sewers and water, or it can use a matching system with the state depending on state legislation, or under, like, Community Development Act of the federal government, you can use funds there for sewage and water.

So that if you take a particular city, each of them might have a different mix of funding sources for any one particular service.

which in the United States is simply another overlapping district which has a geo-political boundary and is



a taxing entity to provide a particular service, such as education is a special purpose district, junior college, special purpose district, a utility system, special purpose district, so you have this -- one of the things about the American governmental structure that makes it so complicated at the local level is you have all these competing jurisdictional areas with different organizations, taxing entities, taxing and providing services of a special type and the boundaries don't correspond and they're not all governed by one body, like a City Council or a County government.

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could live in -- you know, say Fairbanks. Now, depending on whether you live on one side of the town or in the borough, you're going to get a different set of services and pay a different rate than if you live on the other side of the line, and we're talking about sewage and water, you talked about the amount of sewage and water that's provided outside the borough is, I think, non existent, that it's local wells and a septic tank system. Whereas, if you live across the line in the city, and you buy a house in a subdivision, within the city, then you get sewage and water and you pay at a different tax rate.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: You also have the fire department.

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Your fire department so your insurance rates are different. It has -- it's a very complicated thing and to look, for instance if we gave you the funding pattern for the



Q I guess we'll find out

1	city of Fairbanks, you'd also want to look at the
2	revenue sources for the North Star Borough and then
3 .	you'd have to back up from there to see how much money
4	came from the state under what programmes and how
5	much money came from the federal government under
6	which programmes, and which services are provided by
7	special districts within Fairbanks and that would
8	be different than the set of services from Valdez.
10	WITNESS BOORKMAN: This may
11	sound like we're hedging on your question but it is
12	impossible, I think, in the United States, to say, take
13	an area, a city, not even in Alaska, where things are
14	even more complex, but take any city in the United
15	States and tell how many dollars go into that city
16	for social services from all funding sources. Nobody
17	can tell you. Nobody can tell you.
18	They did a three year study
19	of Oakland, California to try and
20	Q Not even Mayor Beam?
21	WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Especial
22	Mayor Beam.
2 3	WITNESS BOORKMAN: No comment.
24	Q Well, because it would
25 1	te helpful
26	A I suspect and I'm without
27 1	knowing your system, that you have somewhat more rational
2.2	or less complicated system of funding services at the

if we get a pipeline.

local level.



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A No, I meant today.

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But say for a community

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such as Valdez, which isn't a large -- wasn't a large community when it started and relatively speaking it's

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not large in terms of absolute numbers now, going from up to 6,000 and something using your figures. Would

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you be able to comment more on that as an example?

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Say, how were the increased services paid for there

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by the municipality? Say, how were the services -- I

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take it with that growth they had to put in new streets.

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and new roads in the community, how would those have

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been paid for or are you able to provide any answers

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on that?

A It gets very complicated

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because for each service, and as I said, we're not

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experts on Valdez and frankly, none of us have been

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there. That's not been a primary area of our inquiry,

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but it gets very complicated because you've thrown

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together, just in that sentence, a variety of services

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paid for by different levels of government, and so un-

less you want to start breaking them out as we did

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with Fairbanks where we said utilities, let's talk about

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the utility thing and talk about the disparity within

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You talked about highways,

we have the State Department of Highways that has basic authority there and you have the Highway Trust

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Fund of the federal government and you have -- it's

a very complicated delivery system here, and the juris-

the city or within the borough.

diciton over local roads, which a city -- a first class



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city has, may be transferred to a borough government, if there is a relevant borough government. For instance, in the North Slope where the North Slope Borough is attempting to get all the 21 municipal functions of all the cities in the North Slope Borough transferred to the North Slope Borough for them to implement for reasons of economies of scale and rational policy making and implementation of those decisions.

witness J. Weinstein: Size is not necessarily a factor that makes it less complicated.

Q Right, okay. That answers my question, in that you can't.

Would you be able to comment on how the -- well, first of all, I take it in Alaska that the municipalities do long-term financing of their capital -- some of the costs of building the capital services by way of debenture financing that are re-paid out of current revenues every year?

witness Boorkman: Some services, not schools. There is bonding power and they do long-term capital improvement planning and they do set a capital improvement budget and they can support that out of their local bonding power, yes.

Q Well, how do --

A There are limits, for instance, on the amount of property taxes which a local government can place on oil and gas properties, which was a big issue on the North Slope, when they limited, the legislature limited the North Slope Borough's ability



to tax oil and gas property in the North Slope borough on a per capita basis. There is no limitation however, for the purposes of paying off local bonds, so that's an exception. The bonding power is without limit for municipal governments in Alaska.

Q Would you be able to comment on how much the long-term debt load of the municipalities has grown in the state of Alaska in the last few years?

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increased?

A I can't give you that.

As I refer to specific jurisdiction we could -- that would be in their local budget and for instance, for Fairbanks when we get you the document you requested, I'm sure that figure will be in there, but statewide I have no idea.

Q Do you know if the property tax level has increased or decreased with the growth in the -- with the growth of assessment that there would be in a community such as Fairbanks?

A Yes, I forget the assessment rates in Fairbanks offhand, but they did increase sharply and --

Q The mil rate would have

A Yes.

Q Even with the growing level of assessed property in the community?

A Yes.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: I'd like



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to make a comment on that. Clearly property tax
assessments have -- the property tax revenues have
grown but no matter where you go in the United States
there is a considerable lag between increased public
costs of providing services and increasing the appraised
value of real estate. There's always a lag, no matter
where you go in the United States. If that lag
has been exacerbated at Fairbanks, it's, for example,
because they couldn't even find real estate appraisers
to hire.

Q Okay, what I'm getting at is, has anybody there addressed themselves as to what might happen after the in-migration leaves when the boom's over? What's going to happen to the people that are left behind to pay for the long-term municipal financing that has been done? Has there been any special relief set up?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: No.

WITNESS TRUSTY: Could I just

interject? This may help to clarify something, Mr. Sigler, but you used the phrase, after the in-migrants leave. By definition, really, the in-migrants take up permanent residency. Now, it may be for a period of five years or ten years, but that's one of the distinctions that we're attempting to draw between the situation in Alaska and in the Northwest Territories, where we're talking in the Territories about transients in the true sense of the word. They come in, they do the job, they live in a camp and they go out, which is different from the in-migrant, who comes in and rents an apartment, or



buys a house or does other things in a city like Fairbanks.

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Q So, it is presumed that the population of Fairbanks, Anchorage, Valdez, are going to stay, at least at the levels they've grown to in the last two years?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: We don't predict overall decreases in population on a statewide basis. There may be some communities that have a temporary reduction in population. We haven't done jurisdiction by jurisdiction projections because as I said, our focus was on the Arctic Gas pipeline and not the Alyeska pipeline.

The history of Alaska in-migra+ tion has been that there's this wave of in-migration for a natural resource extraction development project and then some of the in-migrants leave and some stay. In the state of Alaska, the whites in Alaska are all in-migrants, at least their ancestors are and so there has been a steady -- the way the population expands in the state is by in-migration and people staying. Not all will stay, we made estimates about how many in-migrants would stay and how many would leave, following Alyeska. But there is not going to be any sharp decline in population of the state overall, in terms of the period that will be measured by any census at least and the thing to remember too, in terms -- you're talking about revenue generation at the local level. Remember, that in the case of Fairbanks, which, after all, is the community that's most impacted by the Alyeska



project, this is the size where you can measure such things fairly easily, unlike Valdez, the capital improvement planning and the expansion of the capital resources of a community have not been done because of the boom.

As we've said in our testimony, the sewer system was planned for the pre-boom population and there are no plans and no -- to expand it for the boom population. It's causing a squeeze, it's causing a problem during that boom period, but there -- it's not like they were going to develop this enormous capacity to handle the boom population, and all of a sudden they look around and there isn't anybody there to use it, and so they're left with this enormously expensive system on their hands.

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	Cross-Exam by Sigler
1	Q So they haven't bothered
2 .	expanding to cover the boom population, they're still
3	at the level they were at before.
4 1	A That's why there's a
5	problem.
6	Q Now
7	A Let me just make a further
3	some point in the terms of social service deliveries when
9	you're talking about operating expenses, that's not
10	true. They've added staff, they've added additional
11	personnel in various categories. But it's likely that
12	the additions are not so great that when the boom is
13	over and you have some out-migration, that you're
14	going to be left with a tremendous residual capacity.
15	We don't anticipate that and I don't think they do
16	either.
17	Q And at the bottom of
18	page 6 you state that:
19	"State revenues are currently still being
20	distributed to local governments on a per
21	capita basis."
22	A That's not correct of
23	all of them. As I said, that highway maintenance money
24	which is revenue-sharing, is done on a mile basis.
25	But generally the revenue-sharing is per capita, yes.
26	Q Do you know how much
27	it is per capita that is granted?
13	A It depends on the service.
← ` '	Maybe 10¢ a head for one service, and \$20 a head for

another. There is a revenue-sharing schedule which I



There are two things.

think we have somewhere but I don't have it with me.

Is this the amount that's 0 granted on a per capita basis, the rate in any event 4 remains the same as it was before the latest boom? Or are they reviewed, the amount of the per capita 6 '

grant?

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There is revenue-sharing, which is an on-going process which has happened throughout in Alaska since statehood, and is a continuing process. There's special impact monies, which were specifically earmarked to try and help communities that were going to be most impacted by the pipeline. As we say at the bottom of this page and at some other point in the testimony,

"Some of the limits on these impact funds were overly restrictive and didn't always meet the needs of the local community for using those monies."

But there has been some attempt to provide impact assistance because of the boom. Whether or not many of the communities, I would argue that it was not enough, it was too little too late. But the conflict between local governments that bear the brunt of the impact, and the state government which has to pay for it.

Dealing first with the programs that are ongoing ones that were in effect for revenue-sharing before the latest boom --

M-hm.

-- was there any change



	Cross-Exam by Sigler
1	in those?
4	A Revenue-sharing
3 1	formulas?
-4	Q In the formulas.
5	A Don't know, but it's
6	easy to find out.
7	Q O.K., how was the
8	amount of the extraordinary grants that would be made
9	available to each community determined?
10	THE COMMISSIONER: You mean quantity of
11	the absolute funds available for all communities?
12	MR. SIGLER: No.
13	Q How did they go about
14	setting up the special impact assistance fund program?
15	THE COMMISSIONER: I think
16	they're conferring on that very subject.
17	A We were just trying to
18	refresh our memories. In general it was grantsmanship.
19	Local governments who wanted impact monies would
2)	apply to the state, and the state would act on their
21	request and either give them what they wanted or
72	give them less, and so that the usual rule of writing
3 '	a good proposal and justifying how much money you
4	needed was the rule, and some communities probably
, F	needed more money but got less because they weren't
	very adept at the grantsmanship game. There has been
ć	a lot of dispute in Alaska about the level of impact
- 1	funds and the method by which they were allocated. MR. SIGLER:
	O So there's been a lot of

dispute from the municipalities and their local councils?



1	A I don't know, what's the
<i>د</i> ۔	distinction?
ز	Q Well, I mean the city and
:	the Borough Councils.
5	A Yes, from both.
6	Q They have not been happy
7	with the amount.
8 .	A They always felt they
9	needed more money. Not an unusual situation.
10	Q Now, do you know any
11	details or the basis of what is contained in this
12	Bill that's currently before the Alaska Legislature
13	to correct the deficiency caused by per capita grants?
14	WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: As
15	far as we know I'm not sure what its final form was,
16	but basically what it did was it put an absolute
17	amount that each community as a minimum would get,
18	and this would I think it was \$25,000, but again
19	I don't know. The problem was that if anything were
20	distributed by per capita, many times the small communi-
21	ties would not have enough money per capita to say
22	pay a city manager or to begin a planning process,
2 3 1	and this was one of the major complaints of the
24	smaller communities. So therefore this legislation
	that is spoken to on page 6 here was an attempt to
	put a floor in, say, "O.K., you absolutely will get
* *** **	say \$25,000, that should allow you to establish
:	some form of ongoing professional government or

whatever you want to call it, and then you can make

the plans for future impacts."



fact that they gave each community a specific amount

WITNESS BOORKMAN: I think that that sort of an underlying issue needs to be brought out perhaps, and that is I think we've been getting bogged down in the overlapping jurisdictional lines of who provides what in Alaska, from City Government to a Borough Government to a State Government, to the because Federal Government, a lot of money comes in still through block grants or categorical programs from the Federal Government, various agencies of it, and I suspect that on the Canadian side, without knowing much about your system of service delivery, that the important thing is to determine early on what is the likely level of impacts in various social service delivery fields? What level of government, whether local, territorial, or federal, has the responsibility for providing those services, and how can we get the money where it's most needed? The bottom line, I think, of our testimony would be that in Alaska that process was an erratic one and didn't satisfy a lot of communities that felt they were being heavily impacted and not getting the support they needed from the state, and the state probably thought they were being unreasonable about their demands on state resources at the time when the budget was increasing rapidly and they didn't have any more revenues coming in, so it's one of those typical tradeoffs in terms of planning that nobody was very happy with.

rather than a per capita distribution.

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Q I think what I'm trying
to get out of you with my question is any information
you can provide as to what problems the municipalities
or the boroughs have had in providing the services
that they were required to provide, and what kind
of recommendations you might be able to make so that
we might be able to avoid those here.

That's hard for me to respond to because I don't know your system of providing social services in the Northwest Territories, or your taxation system, or your -- I don't know if you have a block grant system, or what the role the Federal Government is to the Territorial, and how the local communities can tax and what they can tax. I mean unless I kn ew that, it's fairly hard for me to make paralellisms with Alaska. I can simply tell you that the general structure of things in Alaska, which is a very complex one in terms of revenue-generation and capital improvements, budgeting, and operating expense hudgeting, and it varies from subject matter to subject matter, and it varies over time depending on the shifts and per capita revenue-sharing figures. But now we need to have a discussion which I've learned a little bit about your system before I can respond as --

Q You'd recommend a simpler system than the one you've got.

A It would be very nice,

yes.

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O One that wasn't based



Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler

on a per capita grant for small communities.

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A Well, I mean the issue really is where are you hurting and how do you get money there, and if a per capita grant doesn't get it to the right place, then perhaps the grants system doesn't make a lot of sense. I don't think it's very complex , it's a fairly straightforward proposition. You want to put the money where the hurt is, and a system that will allow you to do that, to anticipate where the hurt is going to be, to be very clear about who is oping to responsible under the existing system or under some modification of your delivery system for providing a bandaid to that hurt, or remedial actions to prevent the hurt, and then providing the necessary resources at the right time, which is another critical element. As we've said in our testimony, one of the things about the Alaska experience that I think we've learned a lot about, and I think they have, and hopefully the Canadians will as well, is that remedial action is often much less desirable than farsighted preventive action. That's easy to say. Hindsight is always easy to apply, but if some of these issues had been dealt with early on, and if for instance, in answer to an earlier question as stated, it had a long term, say a 5-year impact budgeting process that they started in 1970 or maybe even earlier than that when they discovered the oil and gas at Prudhoe Bay, a lot of these negative impacts would have assuaged earlier.

If I can just elaborate on that for just a second, there was a strange phenomenon



that occurred in Alaska, at least that we observed, and hopefully it won't happen in the Northwest Territories. That was that when we began to work on our yellow volume that we've referred to, we went to Alaska. did some field work, gathered data that wasn't available outside the state, and tried to talk to all the Commissioners of the various State Departments -education, health and social services, and revenue, administration, all of them -- and there was a strange kind of feeling that we came back with, which was that people had talked about the impact of this pipeline for so long and we were talking in 1973 for years since they thought they were going to build the pipeline (it had been delayed, of course), people had been talking about the impact for so long that it had become unreal. It was almost a selfmesmerizing kind of process, in which in 1974 when Alyeska began to hire and to build that pipeline, people that had been talking about impact for five years were surprised, just like if you talk about something long enough and it takes on an unreality, apart from the words. THE COMMISSIONER: They thought

there was going to be another workshop, another series of workshops before they got under way.

A Yes, you must feel the same way about this Inquiry, it's never going to end.

But the reason I mention that is because I think that that's sort of -- I don't think that that's because

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of the planners, there are good planners in Alaska, or that the State Government wasn't concerned about these things. I think it's just very hard, when they're used to budgeting on a one-year basis and you have all the pressures on local legislators and decisionmakers that any governmental system has, to say, you know to put aside today's crisis or next year's budget and when the legislature is breathing down your neck and you've got to have your budget ready for the governor to present at the first session of the Legislature, and all those day to day pressures, to step back and say, "Wait a minute, let's look at what we're going to do five years from now. What are the problems in this functional area, say education and how are we going to deal with them?" I think it's critical to do

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I think it's critical to do
that, and if you can't do it better—than Alaska,
then you're going to have some of the same problems
they ran into. But it was very difficult and I can
see a lot of the constraints that kept them from doing
that, there were a lot of day to day pressures, and
Alaska is not a state that is a mile deep in planning
talent. That's not a put-down of Alaska, it's
of
simply a reflection a small population on a limited
budget for planning staff.

Q Did the special impact assistance fund cover things like recreation facilities for the fast growth communities?

A As we mentioned in here, one of the three areas in which you could spend impact



funds for capital purposes was in recreation facilities.

That was one of them. The local governments wished there were more. They could use them for capital purposes.

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1 THE COMMISSIONER: By the wrong way, so you don't go away with the impression, this Inquiry is established by the Government of Canada --4 by the Federal Government to do just those kinds of 5 things and we don't have people breathing down our necks 6 to have us deal with day-to-day problems, which is an 7 advantage -- a great advantage to this kind of Inquiry. 3 I'm sure Alaska envys A 9 you the time and concern. 10 THE COMMISSIONER: How are we 11 doing in terms of the coffee break! 12 MR. SCOTT: Well, Mr. Sigler's 13 half-hour is I would say drawing to a close. MR. SIGLER: Well, I was inter-14 15 rupted once. 16 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, let's 17 take a break for coffee then and come back and you can 18 clean up in a minute or two, I suppose. . 19 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED FOR A FEW MINUTES) 20 (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT) 21 MR. SIGLER: I realize the 22 difficulty the panel is, sir, having in trying to answer 23 some of my specific questions about municipal financing, 24 so I will bear that in mind in my subsequent questions. 25 It might speed us up a bit. 26 Now, on page seven, you start 27 talking about specific private and public goods and 24 The first one is housing and you mentioned 2 4 1 that the State housing industry is primarily private.

I wonder if the land development is done by private



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. f, _ 7 | Q Well who does the private developer go to to buy the land that it is going to

develop for its housing projects?

developers there or if it is done by the municipalities or by the State or --

built housing in the United States with the exception of military bases. But the most we have is federal programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development which is one of our federal departments and the Administrative Branch which subsidizes -- it's a unit subsidization program in which you are subsidizing the unit by rent supplements or by artificially subsidizing the mortgage rates so that the housing is cheaper. But the Federal Government doesn't build housing as it does here.

Q I'm'talking actually of house construction. I am talking about development of land banks around municipalities.

A No.

Q Who decides what areas are going to be opened for new housing subdivisions?

Board that has jurisdiction in that area. As we said in our testimony, land use planning in Alaska is fairly rudimentary. There is a, for instance around Fairbanks, the North Star Borough has a Planning Department that has zoning powers.

A The person that owns the



24439 Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler 0 Pardon? A The person that owns 0 Was most of the A Well, there is a lot of Say the City of Fairbanks, 0

So the expansion is taking

municipality.

] land. 3 4 the land. 5 6 land owned privately before the boom period started? 7 3 federal and now State land and of course land that the 9 natives have as private -- theyown in joint under the 10 Native Claims Settlement Act. There is a lot more land 11 that is non-privately owned in Alaska than in most 12 states, but you would go to a private owner to buy land 13 if you wanted to. to construct a house 14 15 before this latest boom period started must have been 16 a certain size and it must have grown larger in its 17 area over the course of this latest boom. Well, who 18 would have owned the land? A Well, no, they have not annexed any additional land. Q They haven't? A No. That -- one of the points we made in our testimony is most of the development that's occurred in both industrial and residential has happened outside of the city limits of Fairbanks in the North Star Borough. Areas which are not served by a lot of the service delivery systems like utilities, water systems, fire protection and the rest.

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placing outside of the actual



Yes, in which you have

Now, talking on utilities

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some real developmental constraints.

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Q Who would that land have been owned by? The State or by private people before?

-- electrical utilities, page nine. I wonder if there

is a Public Utilities Board or regulatory agency in the

State of Alaska that's responsible for the planning of

new electrical services or the expansion of existing

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A Private people.

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capacities?

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Q Although we are pretty envious of you here in that you -- they only had two

A There's a Public Utilities

Commission. I don't remember the exact name and state, which sets rates. But expansion planning and that type of thing is done by each local utility.

Q Would that contribute to the problem, of not enough planning having gone into planning of new electrical facilities or increased capacities?

Electrical Association outside of the city limits -- the one that serves the borough is having serious problems with power outages because the system is not capable of providing the requisite number of -- the requisite amount of power during peak loading periods which occur in the winter when you have to heat homes and you need more light.



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power outages in December. I am sure we must have had at least six.

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A Everything is relative,

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I quess.

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0 Public safety. You've

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mentioned the crime statistics and stating that the: "Contrary to public opinion in sections of the

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lower 48, the crime in Alaska has risen no

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faster than the increase in population."

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That's most true A Yes.

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of the serious crimes. As we point out in there the

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statistic, Part II, crimes have increased more rapidly

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than population.

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Q Yes, I would take it

you would have to admit that the problem that we discussed earlier of police officers leaving their jobs to take jobs in Alyeska has complicated the problem of public safety.

A Of course. Even if crime statistics are consistent, don't rise or decrease, and you have less police officers, law enforcement is a problem.

Q Would you be able to comment perhaps on any reason why the rate of inflation in Fairbanks is substantially higher than in Anchorage? What would account for that?

A The rate of inflation in Fairbanks is higher than in Anchorage. Well, for one thing, you have more impact in Fairbanks than you



do in Anchorage and it is a smaller community and less
able to handle it. The drain on existing goods and
services is greater and the ability to provide, to
supply them is less.

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Q I see. So the smaller the community that you start with, the impact is going to have more of an inflationary --

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: No.

The answer -- Fairbanks is the inflation of both cost push and demand pull. Demand pull, all the in-migrants going to Fairbanks; supply can't expand fast enough to keep the price down and match the increase in demand, therefore price is increased. The cost push because of the high wage scale due to basically Alyeska construction.

Your statement that the smaller the community, the greater the inflation does not necessarily follow. If it is a small community and supply is able to be increased correspondingly with an increase in demand, no, prices are not going rise.

The problem in Alaska -- the demand pull problem -- has been that supply has not been able to be increased as rapidly as demand, therefore prices increase.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Which is the function of two things. One, the lower economic level of the community and its ability to generate locally and also the transportation difficulties.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: Yes, in other words, let's say if Fairbanks were a suburb of Vancouver and you had a massive in-migration --



WITNESS BOORKMAN: Well look,

presumably that suburb of Vancouver would be able to expand its supply of public service more quickly and with fewer bottlenecks than Fairbanks, Alaska.

Q So, you're saying that the further isolated the community is, the harder it will be to keep up with the demand of services?

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you can supply -- you can meet demand in one of two ways. You can generate the supply of goods or services needed to meet that demand locally, which is more difficult in the smaller community because you have a lower economic level. You have less manfacturing, less goods and services to distribute. Or you have the means of transportation to get them in. In Fairbanks, it's not as big as Anchorage. It doesn't have the same level of goods and services locally, and transportation is a problem.

Q so those are all the factors that contribute --

reasons for instance that Edmonton we thought -- I said earlier would be more able to handle a wave of in-migration as a hiring center than say Fairbanks would, because it is a much larger community and it supposedly -- transportation is easier to Edmonton I suspect than to Fairbanks and also it has a larger economic base so it can supply goods and services locally, that are locally generated.

Q When you talk of small



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was built.

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That's right. Yes.

O.K. Going on.

When you list your three crucial factors on page 19, the

MR. SIGLER:

A 500 and less, generally.

As we say here, the one area in which there has probably been a serious data problem is monitoring what has been happening in a lot of the small villages in ·Alaska and I realize that that is of special interest to this Inquiry. I simply hope that there is some mechanism developed out of this Inquiry for monitoring what has happened in some of the small villages and in learning whatever you can learn from their experience. But these are quite small villages. I assume from what I have heard about the populations of the villages that would be nearest to the Arctic Gas line in the Northwest Territory, that it would be roughly comparable.

village impacts starting on page 14, what size of

communities are you talking about as being small villages?

There aren't that many small villages however directly adjacent to the Alyeska pipeline it should be pointed out.

THE COMMISSIONER: As a matter of fact, that had occurred to me from Prudhoe Bay south to Fairbanks, you are really going through wilderness.

> A Yes.

Then from Fairbanks south to Valdez, you run through that Copper Center area where you have two or three villages but they were, to use the jargon, impacted 25 years ago when the highway



last one being the lack of adequate state planning,

I take it, just to recap that included in that on a
general basis, you would say that includes the lack of
planning by the State to fund the municipalities
or the local communities?



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A I'd say it was a lack of anticipatory planning to mitigate in advance the negative impacts. Whether or not that should be done by giving more money to local communities is a policy decision, and it's not the only way of doing it.

I understand that your clients would prefer to go that route probably.

Q You see the necessity, though, do you, that the municipalities of the communities be involved in the planning level in advance of the project?

A Well, I think as a matter of general policy it's wise to incorporate into the planning process everyone who has a stake in the impact.

Q Talking about the Fairbanks hiring halls, I wonder if you could explain or know how it actually came to pass that all the unions hiring halls happened to be situated in Fairbanks?

Were they there before the decision was made, or what?

you know, is right in the centre of development for
North Alaska, and there always have been local unions
or union locals in Fairbanks, and when it came down to
how they negotiated the settlement between the various
unions, international unions, between Alyeska and
the state, that was one of the things. They were in
place, they were already effective ly in hiring halls,
and that was the way that the procedure was set up.

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Fairbanks,



		Cross-Exam by Sigler
1	offices were.	
2		A I don't know what you
3 🝴	mean by "offices". They	had hiring halls. They're
4	different than offices.	
5		WITNESS BOORKMAN: They had
<i>ć</i> ,	offices in Anchorage.	
7		Q They had hiring halls in
3	Fairbanks so those were	continued. WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: A Yes, the unions had
0 :	set it up so that specif	ic locals had jurisdiction
1	within a designated geogr	raphic area and for North
2 .	Alaska for most of those	unions that was Fairbanks.
3		WITNESS BOORKMAN: We
4	could just say in fairne	ss to the record that an Arctic
.5 #	Gas witnes will testi	fy on all the labor issues
.6 !	in a later panel, and wi	ll probably give you a better
7 ,	historical sense of the	development of those agreement
. 3		Q When you talk of the
Q .	factor of lack of state	planning, how much would
·)	you be able to comment f	rom your experience in Alaska
11	how much lead time would	properly be required to work
2	out the planning by the	state or different levels of
. 3	problem of	from your evidence that a
. 4		ing was caused by the sort of
25 26		of, and having to proceed
27	right away with the proj	
. /		A I can't imagine having

How much time do you need to adequately plan for

any more lead time than they had in Alaska for the

Alyeska project. I mean it was delayed for years.



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impact? I don't know. I think you have to make a basic commitment to it and it depends on how complex the impacts are likely to be, and how many levels of government or delivery agencies you have to incorporate into that planning process, and have clear-view plans. It has much to do with the decision-making process in the jurisdiction you're talking about. Conceptually the basic issues aren't that difficult. What's hard is building political and legislative support for them, as in most areas.

It should be noted that the State of Alaska doesn't have a lot of planning in-house, they have a State Planning Department, but it doesn't do long-term planning in the areas we're talking about. The planning was done around impact, anticipated impact was largely done in each of the state agencies, like the Department of Education. Now there was some attempt by the Department of Administration to do -- to encourage and provide a mechanism for long-term planning it was pretty much stillborn, and what we ran was a situation into in Alaska where about the only long-term planning that was being done was being done by summer interns who would come in for three months and do some planning. It was actually very good many times, and then they'd leave at the end of the summer. These were not, you know, High School students, they were graduate students or people with graduate degrees, and they'd leave after the summer was over and the plans would just sit there. That's sometimes the way we feel when we write a report.



1 Does anyone read it?

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: You

know, I think it's realistic just to say that the bottleneck in planning is political.

Q Yes.

who have analyzed the situation come up with solutions which certainly would have mitigated the negative impact in Alaska, and will mitigate future negative impact you know, when and if another major project is built in Alaska. These policies could be implemented immediately if the political process works quickly. If it works quickly in Canada you'll get it done in two months; if it takes a long time it will take you ten years.

were all philosophers or kings there wouldn't be any problem.

Q It's a matter of implementing the plans as much as formulating the plans.

Political will.

A It's an act of will,

The reason I asked that

question is that we plan to call witnesses from the
Territorial Government, showing what their planning
efforts are at this time related to this type of
project, and given a guestimate of how far that might
be down the road and how much planning they have
before them, whether it's realistic for them to complete
their planning in that length of time. I was interested

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to know of anything you might have to help us tell how long the planning process did take in Alaska, or whether it was a problem of time or just poor planning that was actually done that caused the problems.

I don't think it's a A problem of time, I think it's just a matter of what we often call the key actors, can they talk with each other and deal with each other effectively and reach solutions instead of bickering?

There's a sentence in 0 the last complete paragraph on that page, the last sentence says that,

"The lag between increased tax revenues and increased population has meant that new sources of public financing have had to be found. " Now, I take it one new source of that public financing is in effect the borrowing on the royalties that will be coming in later on from the petroleum. What other new sources of public financing have been found? Can you give any more examples?

Well, they debated selling more leases.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: As we mentioned in our report, prepayment of taxes including property taxes by three months to get the payment date was moved to the last day of fiscal '77.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: There are other options. You raise the income tax, you raise the sales tax, you raise the property tax, all of which are not politically very palatable.

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Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler Q I don't know which ones

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could be made, I wanted to know

from your experience which ones have been used
because you state that new sources have had to be
found. I wondered if you could help us by telling us
what those new sources are?
WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: We gave you two.
WITNESS BOORKMAN: I sorry, I just

don't know frankly which of the jurisdictions

1n Alaska, if any, have raised their -- I'm
not aware of increases in sales tax.

Q The problem I'm having

is --

A Property taxes have

increased.

Q The problem I'm having is that you make statements in your paper, and then I try to get examples or details of the basis for these statements, and you say you're unable to answer them.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN:

A I think that's an unfair

comment, because I'd say at least three times in our testimony we've mentioned the two major sources of new funding,

- (1) the prepayment of taxes three months until the last day of the fiscal '77, and
- (2) 20-mill ad valorum tax, which is the prepayment borrowing against the severence taxes, and in our earlier discussion with you we talked about property tax and we mentioned that we believe the property taxes had in fact been increased substantially in the last few years in Alaska.



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is the plane --

also, I think your question assumes that the solution to the problems have been found, and I think our testimony indicates that there are a lot of unresolved hassels in Alaska, and if revenue generation had perfectly matched population increases, there wouldn't be those problems.

THE COMMISSIONER: So there have been no further measures taken besides the three you've outlined --

A Yes.

Q -- to make up the deficit.

A Right. Certainly there

are no major ones. There aren't that many places from which you can generate new revenues.

MR. SIGLER: Q Well, if we go into the second -- Mr. Trusty's paper, he's inferring the situation is going to be different in the Northwest Territories. How would it be different here, the problem of not having adequate sources of public financing?

WITNESS TRUSTY: Well, I would --

learned friend would excuse me, sir. On the basis of my advice these gentlemen from the lower 48 made plane

MR. STEEVES: I wonder if my

reservations tonight. Mr. Trusty will be here tomorrow.

I wonder if my friend would be so kind as to defer his cross-examination of Mr. Trusty in the hope that everyone can get through their cross-examination.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, when

MR. BAYLY: Mr. Commissioner, if



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Sigler Cross-Exam by Bayly 1 we're not going to sit tonight then possibly --2 THE COMMISSIONER: Can I 3 just ask when the plane --4 A We have reservations 5 for 7:45, I think it is. 6 MR. SIGLER: The rest of my 7 questions will be for Mr. Trusty. 8 MR. STEEVES: These gentlemen 9 have --17 THE COMMISSIONER: Let's 11 carry on then, in any event. Who is next? 12 MR. SCOTT: Is Mr. Sigler 13 finished? I'm not clear. 14 MR. SIGLER: Yes. I'm finished 15 except for Mr. Trusty. 16 MR. SCOTT: All right. 17 Bayly? 18 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BAYLY: 20 Q Gentlemen, page 1 of 21 your direct evidence, you said your evidence does not 22 deal with the Alaska Mative Claims Settlement Act, and 23 I take it from that and from your curriculum vitae 24 that it is because you have no expertise or background 25 in that area. Is that correct? 26 WITNESS BOORKMAN: We're not 27 experts on the details of the Native Claims Settlement 28

Act in Alaska. We know its general provisions, through

our work in looking at Alaska, but if you want detailed

analyses we're not the people to ask.

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	Cross-Exam by Bayly	
1	Q And you have also not	
2 !	in your evidence gone into the effects in Alaska on	
3	native people in particular, and is that for the	
4	same reason?	
5	A Generally, yes.	
6	Q Although I take it	
7	you may be aware that there may be different kinds of	
8	impacts on native people in particular, as opposed to	
9	either your in-migrants or the long-time white residents	
10	of Alaska.	
11	A Yes.	
12	Q So any questions that I	
13	might ask on the impact of the project on the ability	
14	of native peoples to implement their land claims	
15	settlement under the Land Settlement Act would be ones	
16	that I shouldn't address to you.	
17	A I would think that you	
18	would get more out of other witnesses.	
19	MR. BAYLY: So presumably, Mr.	
20	Commissioner, from the evidence that we're getting	
21	from Arctic Gas, not from their witnesses. You don't	
22	intend to call any evidence on that?	
23	A I'm sorry, I'm	
24	having trouble hearing you.	
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, so	
26	am I. If you are saying that you don't intend to ask	
27	these gentlemen any questions about impact on native	
28	peoples in Alaska, a subject they have eschewed	
29	well I'll go right along with that, because they have	

disclaimed any special knowledge in the matter.



they don't so that --

MR. BAYLY: That's what I'm trying to establish sir, and if they don't have the knowledge I won't pursue it, but I want to make sure

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, Mr.

Boorkman, as I understand it, you said that the collection of data related to impact on rural villages, which were essentially native villages is simply not there, and as far as the hiring of natives on the pipeline is concerned, you had a footnote that dealt with that, but that was about the size of it. 5,000 in total and 8,000 jobs.

A Yes, and we're not -- we don't know enough about the statistics yet to be able to evaluate them very accurately.

THE COMMISSIONER: So, I think we've drained the panel's capacity to help us on that, on those subjects.

A Let me in fairness just say that we have done more detailed work in one native village in Alaska, as part of our work for Arctic Gas on a continuing basis, and know something about the dynamics of the local social and economic system there, including land claims, but in terms of general -- being general experts in land claims and its impact around the state, we're not the right people.

If you'd like to hear about

Kaktovik I can tell you.

MR. BAYLY:
Q Well, unless you can say

whether or not that is something we could apply in a



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general way, either to Alaska or to what we may expect in the Mackenzie Valley, it may not be of much use to us and you can perhaps be the best judge of that. If you think it is of some universal application, perhaps you can tell us what selective impacts there have been.

than we've described very tangentially in our testimony, which is that the Settlement Act has accelerated the social, political and economic integration of natives into Alaskan life and that's sort of a bottom line generalization, which I think is accurate and -- but in terms of specifics that are universally relevant to the Mackenzie delta, I assume without knowing much about your land claim situation that the situation is different enough here so that the Kaktovik experience would not be directly relevant.

A All right. Now, one of the problems that you seem to have isolated, with regard to the construction of the Alyeska line is that it involved a lot of what you call in-migration.

Now, I gather from an answer that Mr. Trusty gave that he, at least, distinguishes between transients and in-migrants, and I wonder if you do the same and if there is a difference you could tell us what it is.

The difference between transients and in-migrants. What distinction did you make?



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is that an in-migrant is someone who establishes residence in a region for some period of time. A transient is someone who comes in to do a specific job and goes out when that job is done. That's the distinction I made in general terms. I added that the transients, in the case of the Arctic Gas pipeline would be expected by and large to live in the construction camps and so wouldn't even be in communities.

THE COMMISSIONER: Now, let

me just pursue that because that's certainly a worthwhile distinction to make, but a teacher who goes into

Fort Wrigley to teach for a year, intending to leave
at the end of the school year has been a transient, there's
no question about that.

A That's right yes. There's a semantics problem, obviously, with these two terms.

I think another way to put it, is, after a project is finished, has the population changed and if it has changed, then the change is a measure of in-migration, you know, if you leave out the natural increase factor. In other words, new permanent residents have been established in a region.

Q Excuse me, sorry, you would then say that all the people who worked on rigs in the Mackenzie delta and are flown in and out of Edmonton --

- A Are transients.
- O -- are transients.
- A That's correct.



Q And that people at Pine

Point though, coming there to work in the mine and bringing their families are --

Mare permanent -- are inmigrants. They may stay five years or -- I think we had very clear examples in the testimony that was presented earlier in this phase with respect to the Yukon, where the population of the Yukon, if I recall accurately the figures, there were 34,000 construction workers working on the highway. They, by and large, all left. The population of Whitehorse mushroomed to some quite large number and fell back so that today it's at a number that it was at in pre-highway construct tion times. So, I think that's part of the distinction.

MR. BAYLY:

Q Well, Mr. Boorkman and Mssrs. Weinstein, is this a distinction that you make for the impact that you've outlined?

don't make the distinction. For us an in-migrant is someone coming to Alaska in search of a job that they do not have at that time, hoping to get one, or a person who comes knowing they have a job on the pipeline.

We do distinguish, and this is sort of a parallel distinction, but we don't use the same terms. We distinguish throughout our work between direct employment on the pipeline, where people are imported from outside to work directly on pipeline related jobs, and secondary and indirect, people that come in and take, or seek to take secondary and indirect



1 jobs, but we don't make the distinction in those terms, 2 no. 3 WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: In 4 our terminology, in-migrants -- the category includes 5 Mr. Trusty's category of transients. 0 Yes, right, and I take it! 7 that whether you call them in-migrants or transients, they are people who take up housing space, jobs, use 9 community services of one kind and another. 1 1 WITNESS BOORKMAN: No. THE COMMISSIONER: Provided they're not employed directly on the pipeline, Mr. Trusty says he'll put them in camps. A Yes, his transients --- A Q So, they won't be a burden. 15 There's another --A 16 The people on pipeline 17 related employment taking up housing and feeding that 18 will constitute the burden on this -MR. BAYLY: 19 I understand that. 20 WITNESS TRUSTY: There's another 21 important distinction, Mr. Bayly, that explains this 22 difference in terminology. In Alaska and Mr. Boorkman 23 perhaps can correct me if I'm incorrect in this, in 24 Alaska the in-migrants come under their own steam, if 25 you like. They make the decision and they cross the 26 border in whatever vehicle they've used and they come 27 as a private citizen. When we are talking about 28

transients going into the north, for example, in oil

exploration, they are being flown up there by a company

and flown out again by a company having been hired ahead

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of time outside the region so that there -- if you like there's a conscious policy decision mixed in with some personal preferences, undoubtedly, but a conscious policy decision on the part of the company. It says, we will provide this transportation service. The people that are measured in the URSA in-migration study are not people coming in on Alyeska airplanes from the south. Do you see what I mean, and that's one of the reasons why there's this difference in terminiology.

MR. SCOTT: Well, does Mr.

Boorkman accept that? I would have understood, Mr.

Commissioner, just to clarify it from Mr. Boorkman's evidence, that if Alyeska flies some welders into Fairbanks who have jobs and who are going out next day to a camp in which they're going to live, they' re counted in the in-migrant total of 56,000.

would count the people that come directly to work on the pipeline as in-migrants.

WITNESS TRUSTY: The question is how many of those there are in comparison to the total --

WITNESS BOORKMAN: That's just a very small part of the labour force. You're talking about roughly an estimated maximum 15 percent of the direct labour force. Remember we're not talking about all those many more indirect and secondary workers.

Statistically those aren't as relevant, given a dynamic of in-migration on Alaska,



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migrant category.

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as they will be, as I understand it, in the Northwest Territories where you're not going to have the wave of other people. You're talking much more about people who come in for a specific project, do that project and then leave.

MR. BAYLY: All right. Now,
I don't want to lose control of this so, I just want
to talk about Alaska for the time being, because you
have
gentlemen are the ones that the airplane to catch and
you've disqualified yourself as being unable to tell
us whether what has happened in Alaska is likely or
definitely going to happen in the Mackenzie Valley.
But, for your definition, you have said everybody who
comes in to work on the pipeline is what you call an
in-migrant.

A That is part of the in-

Q Yes. I'm not saying they are exclusively those, and I'll get to that in a minute.

A Yes, yes.

Q But those that --

THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse me,

you don't have a category of transient.

A Right.

MR. BAYLY: But you have told us that people come into work on the pipeline and you call those in-migrants. There are other alien migrants but those aren't among those.



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Q What I want to know is whether in your opinion, the Alaskan labour force would have been capable of building the pipeline without this in-migration?

A I think not. I think it's generally accepted that there are highly skilled pipeline workers that belong to one local and one local only.

Q And with regard to -without robbing other employers in Alaska, of their
employees, were there enough unemployed people to fill
the other categories?

A All the non-highly technitical pipeline construction.

Q Yes.

A Well, let's see. Are you talking about just direct construction and employment, or indirect and secondary as well?

Q Well, let's do one at a time because I'll be going into secondary ancillary activities in a few minutes.

The peak employment, direct employment, as I remember from our testimony, is 24,400 or something of that sort. If you take the unemployed people in the work force, assuming that they have the skills, it would not be enough. If you drew people in from -- who are not part of the labour force, people that entered the labour force because of the pipeline project who were



1 not part of that labour force before, natives, housewives, students, others who weren't formally classified as either employed or unemployed, they're not in the 4 labour force. You might well have enough people to 5 provide those 24,400 direct construction jobs. 6 Given the skills needed, it is doubtful that the state of Alaska had the sufficient labour pool to fill all 3 those direct jobs. 9 WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: I can give 10 you a statistic. Mr. Boorkman just said that the state 11 work force is 24,400, and in our testimony we say that 12 as of January '76 there were 22,900 unemployed. Well, 13 can give you figures going back for four years but 14 let's say -- I will give you a figure from January '73, 15 before pipeline construction began. There were 14,000 16 unemployed people in Alaska. State employment is 24,400. 17 Now, the question is, --18 WITNESS BOORKMAN: Just let's 19 clarify once again, that's unemployed people. When you 20 add unemployed people and employed people, that's the 21 labour force, that's not necessarily the pool of labour 22 you can draw from. 23 These students that are 24 ; going to school can decide to give up school and come 25 work. 26 1 0 Yes. 27 But they aren't the labour A 28 1

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All right and --

It's probable though, even

source.

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with those additions to the labour force, that you would not have made up enough to fill all those direct construction jobs.

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I understand that. You

4 for the bringing in of a number of workers skilled and

be activities whether it housewifery or from the schools or perhaps from other jobs, there was the requirement

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Α Yes.

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So whether it is the 0

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in-migrants that caused the social impacts or not, they were a requirement?

unskilled for the building of the Alyeska line.

have told me though, that without taking from other

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Some in-migrants were a A

requirement. Yes.

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Yes. Whether you got

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too many or not is another question, but some were required or you cauldn't have built the pipeline.

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Yes.

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Now, you had said -- and

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the reason I askedthis question was that when Mr. Sigler

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was putting a question to you with regard to the

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maintenance of services in the various communities and

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the expansion of them, one of your answers was that

you could stop in-migration. I would suggest to you that to stop in-migration on this project might well

have meant that the State of Alaska with its labor force

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and its labor pool would have been incapable of building

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A Well, I think you know

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the answer to the question.

this pipeline.

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0 Yes.

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A The problem of



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in-migration is not that you are bringing people into more the State, but that you are bringing far people than there are new jobs. You're adding to unemployment.

You're adding to the demand on services by this massive influx of people and you can't handle them all.

When I said you stop inmigration, I meant that mismatch. I didn't mean that
you don't let anybody come into the State.

perhaps too many people coming in. Now some of them obviously come to work on the pipeline. Others, I gather come in not with the skills to work on the pipeline, but because they hope to get some job which is ancillary or secondary to the pipeline whether it's in a trucking company or a supply company or a grocery store.

A Yes. It's hard to talk about peoples motivations. Looking at past boom periods, it's likely that a lot of people came hoping to get a job on the pipeline when a realistic appraisal of their skills would have said that that was impossible and the best that they could hope for was work in a diner as a dishwasher or something like that. So they may not have come to take a secondary job, but they may well have wound up with one.

Q Yes. There were obviously more secondary jobs because the people that were coming in to work on the pipeline. I suggest to you had to be serviced by dishwashers in diners, more garbage men, housebuilders, etc.



Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Bayly

A Well, it has to do with the multiplier effect in Alaska, given the development of that State's economy and what happens when you dump -- when you produce a certain number of jobs in a particular sector of the economy.

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In another place that had a different level of economic development you would have a different multiplier and you'd produce a different ripple effect in terms of secondary and indirect employment.

your
page 27 of evidence where you say:

"Overall, the rapid population in-migration has meant that thousands of newly arrived people had to be provided with necessary goods and services."

I assume that is what you mean by the "ripple effect".

the relationship between direct employment and secondary and indirect employment which is not the same in all jurisdictions. It's not the same in Alaska as it is in the lower 48. California, I am sure, has a much higher multiplier effect — a much higher multiplier figure on direct employment than Alaska. It's a much more highly developed economy.

Q All right. Well, let's just talk --

A The Northwest Territories, from Mr. Trusty's testimony has a much lower one.

Q Let's just talk about

Alaska. California may be fascinating but we're not



1 ;	interested in it for the purpose of comparison.	
۷.	A I'm just thinking of	
3 +	my plane.	
4 '	Q Right. There were still	
5	more services provided and you needed more workers to	
6	provide some of these services I take it; some of them	
7	skilled workers, some of them unskilled.	
8	A I am not sure I am	
9 !	following you. If you are saying that there's a	
10	population increase, therefore, you have got to provide	
11	more services; therefore you need more service provider	
12	the answer is yes.	
13 "	Q Yes.	
14	A It's sort of a strange	
15	way of looking at it.	
16	Q Yes. So, there is a	
17	multiplier effect, no matter what the number that is	
18 0	assigned as a multiple is.	
10	A I think you're comparing	
20	apples and oranges. The multiplier effect has to do	
21	with the production of direct employment on the related	
22	pipeline project and the relationship of that generation	
23	of employment with the generation of employment in	
24 .	other sectors of the economy. That's a different issue	
25	than in-migration. That's a different issue than	
26	service provision.	
27	Q All right. Well let's	
***	go back again then and start this at this point. You	
<u>.</u>	had people who came in to work on the pipeline. You	

had other people who came in for whatever reason and



1 ended up doing other things. 2 Yes. A 3 Right. Now to your 4 knowledge, did the Alyeska company or the State say in their advertisements and promotion of the pipeline 6 that there would be lots of spin-off or secondary 7 activity generated by this pipeline construction? 8 A Just the opposite. They 9 tried to discourage people from coming by saying there 10 weren't jobs. 11 Now, let's go back to Q 12 in Alaska itself. Was one of the selling points that 13 Alaskan business would benefit from the pipeline? 14 A Of course. Of course. 15 Sure. 16 Q Right. O.K. and the 17 way they benefit presumably is to build their businesses! 18 and employ more people and sell more goods and services. 19 The Chamber of Commerce A 20 mentality. Yes. 21 0 Yes. 22 -- that the Judge referred 23 to. 24 Right. That was something 25 that the State was interested in promoting because the 26 State wanted business to grow within its own boundaries. Α The State is not a 23 monolith but the people of power in the State won that 23 argument, yes.

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Weinstein,	Wei	instein
Boorkman,	Irus	sty
Cross-Exam	by	Bayly

	Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Bayly
1	Q Yes. The Alyeska line,
	I suggest to you did not propose to provide everything
	for itself. It did not propose to provide all the
	services that it required within its own company?
5 :	A It depends on who you are
	talking about. In terms of the construction camps,
	they tried to make those as self-sufficient as possible
3 9	If you're saying that they proposed to provide services
	for indirect and secondary workers, no they did not.
	Q All right and they did
1	not, for example, provide their own airports to bring
	workers into Anchorage and Fairbanks. They used the
11	existing facilities.
,	A At Fairbanks?
	Q Yes.
	A Yes.
	Q They did not build their
	own sewers for their own employees in Valdez. They
	used the existing facilities.
	A Sure. They paid landing
	fees when landed at the airport. Yes, of course,
	they absorb services. No question about it.
,	Q Your statement was
	just a minute Mr. Trusty and I will give you a chance -
	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr.
,	Weinstein is ahead of Trusty in the line-up. MR. BAYLY:
	Q Sorry. Your statement
	in your ovidence is for example that some of the

airplane services that were provided to the smaller



Weinstein, Weinstein

Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Bayly] ' communities did not provide as good service for the pipeline work going on presumably because the pipeline 3 .. company and other organizations supporting it were 4 using some of these facilities. 5 A Right. 6 0 Now, Mr. Weinstein? 7 It's all right. He's 8 pacified. 9 WITNESS D.WEINSTEIN: He's 10 said everything I could say. 11 WITNESS TRUSTY: I simply 12 want to note that the way you put the question suggested 13 there wasn't also a camp at Valdez and in fact there 14 is a camp at Valdez as well. It's totally self-contained 15 and it is on the opposite side of the bay from the 16 community. 17 Q Well, I realize that and 18 I didn't want to leave the impression that pipeline 19 workers weren't housed in camps. But it is true I 20 understand that -- and in your own evidence that the 21 population of Valdez grew considerably by a factor I 22 believe of many times. 23 WITNESS BOORKMAN: 265% or 24 something like that. 25 Yes. 26 WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: You're making statements like this. I think --- 3 No, I am asking the questions

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You'remaking the statements.

No, you made the statement



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decision.

in your question and I think that, one on your statement about Valdez. First of all, a lot of the facilities for floor engineers and workers building the terminal are in facilities supplied by the company and not by the town -- sewage systems, road systems, housing, etc. That's one thing.

Second of all, the use of airports many times where you had supplies being delivered directly to the camps were on airstrips, etc. provided, built and maintained by Alyeska itself, not by the local communities. Where we talk about the overlap of demand for services for instance if there is a use of a commercial carrier and he is faced with an opportunity to either deliver to sometimes a small to community or deliver that Alyeska camp, the opportunity costs would sometimes be that he would go to the Alyeska camp and delay the delivery to the small town.

But it would not be necessarily the use of that individual town's air facility or town itself. It would be a separate entity and a separate kind of decision.

Q I understand that from
the evidence that you have put forward that the tax
was on the services that had been provided to the
enough
communities. There weren't airplanes to go around for
everybody, so everybody had to share the airplanes that
there were, for example.

A That's a private sector

Q Yes, in the private sector.



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Yes.

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Alveska could have functioned without these ancillary industries supporting them?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: What do you

Now, how about whether

mean by that?

They have, without the use of private carriers in the air, on the ground, without the use of communities to house certain of their executive and supervisory personnel, could they have functioned?

It's a highly speculative if question. I assume you could have run the project as a para-military operation, they could have provided everything they needed for their workers.

Right and in this case though, they did not?

As we have said, the direct construction workers -- the people that work for Alyeska or the subcontractors were generally provided with all the goods and services they needed to do their work. Their housing, their other social services by the company, to the extent that the Alyeska project and the socio-economic dynamic of the State of Alaska combined to cause a wave of in-migration which then demanded and absorbed services.

I mean, the question is one of casuality and when you say Alyeska, I think we've got be a little more precise about who we are talking about. Are you talking about direct workers. Are you



!	Cross-Exam by Bayly
1	talking about the company and subcontractors? Are talking
2	about the general project's impact in the broadest
3 4	sense which is what we have been speaking to.
4	Q This specifically, there
5	was
6	A Excuse me one moment.
7	Q Go ahead. Are you ready?
8 ;	A No, I am waiting for you.
9	Q Was there an answer coming
10	out of that conference?
11	A No, no. I just got
12	all my ammunition stored up.
13	Q Oh, O.K. Good. I
14	suggest to you that your last answer with regard to
15	a paramilitary operation was the only thing that
16	was anything like that, were the construction camps
17	themselveswhere in those camps, those facilities of
18	housing, sewage, water supply, air support, were supplied
19	by the contractors and the company. Is that correct?
20	A Yes. This is what I
21	took you to mean by Alyeska in the narrow sense.
22	Q Yes. With regard
23	to secondary facilities, the State Government and others
24	supported the growth of business generated by the
25	pipeline construction within the State itself. They
26	wanted this to happen. They wanted people to profit
27	in the State from the construction of the pipeline.
28 ļ	A I'm sorry. Excuse me.
29	Who wanted what?



1 ! wanted people within the State to profit from the construction of the pipeline, not only by working directly on it but by providing goods and services to it. 4 A There are people of ŝ importance in the Alaska State Government who favored 6 the Alyeska project because they favored development in 7 . general, and the pipeline project in particular, because 3 they thought it would lead to an expanding State 9 economy, more jobs, more profits, more capitalism. 11 0 That was the majority 1 opinion I take it or at the least the opinion? 12 It was the opinion that won. A 13, 0 All right. 7 4 Α It's also an opinion held 15: by many natives. 16 Q All right, and did 17 Alyeska use that as a selling point both to the 18 government and to the Chamber of Commerce mentality 19 as you like to call it? 2) I wasn't around when Α 21 Alyeska did its initial PR work, but they would be crazy 22 not to. 23 0 Could you conceive of 24 any way then, apart from a paramilitary operation, in 25 which Alyeska could have constructed this without

the use of the supply of goods and services by other

organizations than their own?

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Boorkman, Trusty
Cross-Exam by Bayly

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't

guite follow that answer.

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A I'm not sure I understand your question.

MR. BAYLY: Q Now what you suggested in your answer was that the powers that won the debate as to whether this growth of capitalism should result from the construction of a pipeline, the people that supported that one, now can you envisage a way in which this pipeline could have been constructed without that?

A Without them winning?

Q No, no, without -- just a minute, without the provision of goods and services by anyone outside Alyeska.

brought all the men, materials, supplies, goods and services that they needed to build the pipeline without touching the outside community? They probably could have come close. They didn't choose to take that route and the State of Alaska would have been enormously angry if they had, I suspect.

Q And are you suggesting in your earlier answer that they should have tried to do that to lessen the impacts, or is the most practical and sensible way to do it, the way that they did it?

THE COMMISSIONER: You might not try making moral judgments on this thing anyway, are you?

A I wasn't planning to.



MR. BAYLY:

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MR. BAYLY: Mr. Commissioner,

I'm not interested in morals. I'm only interested in whether or not this was the most sensible way to construct the Alyeska line to minimize the impacts on the people and the facilities in the state. If it was, that's the answer I'm looking for. If it wasn't, then there may be another answer.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, to do it in the antiseptic way that they chose not to, would have minimized the impact. I mean it seems to me that's plain enough.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: I'd not like to make a comment, although I'm'privy to Alyeska's confidential information I am sure it's a mistake to say that if Alyeska had done the antiseptic job of providing goods and services, flying men, materials, goods and services in from the 48 and not affecting a soul, or affecting a soul in the State of Alaska they could have done it. But the price of the project would have escalated. I won't even attempt to assign a multiplier. I'm sure the multiplier would be enormous.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: And it was contrary to the policy of the State of Alaska.

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN; You're also talking, making a mistake between where you employ people we've talked about the possibility of employing people at points outside of Alaska or in this case outside of the Northwest Territories, and where you purchase goods and services which might be from the local merchants or whatever, or native corporations.



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You have that choice separate from employment. We've spoken to employment issues and not to the choices that faced Alyeska in terms of goods and services.

Q All right, then did
you in your study or in your research examine goods
and services and where they got them and what the
various impacts that were generated by that work?
WITNESS BOORKMAN:
A We looked generally at

was written in 1973, before Alyeska began. We looked generally at their plans in terms of providing goods and services that would be needed by their workers. For instance, their plan not to use local doctors, their plans — their medical service requirements and ways of we found out providing those services, and briefly what their current plans, because they hadn't finalized them yet, were in terms of catering, food and that type of thing. We told what we knew at that time and that was before a lot of that was finalized.

Q Did most of the secondary activity that was generated, did it get generated in Alaska? Did they supply themselves locally, or did suppliers from the lower 48 move in to fill the need?

A The manufacturing sector of Alaska is so marginal that most of the stuff had to come in from outside. Certainly the pipe did because -- oh, I'm sorry, the distributors were local but if you're talking about the goods, if you're talking about the bulk of the materials used in constructing



the pipeline, they mainly came from outside.

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WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: The

Alaska service sector grew considerably. The Alaska manufacturing centre did not, no. Basically what Mr. Boorkman says, manufacturing occurs mainly in the lower 48, but the Alaska service sector and distributorship grew enormously.

Q And did the Alaska service sector that grew, was it the same group that was there before the pipeline construction began, or was this sector taken over by people from the lower 48, as we've heard some evidence of earlier in the Inquiry?

WITNESS BOORKMAN:

A Well, one of the things

that many people observed about Alaska is that Seattle benefitted from a lot of Alaska development, because it has traditionally serviced the points at which goods and services entered the state. That pattern has started to change, as Mr. Weinstein said, the manufacturing sector of the economy, the development of goods has not changed appreciably in Alaska. There is still isn't a lot of lettuce production in Alaska and I doubt that there ever will be. However, there are many more professionals, there are many more lawyers, there are many more consultants in Alaska than there used to be, and a lot of that is local and indigenous, and provided by the size of the Alyeska project and the development that it generated. That's been especially true of the interface between land claims and the integration of natives into the economic system and pipeline development.



Well, is it true with

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regard to some of the services that were provided, that service businesses were taken over by entrepeneurs from the lower 48 who saw in their in-migration that as their chance to participate in the Alaska --

A In some cases that's true just as when land claims were settled many natives bought existing businesses that were marginal or foundering, or that they were interested in for social or cultural or economic reasons, yes.

don't have objective facts to back this up. My general

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: I

I think, well the people that were in Alaska when the Alyeska buildup began were the people who benefitted,

impression is that with the exception of the natives,

therefore that includes the natives. Then people who sensed that, "hey, when they build a pipeline, I'm going to

fly to Anchorage and buy a business, it was too late.

The resident Alaskans, including the natives, were the ones who benefitted in the expansion of the service

and distributor sectors. Residents as of '73 or some-

thing like that.

Q Now, I gather, going

back to the earlier point that we began with, because too many people came in, too many in-migrants arrived, looking for jobs, but although they may not have either found work on the pipeline or in the secondary service or the small part of a manufacturing industry that may have existed in Alaska, they still took up

goods and services that either were there for the former



Alaskans or for the people who working on the pipeline 1 or other activities. WITNESS BOORKMAN: Α Yes. 4 And so they put a strain 5 on these facilities, whether or not they could be 6 accounted for in the work force. 7 Yes. 3 And these included govern-9 ment services such as Unemployment Insurance, and 10 welfare, as well as housing, health services, etc. 11 A Not Unemployment Insurance 12 Q Unless they had got laid 13 off on the pipeline. 14 A They wouldn't draw it 15 in Alaska, in any event. 16 0 I beg your pardon? 17 A They wouldn't draw it in 18 Alaska, in any event. Assuming they came to the state 19 officially unemployed, meaning that they were eligible 20 for Unemployment Insurance, they would draw it from the 21 state in which they had become eligible, not in Alaska. 22 0 Until they got a job in 23 Alaska for no matter how short a duration. 24 A And it's not how short a 25 ' duration. I believe there's a waiting period. 26 WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN : I believe six months. WITNESS BOORKMAN:

I've forgot the rest of your list since I was taking

exception to that item.



Q But they did take up health services. They did take up general welfare assistance or whatever you call it?

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A No, that's not a correct assumption. Welfare restrictions in Alaska are fairly stringent. Poverty is not sufficient, you have to have a family break-up, and so it's a little more complex than that. You just don't go to Alaska and get poor all of a sudden and get welfare. We're a welfare state in part, but the eligibility requirements are still fairly stringent.

THE COMMISSIONER: You have to be a deserted wife, that sort of thing.

A Or a divorced wife with kids to support.

MR. BAYLY: Q In short, although your state policies may have induced more in-migration than necessary, it probably would have been impossible to service and build the pipeline without some significant in-migration, including that caused by the need for more secondary services.

with some of your words. I stated before -- it isn't much of an admission -- that you could not have filled the direct pipeline jobs without some people, some talent coming in from the lower 48. That in our definition is part of, although a small part of, in-migration. So yes, some in-migration was needed for the project to succeed; some in-migration would be needed for any major development effort in an undeveloped area like Alaska. We're



talking about the scope of the in-migration and its ramifications across the border in Alaska.

Q And I suppose your

technical people who were monitoring and doing the surveillance on the pipeline, or in the government offices who did that, came from other parts of the United States than Alaska as well, to a certain extent.

A Some, you mean originally

or immediately?

Q For this particular

project.

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A No, the Department of Labor of the State of Alaska did a lot of monitoring of this dynamic. Infact my in-migration survey was conducted with staff of that department.

Q All right. Did no sector of the government grow then because of this project?

sectors of the government grew, yes. As we said in our testimony, they had additional need for sanitarians for inspection purposes, they increased monitoring units in State Government, they increased the school system, they increased health and social services. There were many increases. In our yellow volume where we discuss anticipated impacts of both Alyeska and the Arctic Gas Pipeline, we identify as at the time that report was written some of the State Departm ent's plans for increasing their work force to meet anticipated demand. When I indicated earlier there was a lack of state planning, it wasn't total, and there was some



	Cross-Exam by Bayly
1	increase of staffing in anticipation of Alyeska
2	impact.
3	Q Now, I take it that the
4	government services that grew, grew from the employment
5 ,	pool, the labor pool in the state, but also grew because
6	people came in from other parts of the United States
7	and elsewhere to fill some of these jobs. Is that
3	correct?
9	A There were people who took
10	additional jobs generated in the States who came from
11	outside, who were in-migrants, if you will, and there
12	were people who took them from inside the state.
13	Q So even in that area you
14	required in-migrants to fill some jobs that there
15	might not have been people qualified to fill in the
16	State of Alaska.
17	A Well, now we're getting
18	very speculative, and it depends on what jobs you're
19	talking about and generally the increase in local
20	service delivery jobs could have been filled in the
21	state, because we're not talking about comparable
22	numbers to direct employment on Alyeska.
23	There may have been a need
24	for a neuro-surgeon and there wasn't one in the State
25	of Alaska, and sure enough he popped up from Miami to
26	fill the bill; so in that sense yes, to get a neuro-
27	surgeon you needed in-migration. Either that or a medical sch
28	Q So if you needed more

teachers you --

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A No, that wasn't the



problem. As our report documents there was a surplus of teachers prior to the institution of the Alyeska project, and that was a surplus labor area that no one anticipated any problems filling. Indeed, there was no problem.

Let me just say it's sort of a reverse logic that we're slipping into. You're suggesting that you had to have in-migrants to provide service. But it goes the other way. Because of in-migration you had to generate more services, and maybe some of those extra service provision jobs were filled in some cases by in-migrants. But without the in-migration you wouldn't have needed to expand, except to meet this general normal expansion of any state service delivery system.

Q I can understand that. What I'm concerned with is you seem to have laid the blame largely for the impacts at the door of inmigration, which I am suggesting to you is a requirement to build this pipeline.

A All right.

Q I mean if we're talking

about back doors --

A Well, let me go over it one more time. You need some outsiders to b uild the pipeline, admittedly, and we refer to in- migration as a dynamic which had negative consequences, we are talking about the entry into the State of Alaska in the two-year period of perhaps 70 to 80,000 people.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: Far

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WITNESS BOORKMAN: 20% of

the -- 20% growth in the state population in two years.

A wave of people entering a state, the state cannot
deal with it. Yes, you need some of those people, you
need a couple of thousand of welders. I don't know
what the figure is, but it sure isn't many, and saying,
"Therefore, how can you bad-mouth in-migration?" It
seems to me to be sophism.

Q Well, you can call it what you will, but it appears that you needed some in-migration, that you couldn't control it in the way that the Alyeska project was planned, or didn't control it.

A No , I think the Alyeska project, if you're talking about building a pipeline, was no different in type than any other major development project in the state. If for instance the voters who have now voted to move the state capital from Juneau somewhere, eventually --

THE COMMISSIONER: But not

Anchorage or Fairbanks.

heaven forbid. If they decide on a site, and if wonder of wonders, the voters of the state actually approved the neccessary money to make the move, which is many hundreds of millions of dollars, and that move takes place, I anticipate that — I think we anticipate that there will be, because of that major development project, another wave of in-migration, because it will be fairly highly visible. It will be something on which there



will be a lot of jobs. It won't be the same amount of in-migration because it neither has as much lure as the pipeline, nor as much romance, nor is it as large a project, but the dynamic is basically the same.

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Q Well, let's --

A The same things happened before. It wasn't just Alyeska that caused it. It was a recurrent pattern. I think that's the thrust of our testimony.

Q -- let's assume that you, Mr. Boorkman, were asked prior to the construction of the Alyeska project what you would do to control inmigration, having seen what has already happened.

What would you do?

A I would not have located the hiring halls in Fairbanks. I would have set up mechanisms -- and this is difficult in Alaska -frankly, it raises serious constitutional problems by giving preference to anybody for jobs. There have been arguments raised that the Local Hire Act in Alaska is unconstitutional -- a section of it as a matter of fact, was declared unconstitutional. But laying that aside for the moment, if local hire is an objective of the jurisdiction in which the development is occurring, as it was in Alaska and as I understand from the Commissioner that it is in Canada, then I would have set up mechanisms to identify at an early stage what we're talking about in terms of resident Alaskans or residents of the Northwest Territories that are going to get this preference. I would have set up



before the project began strict enforcement mechanisms to make sure that those people and only those people got preference for local hire . I would have set up arrangements for hiring immediate outsiders and hiring them outside the area in which they were going to perform their work, so as not to stimulate jobseekers with very little chance of getting employment from coming to the very area you're trying to keep them out of. I would have intensified the efforts to publicize those procedures across the nation so that people in Tulsa, people on Oskosh knew that if they wanted a job in Alaska that they had to go to Seattle to get it or they had to go to Chicago to get it, or Kansas City or some place that could absorb that impact and still perform the function of attracting the right kind of labor.

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What else would I have done?

Q I was going to help him out and say what else he might have done. Messrs.

Weinstein, have you got any other things that you might have done?

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: I'm not sure. I think they could have had a more effective revenue-sharing mechanism between the state and the localities, but again the problem -- that's hindsight. A lot of the problems result because of the in-migration and we've pointed out the problems of revenue-sharing. But I think that even then before Alyeska came in there were problems with the kind of revenue-sharing mechanisms that did exist.



Weinstein, Weinstein
Boorkman, Trusty
Cross-Exam by Bayly
WITNESS BOORKMAN: I'm just

1 reminded of something else. It would be good to have 3 1 those people that do come in from outside of state to work as direct construction workers, the highly skilled 4 5 people to be rotated out of the state when their 6 tour of duty is over, so they don't go to the major 7 population centres and get drunk and look for hookers 8 and things. 9 And by how much would 0 10 you predict that your policies would have been able 11 to curtail the surplus in-migration? 12 I think it could have 13 been cut very significantly. 60%, 70%, I don't know. 14 It's very hard to say. 15 I take it, though, some Q 16 17 It could have mitigated A (18 it a great deal. 19 Now you didn't suggest 0 20 turning people back at the borders. 21 You can't do it. 22 Yes, I realize that. 23 You may not be able to do some of the things you 24 suggested with regard to the labor local hire laws 25 either, but you would have liked to have done that. 26 I take it, though, short of doing that, you're still 27 going to get some people who come in on spec that 23 there's going to be something generated that they're

going to be able to benefit from, whether they are

a bookkeeper or a hooker.

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Different strokes for different folks.

> Or a number of occupations 0

in between.

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A Yes, indeed.

Which end of the spectrum do you think attorneys fall into?

Mr. Trusty, while we're on this particular subject, and I won't ask you very many questions now because I know these gentlemen have to leave, what I've been suggesting to them is that although Arctic Gas in the Canadian situation may be able to control those activities over which it has direct employer-employee supervision, there may be a lot of ancillary activities that go on over which it has no control, which will cause in-migration or an inc rease in transients, to use your breakdown of population.

WITNESS TRUSTY: We are going to be going into that in some detail but let me just skim the surface for a second. As a general principle, that's correct, that despite whatever you do in terms of direct employment policies and hiring centres and so on, and despite all the advertising in the world, there may be some people who will come north looking for jobs or opportunities that they might be there. That clearly is a potential. think

I would note that you have a different kind of logistic



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system operating in the north, so that getting beyond the limits of the Mackenzie Highway, ie. past Fort Simpson becomes more difficult and more costly, so that's one factor. If you know you can't be hired by the pipeline for sure, then that may be a mitigating factor. Also the fact of government controls that operate in the Northwest Territories as opposed to Alaska means that you can put in land use regulations, you can prevent the kind of -- to use a term "squatting" that has occurred in some places of Alaska and to which Magistrate Sprecker referred, because you can simply put in the land use controls and prevent it. You can prevent small businesses from mushrooming in a community. The zoning controls are very powerful. The lack of private development, as compared to government, and as compared to the Alaska situation, is a factor. So I think there are mechanisms, there are mechanisms that go beyond the scope of what a private company can do, and I'm not denying that the potential will be there. I think it will be very much reduced. The one other factor I would

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note is that because of the geography of the situation if you take for example the community of Fairbanks, the military bases used to house the construction crews that operate in that portion of the Alyeska line and it also is a personnel processing centre and so on. So a lot of incomes are being spent right there. The geography is not the same, in the Northwest Territories.

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We'll be going into detail about how close we are to



communities and the extent to which workers will go into communities; but to the extent they don't, you don't have a multiplier effect. Therefore you don't have a demand for services, and housing and all those things. So as I say, we'll be coming back to this in some detail.

Q I take it, though, that you would agree with me that some secondary activities although not directly the responsibility of the pipeline construction company, may still be something they are responsible for generating either the growth of or the commencement of.

A That's correct, true.

Q And over which the company will have very little control except as it may be able to influence the government to put in regulations through something like this Inquiry.

A That's correct. Obviously there is a direct link between how aggressively you procure locally, procure goods and services, and how those businesses develop, just as there is a direct link between local hiring preference and in-migration, you know with residency qualifications and so on. An local overly aggressive procurement policy can cause expansion beyond that that might be considered desirable.

Q Now, with regard to housing, and back to the Alaskans again, or the Californians from Alaska, Mr. Boorkman, you've emphasized that there may be a gap between the housing that people can afford and the housing that is available in some

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of the communities that have been impacted by the pipeline or the pipeline-related activities.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: We're mainly talking about Fairbanks.

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following you.

Q Yes, and would you attribute that to the construction of the pipeline, or would you contribute that to in-migration or to the growth of ancillary or secondary services and service industries?

A Well, it's a combination.

If you didn't have more people coming in who needed houses, you wouldn't have the problem. You also wouldn't have the demand that would force the price up. If you didn't have a project you wouldn't be drawing off parts of the construction industry that could produce new housing to meet some of that demand, so it goes in many different ways.

Q And in that sense you may have more than one boom caused by the construction, one which is directly the construction of the pipeline and one which --

A I'm sorry, I'm not

Q In Alaska you had a multi-faceted boom, if you want to call it that. There were those workers that were brought in and interacted with the community very little except perhaps on their time off, the ones who lived in the camps who worked on the pipeline.



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Q In Alaska you had a multi-faceted boom, if you want to call it that. There were those workers that were brought in and interacted with the community very little except perhaps on their time off, the ones who lived in the camps who worked on the pipeline.



A Right.

Q The only influence they may have had is to draw off employees from other parts of the Alaskan economy to more attractive jobs on the pipeline.

A Yes.

Q All right, and then you have the in-migration boom which went along with this. It wouldn't have happened independently, I suggest. People came in because of the pipeline.

A Oh yes.

Q And they caused some of the pressures on the community over which Alyeska had no control.

A Right. If they hadn't come they wouldn't have generated those pressures.

Q Yes, but they didn't come because there was some other boom going on in Alaska.

A Oh no, no, no. Of

course.

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Q Just one more question for the -- for you three gentlemen. Mr. Boorkman, you said that the process of winking at crime that was going on in the camps had no impact on communities.

A I don't think I did say

that.

Q In answer to the

Commissioner's question.

A No, what I said was that



the statistics indicate that the increase in crime in 3 4 the community he was referring to did not even match the increase of population, so that one was hard pressed 5 to say that there was an increase in the crime rate 6 due to the project.

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
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1 :	Q But that does not account
2	for what may or may not have been going on in the camps
٥	that Magistrate Sprecker and others have talked about.
. ,	A There may have been
5	crime that does not appear on the reports.
6	Q And that may have far-
7	reaching attitudinal effects on the people in the
3 1	various communities if they were in the camps that
9 .	we haven't been able to measure yet.
10	A I'm sorry, I'm not
11	following you. People in other communities that came
12	into the camps that saw them drinking and carrying
13	on may have had their attitudes affected?
14	Q Yes.
15	A I'm not sure of the size
16	of that universe, it's theoretically possible.
17	Q But you can't measure
18	that right now? You can't
19	A I don't know if there
20	was such a case.
21	Q This isn't something you
22	have statistics on?
23	A No.
24	Q Right. I have some
25 !	questions for Mr. Trusty, but I'll wait until Mr.
26	Scott is finished with the others.
27	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
28	MR. STEEVES: Well sir, can
29	I speak for a moment? Mr. Boorkman has spoken to me
30	on bobolf of Manne Walnut 1

on behalf of Mssrs. Weinstein and himself. He has



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established an order of priority and he asked me to inform you that they're prepared to stay as long as necessary in order that whatever help they can give this Inquiry is made available to you. So, we suggest that everybody has got to stop now. It is no longer ϵ the case. 7 MR. SCOTT I'm glad to 3 hear that sir, I was just getting subpoenas ready while 9 they were within the jurisdiction. 10 WITNESS BOORKMAN:]] you going to enforce them? 12 MR. SCOTT: You're here. A 14 they returnable? VOICE: Tomorrow. 16 Α 17 to be out of the country by tomorrow, what are you 13 talking about? THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Scott, --20 MR. SCOTT: I have to inter-22 ject, Mr. Commissioner, Mr. Boorkman's an old O.E.O. ..2 lawyer and he's very conscious of how you escape the 13 impact of a subpoena. 24 Oh, you're a vicious man. A 25 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry sir. 25 1 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, all _ 7 I want to know is what happens now? 28 ' MR. SCOTT: Well, Mrs. McQuarrie 29 has some questions and I have, I would think about

half to three quarters of an hour and if possible tonight,



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

I would like to ask some questions of Mr. Trusty when the Americans are here.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, do you want to carry on or do you want to stop for a bite to eat?

MR. SCOTT: It's up to Mr.

Steeves.

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MR. STEEVES: Well, I've just asked the witnesses and they say carry on.

MR. SCOTT: All right. I gather Mr. Bell hasn't any questions. He advised me of that earlier. Mrs. MacQuarrie, you're next I think CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MRS. MacQUARRIE:

Q I was wondering if

there was just -- like prior to the building of the

pipeline in Alaska, was there general public apathy

towards the construction, or were the people there

concerned about the impact that the development would have?

hard, I think, in any place to really say with any great assurance what the people of an area think, because the people don't speak. The newspapers speak and all the rest, but I think generally it's fair to say that a lot of people were excited by the prospect of the pipeline for the development it could bring, the growth it could bring. There were a number of people that understood that this was going to change the way of life and maybe some of the things about Alaska that they had come there to enjoy. So, I think that there were people that were ambivalent about it.



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Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

Q M-hm, but there wasn't a similarity -- a commission such as the Berger Inquiry to determine whether or not it was going to be good or bad?

A No, no, no, regretably not.

Q I see. What was the length of time between the decision that the construction would take place and the beginning of the construction period?

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THE COMMISSIONER: Well, that is really '68 to '73, isn't it?

well, I'm trying to find that specific date. The
basic scenario -- and I wasn't around for all of it,
but I can trace it generally, was that the pipeline
which they anticipated building at the end of the '60's
or right at the beginning of 1970, was delayed for a
number of years for environmental reasons and through
judicial restraint of the permit power of the Secretary of
the Interior. Finally Congress entered the act and
passed legislation, the Pipeline Authorization Act,
which mandated that the pipeline be approved, exempted
it from further environmental review and set up a period
by which the constitutionality of that piece of legislation could be tested, a very limited review period.

From the time that Act passed, which was -- we think '73 or we can track that down, the pipeline started in April of '74 so it was a very short time once they finally cleared the last legal



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hurdle.

WITNESS TRUSTY: Can I add one point to that. It be, my understanding is that because of the initial -- there was almost a start before it went into the Courts and as a result, pipe had been delivered, a lot of the initial procurement that normally constitutes the lead time between certification of a project and start of construction. A lot of that had already occurred.

Q Yes.

A So once it was cleared through the Courts, once the legislation was passed and the project was going to go ahead, a lot of the normal lead time had been used up three years before, or whatever the time period was. So, I just wanted to make that point clear that —

was time for the companies to get ready, but you mentioned earlier that there wasn't any government planning or planning and building of facilities in the communities to accommodate the influx. Is that so?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: I would say that the government inadequately anticipated the scope of in-migration that the project would cause and inadequately prepared to deal with it. That's the long way of saying yes.

Q Thank you.

A I'm just reminded of something I said earlier. It wasn't a function of time so much, it was a function of perception and will and political

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decision making.

Q And this was the basic reason why the communities weren't prepared as far as facilities were concerned to accommodate the influx then?

A Yes.

Q Thank you. On page three you mentioned the statistics regarding the number of workers. Is there any breakdown for the number of married women who were likely employed as well?

A The number of workers on the pipeline you're referring to?

Q Yes.

not sure that Alyeska, which would have those figures, has brought them out in that kind of a breakdown. I'm not aware of it if they have. I do know from my own observations, which are not universal, that there are a lot of women working, certainly in the North Slope in the Prudhoe Bay area, but how many -- who they're working -- you have to be careful because some of them may be working for air taxi companies or something else, but there are a number -- there has been some priority given to women on the pipeline for affirmative action purposes, if nothing else.

Q Is there any minimum age for workers on the pipeline or in the support services?

A There is, but I don't know what it is. Minimum age -- I think you have to be 16.

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Weinstein, Weinstein, Boorkman, Trusty Cross- Exam by MacQuarrie

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WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: It's

WITNESS BOORKMAN: I don't know

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the normal -- under the federal child labour laws.

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if Alyeska has any other rules about the people they

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employ, their age.

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wondered, whether --

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A I'm sorry, I don't know

Well, this is what I

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that.

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Q Okay.

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WITNESS TRUSTY: I might add one point on the question of female employees and this relates particularly to the North Slope. Because of the legislation that exists about non-discrimination along sexual lines and the -- and I think that translates almost into quotas. The information I was given when I was there was that women were so much in demand to fill the quotas that they could literally choose the camp they lived in and choose who they -- which precise operation they worked at and so on, which is not true of many of the others. So that there are

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them.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: I'd like

certainly women employed up there and there is -- from

the perspective of the industry, faced with government

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to add there are several affirmative action plans.

imposed quotas for females, there aren't enough of

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In addition to the Alaska plan, which is for minority groups by and women, which is signed about 300 parties. The

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contractors, the unions and various governmental entities,



Weinstein, Weinstein, Hoorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

which has a goal of, I think, 28 percent by 1977.
28 percent minority.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: And women.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: At the

time it was written minority did not include women,
now it includes women. But in addition to that, Alyeska
itself has signed affirmative action plans, one for
employment within its own ranks and another one for
awarding business contracts to minority -- firms run
by minorities and firms run by women.

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WITNESS BOORKMAN: It's a the little complicated in the United States because/minority term is not really the operational one for a minority business. It's socially and economically disadvantaged and there are a variety of criteria that can go into that. I assume being a women could meet some of those criteria, but it's not that clean.

On page eight you refer to the original substandard housing. Are there any health problems associated with perhaps overcrowding of these substandard --

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: The definition for substandard in the United States, one of the criteria is overcrowding, right.

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A There are two. Yes, it's based upon the census and the census had two criteria and one of them was overcrowding. The other was a subjective view of say safe --

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Lacking in

That is part of it?



toilet facilities.

WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Toilets,

3 " right.

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witness Boorkman: In terms of health hazards, if that's what you're talking about as I understand. I'm certainly not a doctor, but traditionally in Alaska, the overcrowding which was endemic lead to a very high rate of tuberculosis, which has been largely erradicated through better health delivery systems throughout the state over the last 20 years, but still you have problems of overcrowding and mental stress and family breakups and the problems that are health related around fire, because the houses are often very unsafe and the heating methods are somewhat primitive in some of these rural houses and you can have fires quite often that can endanger lives and health.

Q And has this --

A I'm sorry, and sanitary conditions often aren't very good either, that's not just the housing, that has to do with the sewage facilities in the permafrost areas where you have honey buckets, and it's just much less sanitary than in many other parts of the country.

next question, but regarding the water supply and the sewage disposal, but taking them both together under a health concern has there been an increase in these diseases related to this kind of situation like tuber-culosis, hepatitis or whatever?



increases in tuberculosis. It's pretty much been erradicated as I understand it, in Alaska, at least by when we were preparing our report. I frankly haven't seen health statistics that indicate any major epidemics or health problems that have been traced specifically to the pipeline impact. Of course there have been injuries of workers and those were anticipated as a health hazard, but one, it's expected in a large project.

I am aware of some other negative consequences of the impact however. There has been, as I understand it, although I can't provide detailed statistics, some increase in family breakups and we're especially interested because of some work we've been doing for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the issue of child abuse and neglect, and that apparently has been some — that problem has been intensified to the degree that some of the strains of the impact have translated into instabilities in families and with the resulting danger to the safety of children.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse me

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I noticed in your curriculum vitae that you had been involved in child abuse and so forth. When I was in Alaska, I think I was told by the people --

A --involved in the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect, please.

MR. SCOTT: Mr. Boorkman was an

abused child.

A Abused witness maybe.

THE COMMISSIONER: That in

Fairbanks I was given some statistics and I don't have them here, that showed at the time I thought a remarkable increase in child abuse in the broad sense and neglected in the percentage of cases — reported cases of allegedly neglected children and abused children and it appeared to have gone up more rapidly than the growth of population. But if I am —

A Well, not from any data specific that I have on Alaska, but just generally given some knowledge about the dynamics of child abuse and neglect, it's a very, very difficult reporting system as the criminal law system is very difficult, and it is hard to determine whether or not you are having more actual abuse and neglect or whether community changes in the nature of the community are increasing reporting.

Q Yes. Well, that's the

problem.

A By having a hetrogenous



-- an increasingly heterogeneous community where you have people from Tulsa living next to long-term Alaskans and having natural tensions because of difference of outlook and all the rest, that may cause reports where there would not have been any if they had all been 48ers which is a time when a lot of Alaskans came in, and they view themselves as a particular class of people because they in-migrated at that time.

so, I don't think anybody really knows, but I wouldn't be surprised if there had been some increase in abuse and neglect because of the strains engendered by some of the negative pipeline impact and by overcrowding and by the absence of a breadwinner who is working on the pipeline from his family which may be an unusual thing. There are a lot of reasons for child abuse and neglect and those are some of them.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Trusty?

WITNESS TRUSTY: Based on

conversations rather than data, conversation specifically with Mim Dixon at the Impact Information Center, as I recall, she cited this as a problem in Fairbanks and to some extent, although because of the native problems, it is difficult to be precise — but to some extent, it seemed to reflect some of the tent living that was going on in the summertime and I observed personally in Valdez, people who were literally living in the parking lot in campers and sometimes with children. Childneglect situations arose out of those kind of situations.

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WITNESS BOORKMAN: There is

another difficulty. I am just reminded. Let me clarify it for the sake of the record that the statistic that you mentioned which I had not remembered was apparently taken from the Pipeline Impact Information Center Report which was then retracted a couple of issues later because the State people said that it was an inaccurate statistic. That doesn't really go to the issue. There may well be increases of abuse and neglect. But the difficulty, especially with neglect is it is such a subjective term. Distinguishing neglect from poverty is almost impossible and it's a very --

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beholder.

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A I'm sorry?

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It's in the eye of the 0

19. 20. beholder. You may get a new welfare officer in a given locality and suddenly the instances of child neglect

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go up because of his own subjective attitudes towards

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the proper upbringing of children. I agree.

Yes. THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm sorry Mrs.

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MacQuarrie. I advanced the position not at all by intervening and that's what usually happens.

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MRS. MacQUARRIE: Thank you.

funded But there were State mental health

services, medical services and facilities before the

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beginning of development, were there not?

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A There were State what?



- Q State funded or --
- A Oh, yes. Yes.
- Q --basic medical services

and mental health services.

A Yes. Yes. Children's services and all the rest, yes.

Q I see, and were these because of the extra stress and what all upgraded to a significant level now to accommodate the fall-out?

if I had the yellow volume back there. I do remember that they were planning to add some -- I remember they specifically were going to add more sanitarium jobs. I believe that the nursing section was going to add some slots. Wait a second and I will try and give you a better answer.

additional convalescent facilities would be needed and planned for that through the Hillberton(?) Act which is a comprehensive health planning act in the United States. The facilities of hospitals who anticipated to be expanded modestly to deal with additional health care demands generated by the pipeline. To my knowledge, that those have not — that has not been an acute area of concern. They were adding public health care workers in anticipation of the pipeline impact. Some of this is very hard to sort out, what caused what.

In some cases, you had unmet

demand.

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in the State that they were finally coming to the point of meeting by adding new staff positions because Alyeska was expected to come. The question was, how do you sort out the causality there. They needed it anyway but the additional impact they expected was the final straw that broke the camel's back and so they added some of these positions.

That was true in a number of areas; things like the itinerant nurses program which is part of the public health service program.

Q But you say that these didn't receive any priority even now? Is that what you said earlier?

I think that generally a comment could be made that increases in the service delivery system have, in many areas, not been sufficient to meet the demands of the increased population and health care is one of those areas.

again, going back to conversations with the head of the Impact Information Center, there have been specific things that have arisen. For example, local doctors at Fairbanks wanting to do the medicals on pipeline hires instead of having Alyeska bring in its own doctors and establish its own medical facility. That's had an impact on the availability of doctors in Fairbanks to service their normal caseload.

There was some debate in Fairbanks about the military hospital, which at one time

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had serviced the community and then they stopped doing that. They serviced the community in very specific ways and I can't say more than that. But there were specific local factors that involved the medical profession itself. I guess one could almost put it in its crudest terms and say how they viewed their share

of the action and responded to it, that had a bearing.

instance just before the Alyeska impact occurred, the policy of the military hospitals in the Fairbanks area to provide gynecological services for wive dependents of men stationed there was curtailed and forcing those people to go to the private sector to receive care, and that type of a process which was totally unrelated to the pipeline could only be intensified by pipeline impact.

WITNESS TRUSTY: Again as I recall, there was a problem as Mr. Boorkman noted earlier, a lot of the expansion has occurred in the Borough outside the City of Fairbanks and there was some problem over ambulances serving anything outside the city limits. So you had the area of growth being the area that was not serviced by ambulances.

Again, it was some sort of

jurisdictional problem.

Q Then who services the people who are left over who don't belong to the industrial base?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: No, it's a jurisdictional problem. Certain services don't go

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outside the city limits of Fairbanks into the borough.

Q Right.

A So people have to come

into the city to receive those health services.

Q but when you were speaking earlier of the local doctors getting a piece of the action and neglecting their home grown patients, what alternatives do these patients have for service? None.

WITNESS TRUSTY: My understanding

but I guess the point to make is that I think Alyeska would have been quite happy to put in its own doctors and do the medicals itself. It was the local medical profession who did not want that to happen. So that it was a community decision if you like, voiced by the community doctors as opposed to a policy of the pipeline company to use local doctors to do their medicals.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Medical

cartel. Just like lawyers.

Q Is this taking too long?

THE COMMISSIONER: No, you're

doing very well. Don't let any of this allegedly amusing banter stop you .

MRS. MacQUARRIE: On page ten

I believe you refer to the policing and Mr. Sigler has stolen all my questions, but I wondered about whether or not there are -- or before development, there were native court worker programs -- legal aides -- that were financed by the State, all these kinds of things.



Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie 1 It's a very embarrassing 2 question because I should know the answer, and I don't. 3 Were there legal service programs that provided legal 4 aid to local natives? 5 0 Well, to local residents, 6 whether they were native or not. 7 I am sorry. Yes, there 8 is. 9 0 There were? 10 A Yes. 11 Q And there are? 12 A There are. 13 What is the -- is there 0 14 a liaison between the police who are looking after 15 the camp security and the municipal police force? 16 Α I think informal only. 17 Do you mean in terms of reporting crimes that occur 18 in camps? 19 Yes. 0 20 Well there would be an A 21 obligation under the law to report a crime if they 22 were cognizant of one. Whether or not that happens 23 all the time is the issue that we've gotten into 24 earlier. But theoretically, yes, there has to be. 25 0 On page 12, with the 26 companies being fairly self-sufficient and not really 27 needing the local merchants, has there been much bank-

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the local merchants?

ruptcy as a result of the -- you know, bankruptcy of

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A We're not aware of any



increase in bankruptcy that has occurred during the boom period. There was a lot of business failure that occurred during the false boom that we referred to, in that period in particular between 1970 and '72, in which the economy heated up in anticipation of building the pipeline at an early stage and then the pipeline was delayed for legal reasons and a lot of people that had geared up, expanded their facilities, their businesses, added new people or capacity were left with inadequate demand for that increased capacity and may have either suffered financial reverses or may have even gone bankrupt. I don't have statistics on the number, but it was a serious economic decline period after the false boom.

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WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: I'm

not too sure. Services were demanded and utilized from the localities, so that local businesses could benefit. There is that kind of -- it wasn't totally separated, the company did not totally separate it.

There's also a secondary --

Q But the local merchants
may have over-estimated the amount of goods he -WITNESS BOORKMAN: overestimated or miscalculated the time at which his

increase demand would begin.

witness J. Weinstein: In fact, one of the phenomena on it, and I understand it's occurred to some degree and I can't comment on the degree, has been because of the project and because of the supposed fortune to be made, unsophisticated go people have attempted to into businesses on occasion, and that's led to this kind of problem you're talking about, and in the case of some of the in-migrants, somebody who failed as a barber in Kansas City decided he could really make it big running a store in Fairbanks because of the project, and that person sometimes fails then, because they just basically don't have the business skills.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: That's the boomer mentality, the in-migrant mentality which is the reason is not the motivating force behind the in-migration, just as it may not be the motivating force behind starting a business to get rich quick and then



One point about teenagers,

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failing. So you can see not only is there the impact not only of boomerism as a phenomenon, in the number of people that came into the state, but in some of the hairbrained ventures that some of the people might have tried to start up.

When you were talking about the school, the education enrollment, are there any statistics available on the number of dropouts and the age group that they may have been in?

There probably are. I don't happen to have them.

Q I was thinking in terms of the numbers of teenagers who would have left the school in order to obtain jobs on the pipeline.
WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN:

in Fairbanks in particular, Secondary Schools are on double session so what happened was that the students, enough teenagers who were of an age where they could get jobs, were able to go to school for half a day and work half a day, and that given the kind of demand for service jobs and dishwashing jobs, bank teller jobs, I mean -- banks probably not; but a number of service jobs, a number of students were able to pick up jobs without having to drop out of school. That's secondary and not indirect employment.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Yes, WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: not with the pipeline. We don't know the level of those type of people in Alyeska jobs, the statistics are simply not available.



1 But part of the number 2 of dropouts would have obtained pipeline jobs at the 3 jobsite. 4 I'm sorry? 5 0 Part of the number of 6 teenage dropouts would have terminated their education 7 in order to work on the pipeline. WITNESS BOORKMAN: 8 I don't know if that's 9 true because I don't know how many of them actually 10 got jobs on the pipeline. It's conceivable that some 11 people dropped out of school hoping to get a pipeline 12 job. 13 What I'm wondering, are 14 there statistics available that would cover that kind 15 of a possibility? 16 A Usually dropout statistics 17 don't get that detailed in terms of motivation of the 18 dropoutee or the dropper-out, or dropper-outer. 19 WITNESS TRUSTY: The other 2) thing is --21 WITNESS BOORKMAN: 22 other two drops. 23 WITNESS TRUSTY: As in the 24 case of any worker, they would have had to go through 25 the union and go up through the hiring hall process, 26 so that they would probably be on a low level of 27 seniority within the preference status. They wouldn't 23 have the relevant work experience and so on. 29 WITNESS BOORKMAN: And given

the need to get a job through the hiring hall, if you're



Then how did the people

going to work directly on the pipeline I suspect that 1 the entire seniority system, not to mention age 2 discrimination, might well have made it very difficult 3 for a teenager to get those kind of jobs. 4 5 Q The second paragraph on 6 page 12 7 MR. SCOTT: I can't hear. 8 MRS. MacQUARRIE: I'm sorry. 9 I think mine works, Can A 10 you hear me? O.K. 11 0 Some of the workers obviously don't bring their children, but what is the 12 level of day care services that are available in Fair-13 banks for people who are working? Have those been 14 15 upgraded, and are they state-run? WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: 16 Yes, I can speak to that. 17 No, they're mot state-run by and large. Most of them are private church or community oriented. The amount 18 of day care has not, as far as I can remember, increased 19 that significantly, and it is one of the crying needs 20 21 in Fairbanks, as is the situation in most cities. 22 In Section (f) the first 23 paragraph, you were referring to inflation. With the 24 increase in the cost of living, were the transfer 25 payments increased to accommodate the inflation? WITNESS BOORKMAN: 26 Transfer payments from the Federal Government to the state? 28 0 Yes. 29 Α No.

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who were dependent on these payments manage to subsist?

A Well many of the people -WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: There are

a variety of transfer payments.

Q Well, the four that we were talking about the last couple of --

A I mean I don't know which they were.

Q Well, social welfare --

A Yes.

Q -- for a family, or the senior citizens' social security pensions, those kinds

of things.

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In general they haven't Α You know, it depends on which transfer payment you're talking about. Yes, they are periodically inc reased. Social security has always been increasing, I'd say every six months the U.S. Congress passes a law increasing the amount of social security payments. Welfare -- not welfare, excuse me -- Unemployment Insurance has been increasingly liberalized. The payment itself, I'm not sure whether that has gone up or not in the last couple of years, but the length of time one can draw Unemployment Insurance has been lengthened. The requirements for how long one has to work before drawing U.I. have been decreased. The benefits have been liberalized so that you've got to define -- the answer is it depends on the transfer payment. Many of them have been increased and liberalized.



WITNESS BOORKMAN: But

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let's get clear on causality. They were not increased because of the pipeline impact. Generally the type you're talking about, they're based on federal guidelines which were not altered for the sake of pipeline Social security is a right, according impact residence. depending on to the formula what you pay in, and you would get increases of the and the number of people getting social that money, security nationwide would not be -- there is no way of breaking that out in terms of what portion of that was pipeline-related or the number of people who went to Alaska. In terms of things like Unemployment Insurance, their there's a pool into which people and employers pay and people draw out of that according to the type of regulations and laws that Mr. Weinstein referred to.

In terms of welfare, as I indicated earlier, welfare requirements are fairly stringent and there could well be a case where somebody came to Alaska in search of a job, didn't find one, didn't qualify for welfare, was not eliqible for Unemployment Insurance, and was going hungry, and would be dealt with by private charities or individual donations, to which the formal delivery system did not respond.

0 So actually the welfare payments weren't to people resident in Alaska for the last 100 years, weren't increased too-significantly to take care of the inflation in the local cost of living. That's what I was getting at.

> Α Oh, I see. As David said,



1 in terms of social security, that's a national --2 when those increases are made they're made for 3 general increases in the cost of living nationwide. 1 They were not affected by the Alaska situation directly. 5 In terms of local welfare, I don't believe that there 6 were any shifts in the eligibility -- in the payment 7 levels. 8 WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: 9 general, mainly if not most in welfare programs. 10 Federal programs are adjusted periodically taking 11 account of inflation. Inflation in Alaska has been 12 worse than inflation in the rest of the United States, 13 so therefore a discrepancy arises. However, U.S. 14 as in Canada too, has just come through a recession; 15 because of the recession, welfare programs have been 16 liberalized and therefore that affects Alaska. 17 So then the --18 WITNESS BOORKMAN: But 19 residents of Alaska would be more disadvantaged than 20 residents of other states because of the higher cost 21 of living. 22 Yes. That took a long 0 23 time. 24 A O.K. 25 Sorry about that. Q 26 A All right. 27 Are the pipeline companies Q 28 responsible for returning their workers to the point 29

of hire once their employment is terminated?

I believe they are. We're

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Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

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going to have an expert on the contracts with the unions and all those procedures later on. I believe the answer is "Yes."

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Impression from the earlier discussions that the pipeline companies are generally very careful of their employees in that they see that they get from point A to point B without disturbing the rest of the community, and is it possible then that our major problem in the Northwest Territories will be with the private contractors or the person like the fellow from Northern Alberta who drives a gravel truck into the Territories and hauls gravel for a few days and spends his off-time in Fort Providence, for instance, a small community? They wouldn't come under the jurisdiction of anyone in that case, would they?

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comment, if I could. First of all, when you made the comment about the pipeline companies being very careful about transporting their people to and from the jobsite, I think by and large that's true, but my understanding is that as a result of the union's position in Alaska in areas where the camps are close to a community, buses are laid on to take the men into the community and that was one of the problems in the Glennallen area. That was a factor that was peculiar to the negotiation in Alaska, one which we would want to avoid here but obviously one which requires union cooperation to avoid.

WITNESS TRUSTY: I might



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, <u>Trusty</u> Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

approach, if you like, in terms of contractors and sub-contractors and sub-sub-contractors, and it, in terms of this project in the Northwest Territories, those contractors who are coming in and working out of a construction camp would be expected to and forced to follow the policies that were established, and certainly any things that were established by way of stipulations with regard to the manner in which the project should be built.

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entrepreneur who has a contract say hauling gravel in a restricted area, and he goes home at night, he passes outside the jurisdiction of any rules and regulations. The difference, I think, in the Northwest Territories will be that by far the vast majority of all the services will be procured by contractors who are coming in from the south and located in the camps to do the job. While there will be local procurement, the level of business sophistication in terms of the number of contractors available and the size of their operations is such that that will simply not be a very large proportion of the total procurement that goes on.

I don't know if that helps, but I want to make that distinction. That distinction isn't as clear-cut in Alaska, I don't believe, because you have larger contractors who were in essence operating right outside their own home base, say working on the section of the pipeline that passes Fairbanks. Those people could go home at night and therefore



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, <u>Trusty</u> Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

the impacts of their spending and so on could be felt.

That would be true of a very small proportion of the total work force in the Northwest Territories.



Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie Q I see. Is gambling 2 legal in Alaska? 3 WITNESS BOORKMAN: No. 4 Is prostitution legal 5 there? 6 WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: Let 7 me -- by the way, the next question -- the mayor of 8 Anchorage has just appointed a commission which came 9 out with a recommendation recommending that prostitution 10 be legalized in Anchorage. 11 The usual camp followers 0 12 according to history are usually a circuit of prostitutes 13 who are brought in from one state to the other and then 14 sent back. I suppose similar -- I won't say that. 15 WITNESS BOORKMAN: Similar to 16 pipeline workers, were you going to say? 17 I was going to say are 18 gambling and prostitution problems of significance 19 in Alaska as a result of development? 20 A Well now, you hear 21 different estimates. As we indicated in our section 22 on crime, there have been greater increases in Part II 23 crimes which are the less serious and include the 24 victimless crime categories than in the Part I or more 25 serious crimes. It really depends on the attitude 26 of the community and many people who live in the 27 Fairbanks area have been used to the fact that Fairbanks 28 is a fairly raunchy town and it has been for a long time 29 and who are not especially disturbed.



Weinstein, Weinstein
Boorkman, Trusty
Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

Newer residents may report

getting upset about. It really depends on your point of view, especially when you are talking about victimless crime. They are crimes. They are illegal. Whether they pose significant problems or not is a matter of policy judgment that I think everybody has to make for his or herself. They have increased according to the crime reports with the caveats that you have to given about the lack of statistical varifiability of crime reports, you know. To say that because the reports go up, crime has gone up is a tenuous argument but — or inference I guess.

WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: Fairbanks

has never been known to be a highly moral town.

Q The other communities near to the development aren't affected then?

WITNESS BOORKMAN: You mean

the smaller native communities that are close?

Q Yes.

A No, there has been no report that I have heard of that indicates there has been a crime problem of any sort, either of victimless crimes or more serious crimes with the exception of the -- with no exceptions.

O I realize that Mr. Bayly asked you this question but I would like to hear your answer again from this perspective. In retrospect, given your -- the social cost of the negative impact of

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Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by MacQuarrie

development on Alaska, would you -- if you were going to do it again and taking into consideration the social breakdown and the family problems and the whole degree of the people costs -- would it have been better to just build the pipeline in isolation using southern workers?

THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse

me, just so I know what you are asking -- I take it

that you are asking Mr. Boorkman to say if it had been

up to him, would he have done it the safe way if that's

the right word to use, simply bringing workers in,

bringing supplies in, bringing materials in and minimiz
ing to the very greatest extent possible the impact on

the Alaskan people. That's what you're driving at?

MRS. MacQUARRIE: Yes, it is.

A If I were a policy

maker who didn't have to run for re-election, I might well have done it that way.

MRS. MacQUARRIE: Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well you are

a policy maker and you don't have to run for re-election

A Oh no, I am not a policy

maker.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's right

A I am a policy persuader

perhaps but not maker.

ask you one question before I forget? You said that in '74 and '75, the two peak years of pipeline employment, 56,000 came in in '75 and you think that if you



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added up the figures for '74 and '75 you'd get something like 75,000 altogether, in-migration in those two years?

A That's an estimate. We did the survey as you pointed out, four times in 1975. We can extrapolate for that year. We don't have any statistics that are nearly as accurate as that survey for 1974. I'm really going back to our report in which we predicted a two-year boom period which would be the years of major employment build-up and we anticipate in our report about 40,000 in-migrants in the two-year period.

We clearly underestimated the level although we were predicting more impact than anyone else at the time. I think we even underestimated the level of impact. When I came up with the 75,000 figure that is somewhat speculative. It's based on the 56 that we can more reasonably postulate for '75 and then saying some probably lesser but significant amount from the preceding year.

Q Yes. You predicted 40,000 in-migration. Was that prediction related to the two peak years of employment or was it --

A Yes. It was for the two years combined. Let me just explain a little bit about why we were wrong. I was -- self-justification at the end of the day. Our population estimates were based upon employment estimates of Alyeska in terms of direct employment, then applying the multiplier, then analysing the general increase in employment and the labor force to the traditional parallelism between those



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two things and population in making some extrapolations. The figures that we used for Alyeska construction were significantly lower than those that were actually finally settled on.

I don't know if you remember but the process was one in which they began by saying they were going to use somewhere in the neighborhood of six to eight thousand workers and ended by having a peak employment of 24,000. So any estimates made on earlier figures by definition were goi ng to minimize the impact. That's by way of self-justification.

Yes, that's intriquing. You say that they started off saying they were going to employ six or eight thousand. They wound up in the peak period employing three times as many. They had a similar difficulty which we neededn't go into regarding cost estimates.

I have always assumed that the reason why the Arctic Gas pipeline -- the one that we're considering here -- was expected to employ -- to require no more than 6,000 construction workers north of the 60th parallel during the peak periods. It's essentially a three-year winter construction program -- was that your pipeline in Alaska was elevated which not only increased the cost but also increased the actual amount of physical work and so on that had to be done.

Have you made any -- is there any basis for thinking, can you tell me just while we are on the subject, whether having looked at Arctic Gas's projections, is there any basis for thinking they may



have underestimated the number of construction workers they'll need to build their pipeline in the same way or at all -- in the same way as the Alyeska people did or at all?

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A Well, you're really asking the wrong person because I think as you pointed out, I understand the same thing you do about the Alyeska They underestimated the diffuculty of the problems experience. technological with an above-ground or an above and below-ground pipeline that had to cross large rivers and do a lot of difficult things. As they had a better cognizance of the design and construction problems, they had to increase their work-force. They were also remember under tremendous pressure by the state which had this project delayed for a long time to generate some revenues. I suspect that had a lot to do with it as well. That problem at least won't be true in the case of Arctic Gas in Alaska. I don't know about on your side of the border, but the relative revenue pressures are not going to be as serious.

O Right.

A In terms of whether or not the design estimates are made, have to be redone. and the workforce increased, I just don't have any knowledge of it. It's not my thing.

point. A couple of the technical difficulties in the above lying pipeline were a part of it. Also the

Q Sorry Mr. Trusty I am



interested in this and there's a conversation there and you're not speaking very --

A Sorry.

Q Sorry, it's my fault.

A I was saying that the

pipeline construction itself was a part of it because of the above ground aspect.

Q Yes.

A There was also the port facility which is a very complex, large undertaking.

Q Yes.

A But in addition, my

understanding from discussions that I had with one of the execution contractors in Fairbanks was that the approval process — the almost mile by mile approval process meant that you didn't have the normal momentum of the spreads. You sometimes would not have the welders being able to come in right behind the initial stringing and do the first part of the stringing operation. The result of that was that they tended to staff up to do the job faster so those men would sit for a day unable to work and so they'd put on extra crews to do more and maintain the schedule. I think that was one of the important factors was the mile by mile approval process.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Does anybody know what he said? It was unclear but it was a distraction. This is much nicer than the Federal Power Commission.



1 Bayly's children who arrive but --2 MR. SCOTT: Who are sometimes 3 clearer than Mr. Bayly is. 4 THE COMMISSIONER: One last 5 question. You said that the number -- that the workers 6 on the Alyeska pipeline construction project itself 7 constituted only 15% of in-migration. 8 No, I didn't mean to say Α 9 that. 10 0 It didn't sound right. 11 No, no. The estimate A 12 I heard and this was taken from listening to the 13 statements of Alyeska before their pipeline project 14 began about the types of labor they would need and the 15 estimate was on the basis of analyzing those and getting 16 some feel for what the labor pool was in Alaska, the 17 question that we were going into earlier that 15% 18 of the direct pipeline jobs would be the type which 19 would require people coming in -- you know, the people 20 from Tulsa and all the rest --21 Yes. O.K. 0 22 Now that was again an 23 estimate and we frankly don't know because Alyeska 24 hasn't told what their actual experience was but it 25 was a small proportion of the direct jobs which in 26 turn is a small proportion of the total jobs. 27 Yes. Right, I am with 0

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you then.

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well, Mr. Scott do you have some questions. I wonder since we had planned on coming



1 back for the movie at 8:30 if we might not come back 2 at 8 and you could ask your questions and we could see 3 the movie. 4 Quite apart from the voice of 5 dissent that has been raised --6 MR. SCOTT: First of all 7 Mr. Commissioner, that won't get these gentlemen on 8 the 7:40 plane. 9 THE COMMISSIONER: There's 10 a 10:50 plane. 11 MR. SCOTT: If we come back 12 at 8:00, that won't get my questions over before the 13 beginning of the movie. 14 THE COMMISSIONER: Well then 15 we postpone the movie. I'm just concerned that there's 16 a limit to how much of this anyone can take and my 17 job is to absorb this and comprehend it. I must say 18 I feel like a break. How long will you be? 19 MR. SCOTT: Well I'll be 20 probably an hour sir. 21 THE COMMISSIONER: Well I think 22 we should come back this evening if you people don't 23 mind. These gentlemen are being very helpful and I 24 find it most interesting and I'd like to be able to --25 WITNESS BOORKMAN: We'd 26 be happy to stay over -- at least two of us can stay 27 over and if you want to do it in the morning, that's 23 fine. 29 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, we

can do it tonight. I don't see any problem with that.



Weinstein, Weinstein

Boorkman, Trusty 1 How do counsel feel about it. MR. SCOTT: Well, I'm prepared | 3 .1 to begin now and go for half an hour and finish up in the morning if that suits better. I don't care. MR. BAYLY: One of the problems 6 with sitting at night is that if we're preparing for 7 something else tomorrow, we don't have the evening 3 to do it in and if these gentlemen can stay, I would $\dot{\mathbf{q}}$ certainly prefer it. If it's very inconvenient, I am 10 prepared to sit tonight. 11 I'm sorry, 1 didn't A 12 hear what you said, but we're willing to stay over if that helps. 14 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, why 15 don't we do this? Why don't we start at 9:30 in the 16 morning and that'll probably do'the job? I appreciate 17 gentlemen your willingness to cooperate with us and 13 I must say that all the people who've come Alaska and other parts of the United States have been most cooperative and willing to share their experience 21 with us. 22 MR. SCOTT: Mr. Commissioner, 23 these are camp followers. 24. A We're trying to live down 25 the "ugly American" syndrome, that's all. 25 -MR. STEEVES: If there's a problem about the plane tomorrow for these gentlemen, may 23 we use your name. 29 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but it

won't do a bit of good. All I want to know is what

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will Ronald Reagan say about the City of Anchorage if they legalize prostitution.? (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO 8 P.M.)

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347
M835
Vol. 159
ANTERON Mackenzie Valley pipeline inquiry:
July 7, 1976

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IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATIONS BY EACH OF

(a) CANADIAN ARCTIC GAS PIPELINE LIMITED FOR A

RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT MIGHT BE GRANTED ACROSS

CROWN LANDS WITHIN THE YUKON TERRITORY AND

THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, and

(b) FOODHILLS PIPE LINES LTD. FOR A RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT MIGHT BE GRANTED ACROSS CROWN LANDS WITHIN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

FOR THE PURPOSE OF A PROPOSED MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE

and and

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT REGIONALLY OF THE CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENT ABANDONMENT OF THE ABOVE PROPOSED PIPELINE

(Before the Honourable Mr. Justice Berger, Commissioner)

Yellowknife, N.W.T.

July 7, 1976.

PROCEEDINGS AT INQUIRY

Volume 159-A

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1	APPEARANCES:
2	Mr. Ian G. Scott, Q.C., Mr. Stephen T. Goudge,
3	Mr. Alick Ryder and
4	Mr. Ian Roland for Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry;
5	Mr. Pierre Genest, Q.C., Mr. Jack Marshall,
6	Mr. Darryl Carter and
7	Mr. J.T. Steeves for Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline Limited.
8	Mr. Reginald Gibbs, Q.C., Mr. Alan Hollingworth and
9	Mr. John W. Lutes for Foothills Pipe Lines Ltd.;
10	Mr. Russell Anthony,
11	Prof. Alastair Lucas and Mr. Garth Evans for Canadian Arctic Resources Committee;
12	Mr. Glen W. Bell and
13	Mr. Gerry Sutton for Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood, and
14	Metis Association of the Northwest Territories;
15	Mr. John Bayly and
16	Miss Leslie Lane for Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, and The Committee for Original Peoples Entitle-
17	ment;
18	Mr. Ron Veale and Mr. Allen Lueck for The Council for the Yukon Indians;
19	Mr. Carson Templeton for Environment Protection
20	Board;
21	Mr. David H. Searle, Q.C.for Northwest Territories
22	Chamber of Commerce
23	Mr. Murray Sigler for The Association of Municipalities;
24	Mr. John Ballem, Q.C. for Producer Companies;
25	Mrs. Joanne MacQuarrie, for Mental Health Association
26	347 of the Northwest Territor ies.
27	Vol. 159-4
28	CANADIAN ARCTIC

CANADIAN ARCTIC GAS STUDY LTD. JUL 2: -:



1	I N D E X Page
2	WITNESSES FOR CANADIAN ARCTIC GAS PIPELINE LIMITED:
3.	Joseph Henry WEINSTEIN David M. WEINSTEIN
4	David BOORKMAN
5	Wayne B. TRUSTY - Cross-Examination by Mr. Scott (cont) 24534
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(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT)

3 MR. SCOTT: Mr. Commissioner, and before I ask any questions while I have it in mind, I would like to give notice 4 5 to Mr. Steeves and to Arctic Gas that during this 6 phase we will be asking for the production of concrete 7 and specific plans with respect to the purchase of 8 goods or supplies by the applicant in the Territories. 9 and I hope in due course that information will be 10 provided. I say that, because in answering Mrs. 11 MacQuarrie today, Mr. Trusty indicated to her that only 12 a small percentage would be purchased here. That, 13 you know, it may only be 10% or 5%, but if that's 14 5% of the capital cost of the project, it involves 15 an extensive purchasing capacity in the Territory, so 16 I hope that Arctic Gas will be able to let us know 17 very shortly the volume they intend to purchase and 18 if possible, the lines in which they intend to make 19 their purchases. As much information on that subject 20 as we can have.

MR. STEEVES: I take notice

of your notice.

MR. SCOTT: Thank you.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SCOTT (CONTINUED):

Q Do I understand from URSA that in the analysis they presented to the Inquiry today they have done no more than attempt to analyze a number of selected impacts?

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WITNESS BOORKMAN: Somehow the



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way you put that, we have presented some of the major impacts that we have been able to gather from basically from secondary data, as I think I explained tangentially earlier today. Our task was really -- our central task was to prepare the socio-economic impact assessment for the Arctic Gas Pipeline in Alaska, because of the timing of that pipeline vis a vis the Alyeska Pipeline, it was incumbent upon us to look and anticipate Alyeska impacts so that we could set the baseline case which Arctic Gas would then impact. But that was predictive.

In terms of monitoring Alyeska impact, that has not been our major function. What we've done is try to gather together as best we can mainly secondary information from a variety of sources and to extract from that the major date of impact that was existent in the state, but probably spend most of our time on the development of an explanation of the context within which those impacts occurred.

Yes, but under various headings you've dealt specifically with impacts on such questions as housing, unemployment, education, policing and so forth. I take it it is recognized that in fact beyond those listed and dealt with, there are a wide range of other impacts which has either not been appropriate or possible for you to touch on.

We tried to focus on the ones that were either of greatest concern in Alaska or presumably in Canada, the ones that received the most publicity and therefore on which we thought there



would be the most questions, and the ones in which the impacts were the most important in terms of quantity, and relevance to the life of the state.

There are certainly other areas you could talk about.

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observe, wouldn't it, that the impacts you emphasized in your analysis are impacts primarily of the economic variety. It doesn't seem to be much about impacts on social or cultural structures in the communities of Alaska that you've dealt with. Now, I take it that I'm not to assume from that that those impacts haven't occurred. It's simply that you haven't dealt with them.

A Well, a couple of things.

(1) if you're talking about cultural impacts in small communities, rural communities, primarily native communities, as I explained before there simply is a dearth of data with respect to that impact that hasn't been gathered by anyone in particular, and there isn't any body of knowledge that we could draw upon to bring that before this Inquiry. We would have done so if it had been available. It was not consciously avoided, it's simply there was no data to bring.

Q I take it, for example, you haven't purported to deal with the impact on the re-distribution of income that may have occurred in Alaska as a result of this project.

A The re-distribution of income among ethnic groups and classes and --



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Scott

Q And workers and retired

2 persons and so on.

A Yes. Well, there is no adequate data on that to bring.

And I take it that you haven't purported to exclude as non-existent the impact of the project on social groupings such as retired persons, persons living on fixed incomes, High School students, and a whole other range of social occupations.

A If I understood your question, we have not excluded that. There simply is no data again to present.

Q All right. Well now,
I observe that in the first page or the first couple
of pages at least, you attempt to describe the
specific Alyeska related impacts and to place them
in Alaska's overall socio-economic context, and you
explicitly exclude consideration of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act. Now, I suggest to you that
the Claims Settlement Act and what follows from it
may quite reasonably be considered as an Alyeska related
impact.

A If I am to guess at your reasoning, I would assume that you mean that/ leverage of the pipeline made land claims happen?

Q That -- let me put it another way -- that the Settlement Claims Act was in one sense a consequence of the Alyeska project proposal.

A Well, can you tell me a



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Scott

1 little more about the assumptions and the reasoning 2 that you're drawing upon to say that? I think I 3 understand what you mean, but I want to make sure. 4 Q I've made no assumptions. 5 I simply put this proposition to you, that when you 6 look at Alyeska and the project, and say, "Now what 7 are the consequences or impacts of that project?" 8 One of them, whether you 9 purport to include it or not in your analysis, has 10 got to be the Native Claims Settlement Act. 11 Α All right, I think we're 12 I'm prepared to deal with the issue directly. jousting. 13 0 All right. 14 If what you're saying is 15 that there would not have been a land claim settlement 16 were it not for the fact that they wanted to build a 17 pipeline in Alaska, that's probably true. 18 Q All right. 19 I don't especially believe 20 in the old truism of government, unless something is 21 wanted I don't believe you give anyone a billion dollars 22 and 40,000,000 acres of land. 23 Q So that in looking at 24 the Alaska problem it would be fair to regard it as 25 within the range of impacts that the Alyeska proposal 26 has produced. 27 Α At a very different 28 level. 29 0 Yes, all right, and I

take it that whether you've considered them or not --



and I don't make any criticism of your determination not to analyze and measure them -- the settlement itself has contributed to the overall socio-economic picture that exists in Alaska.

A Well, of course.

Q Yes, and it's contribut ed to it by achieving the introduction of certain capital resources into the hands of persons who didn't have those capital resources before.

A Yes.

Q And it permitted persons who weren't otherwise able to do so, to engage in joint ventures and spend money and buy goods and do a whole range of things that previously was not likely for them.

A Yes.

Q So thatin that sense it the would be true to say that settlement has altered the socio-economic picture in Alaska.

A Yes.

Q Now in Alaska, as I understand it, the native population that benefits from the settlement is proportionately relatively small.

A The proportion to what?

Q To the population of the

state.

A Oh yes.

Q What percentage roughly



is it, so I'll know?

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Α About 55,000 natives and 350,000 Alaskans -- what is that, 7?

> All right. Q

Α It's late in the evening and my division is not great.

Q And it's obvious to say that the -- that if the proportion of persons benefitting under the settlement was larger, the impact of the settlement in altering the socio-economic picture of the community would naturally be greater.

I'm not sure, it depends Α on whether the settlement was larger.

Well, assuming the

If you're going to A

diffuse the same amount of money.

Assuming it was the 0 same or proportionately larger.

A Well, I can't do both. If the settlement was the same, if you provided a billion dollars and 40 million acres of land to 350,000 people instead of 55, I suspect its impact would be diminished. If you increase it by a factor of seven times, so that you're spending the same amount of money and an equal amount of land per capita, then it would be equal.

- Yes, all right. Q
- Or more or something.



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Cross-Exam	by Scott	

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Q Or more.

A Or more, yes. In gross

terms per capita, equal.

go there to do so.

Q And do I understand, for example, that one of the impacts of the settlement has been (and it may not have been large) an amount of in-migration to Alaska induced by claimants who think they are entitled to participate in the settlement, but have to go there to do so.

A No, you don't have to

Q I'm wrong about that?

A The 13th corporation is the -- there are 12 regional corporations; there/option of having a 13th which will represent all natives who are not Alaska residents. I'm sorry, there is a 13th corporation, they went through a couple of changes on that, but there is currently 13 corporations.

By the way, let me just say
I'll be happy to answer these questions to the extent
of my ability or the Weinstein's ability, but once
again let me just say that we are not experts on
the intricacies of land claims but we'll do the best
we can.

Q No, and I take it that your justification for excluding the impact of the settlement in the analysis that you've made is that the proportion of persons who benefit under the settlement in Alaska is only one-seventh of the



A Comment of the Comment

population.

A No, the reason we excluded it is because we were focusing on one Alyeska impact. Well, let me back up. I think the reason we're here is because there is an implicit assumption that is either spoken or unspoken that what's happening in Alaska with Alyeska, the negative, the good, may be a parallel to what will happen in the Northwest Territories with a gas pipeline, and to the extent that that's an issue of concern, we've been called to describe what the actual Alyeska impacts are to the best of our ability, and the best of our research, and to try and explain what the dynamic underlying that impact has been.

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Weinstein, Weinstein, Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Scott

Q Yes sir, but I'm suggesting to you that in doing that you decided that it would be desirable or the only feasible way, perhaps, in your case, to omit the measurement of impacts that flow from the settlement itself.

A Well, the impacts that flow from the settlement itself have not been very well documented according to any information that I've been able to see. Now, it's fairly early to say. real money and the real impact as intended, I think, by the basic philosophy of the Settlement Act has not yet been realized fully. That native employment patterns have shifted some, but in terms of the leverage that that capital and that use of the land gives natives in Alaska, we don't know what the bottom line is. don't know yet what the impact of that's going to be. It's still too early to say. They've been involved, as you know, in a variety of task enrollment, land selection and a lot of initial activities that really don't get you to the point at which the major impact of the legislation and its formula for distributing money and land that can be foreseen.

Q You see, the difficulty that confronts me is when I take your experience and try to apply it to the Northwest Territories, and recognize that it is conceivable that a land claims settlement may be effected here contemporaneously with the pipeline which will benefit over 50 percent, let us say of the population of the Northwest Territories.

Obviously in that situation, the measurement of the



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impact of that land claims settlement, the effect it may have on inflation and so on and so forth becomes critical in --

A It depends very much, of course, on how you structure the land claims.

Q Precisely, but doesn't it become critical in attempting to predict the socio-economic situation that will exist during the course of construction?

suppose the question is, how far down the speculative road we feel comfortable in going. We, being all of us. I think that the purpose of our testimony is to try and describe some of the elements of impact, pipeline impact in Alaska, if you will, distinguishing them from land claims impact and to try and take a look those of at, through Mr. Trusty's testimony and other witnesses who will follow, whether or not the context is basically different in the Northwest Territories and if so, whether or not pipeline development will therefore have a different cast, will take a different shape.

I think it's useful to distinguish that discussion from a discussion of, if there is land claims and depending upon the type of land claims adopted, what will the impact be if it's contemporaneous with pipeline development. There are so many assumptions and hypotheses involved in that kind of dual analysis as to make the results somewhat less than compelling.



what it ends up at is this, that insofar as Alaska is concerned, you haven't purported to, perhaps because of a dearth of data, you haven't purported to measure what impact, if any, the settlement had on such things as inflation, increasing of demand for consumer goods—the supply of consumer goods and all those other matters that you talked of.

Well, okay. In general, as I said, in general terms the data is not in yet. terms of the timing of the Act, inflation and shortages of goods and services and the like have not been issued because of the nature of the distribution. It's not as though you gave ten thousand dollars to every native in Alaska and said, here, go spend it and six months later all that money was spent and you had an enormous buying spree in the state, that's not the way land claims has been structured as I'm sure you know, and the -- based on my somewhat limited knowledge of land claims, the formula that Alaska, I'm sorry, that the Congress settled on, tends to be one in which reduces profligate spending or the influx of a tremendous amount of money into the state of Alaska which would lead to things like inflation and the shortages of goods and services.

Q Do you know and perhaps you don't, but do you know how much has been distributed?

- A To individual natives?
- Q To corporations.
- A But, see that's the Corporations, as profit making bodies,

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A Charles .

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whether regional or village, can't alienate -- I mean individual natives can't alienate their right in those corporations, as I understand it and the corporations can invest in profit businesses and joint ventures as you pointed out. But in terms of buying of goods and services, that tends not, as I understand it, to be the place in which that money's gone. There's been some investment in business, but that's not usually an inflationary response.

Just one piece of data that we do have, is I think to date, 272.5 million dollars have been distributed out of the roughly one billion dollars that will eventually be distributed ,butas I said, that might --

THE COMMISSIONER: Most of it's in the bank isn't it?

A Yes, most of it's in the bank, exactly. My experience has been, and let me just say once again, I said it this afternoon, that our experience with land claims is most informed and we're talking in relative terms, and in terms of the regional corporation on the North Slope and the village of Kaktovik which we've had some experience with.

want to generalize it, by what the native corporations have done with the money they've received to date, is they've taken fairly conservative posture, and as the Commissioner has indicated they put the money in the bank or they put it into some investment that's very secure, and they're trying to go slow and make informed



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decisions after careful thought and policy review.

So, it's not been a wave of spending or spree of investment or something that has enormous impact on the economy of the state.

MR. SCOTT:

Decause it occurred to me that when the Congress decided to -- if I can put it this way, pump one billion dollars into Alaska, and has already pumped two hundred and fifty million dollars into the state, whether you were able to ascertain whether that had any implications in respect of the impacts that you've discussed.

A So far, I know of no study or data which reflects any major impact of that distribution of income, distribution of funds.

Q Well now, we've been told in Canada that if a pipeline is built up the Mackenzie Valley to carry gas, thereafter there will follow an escalated programme of oil and gas exploration and development which would not have occurred but for the building of the pipeline or not have occurred within a reasonable time frame, but for the building of the pipeline.

Now, has that been the experience in Alaska as far as you know?

A Well, how can you say until you build a pipeline?

Q Well, you're building a pipeline and we've been told that the permit, the issuance of the permit to build a pipeline and some general assurance that it will be built is going to



escalate and this is said to be one of the benefits, is going to escalate exploration and development of resources that might until that moment have been marginally useful or which might only have been useful in the long term rather than the short term.

A I don't believe that

to my knowledge -- as far as I'm -- I'm trying to refresh

my memory so I don't say something enormously stupid.

As farras I can recall there has been no major increase
in exploration activity in the state, with the exception
of current drilling that's going on in the Gulf of

Alaska on the outer Continental Shelf, which is of
course, unrelated to the pipeline since it wouldn't
be served. The pipeline would not provide an access
to market for that petroleum reserve if it were effectively
tapped, and of course that activity is not controlled
by the state but by the federal government.

Q Well, that will no doubt be a point of distinction then, between the two projects that we'll come to in a moment.

Let me ask some factual questions to see if I can understand the situation in Alaska in order to make a comparison. Now, can you -- you've told us in your evidence that as of July 1st, 1973 the population of the state was 330 odd thousand.

- A What is that page?
- Q I'm sorry that's three.
- A Page three, yes.
- Q It's at the bottom, I

think, of page three. Now, I take it from what you say



, and	later that that would be really in the middle of or
۷	just after what you've identified as the false boom.
3	A After.
4	Q Yes. What would the
5 !	population of the state have been immediately before
6	the false boom?
7	A I'll get the census
3	figure for you. You have to understand that in the
9 1	United States, as I guess in Canada, we take a formal
11	census only once every ten years and so the 1970 figure
11	is as accurate as we get, and figures thereafter are
12	estimates made by the Department of Labour or some
13	other state agency and so are not because the census
14	the census figure in 1970 was 302,000.
15	Q Yes.
16	A So, we had a growth of
17	about 30,000 people in say a three year period.
18	Q Yes, and generally
19	speaking would
20	A By the way, that 330's
21	an estimate.
22	Q I understand, but would
23	that figure, 302,000 be, generally speaking, before
24	the false boom?
25	A Yes.
26	Q Yes, all right. Well now
27	you told the Commissioner that your extrapolated figures
28 1	revealed that there was in-migration in 1975 of about
29 !	56,000 persons and that in 1974, '75 and you become more
30	general at this point, it would be 75, 80,000 in total.



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
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Well, if I can just reiterate, we conducted this study for the Department of Labour, which is unrelated to our work for Arctic Gas and one of the elements of the study was an inmigration survey, I believe the first ever done in Alaska history, which measured over a two day period four times during the year, all the people entering the state by air, ferry and car. From that we extrapolated to get annual and quarterly figures and those are the figures that, on the basis of that extrapolation we feel most comfortable with, that's the 56,000 figure. On the basis of our general analysis of the boom dynamic of the state, we think that the boom, the wave of in-migration began with the start-up of massive hiring by Alyeska, which occurred in early 1974 and other indices , although not precise data, indicates that that's the case, but that's when you start having a wave of people enter the state. How large that group was in fact, in 1974, no one will ever know because they weren't counted in any way. All we can do is estimate from the relevant data, and I would suggest that it's probably something less than the 56,000. It could be as much as 56,000, which is the figure for 1975. Just taking somewhere in between, it seemed to us that 70 to 80,000 would be a fairly reasonable figure.



1	Q All right. Well now,
2	another set of figures, can you tell me the unemployment
3 .	rate in Alaska in 1970 and in 1973?
<u>^</u>	WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: 1970
5	the unemployment rate was 9.3%; and it was 12.0% in 1973
6	Do you want the absolute numbers, too?
7 :	Q No, I don't think that's
3	necessary at this stage. Can you tell me and I
9	know this is difficult perhaps because of regional
10	disparities but in 1970 and 1973, how did that
11	relate to the mainland unemployment rate?
12	WITNESS BOORKMAN: You mean
13	the lower 48?
14	WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: Roughly
15	double.
16	Q Your mainland.
17	WITNESS BOORKMAN: Well, Alaska
18	I mean Hawaii refers to the rest of United States
19	as the mainland. Alaska refers to it as the lower 48.
20	They are about double.
21	Q So that before the false
22	boom began, there was already in Alaska an unemployment
23	rate that was double roughly the 48 state rate.
24 1	A Alaska has chronic
25	unemployment much higher than the lower 48.
26	THE COMMISSIONER: Is that
27	because was that before Alyeska?
23 -	A Yes.
<u> </u>	Q Because of the native
,	the large, compared to the lower 48, the large



Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Scott

percentage of native people comprising the population?

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Α No, because they normally wouldn't, if you're saying they made up the unemployed, likely not. They probably weren't reflected in labor force figures at all. They showed up as neither employed nor unemployed. Remember, when we say "unemployment", for the purposes of an Inquiry like this, or for the purposes of our reports, the formal definition of "unemployment" is not the most useful of terms. It's about all we have to go with. It's the only consistent figure they gather, but it has its limitations. It does not count people who have given up on the job market, are no longer trying to get jobs, are not registering with their local Unemployment Office, which may make sense in a place like New York City but when you're out in the bush and you have to go 500 miles to get to the nearest Unemployment Office registering and keeping on top of things, it's very difficult; and so a lot of people fall in the cracks and are not counted at all.

MR. SCOTT: Q In short, the unemployment figures you've given us for 1970 and 1973 have to be considered in the same way as you have set out in your analysis for the subsequent unemployment figures as being understated.

A Yes. All unemployment figures are understated in Alaska and everywhere else.

Q Yes.

A But especially in Alaska.

Q Mr. Trusty, while we have



7 you here, do you know the Unemployment Insurance figures for any relatively current period in the 3 . Northwest Territories and do you know the welfare 4 assistance figures for the Northwest Territories? -) Or can you find those for us? 6 WITNESS TRUSTY: Certainly 7 we can get welfare assistance figures and there are 3 figures quoted in Gemini, and if you like I can look 9 some of those up right now. I have the volumes here. 17 Q Well perhaps I'll turn 11 to the others. If you can look those up -- what I'm 12 really anxious to get --13 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Trusty 14 wanted to add something. 15 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry. 16 One point is that when 17 it comes to Unemployment Insurance, and I'd like to 13 check this out before I say it too strongly, but I 19 believe that you do not have comparable Unemployment 2) Insurance operating throughout most of the Territory. 21 It's one of the reasons that the statistical base 22 is so bad as compared to Southern Canada, because the 23 system doesn't function in the same way. The subsidiz-24 ation pattern is so different that Unemployment 25 Insurance is not equivalent to what you get in Southern 26 Canada.

Q I understand that, and that's why I've asked for two figures -- the Unemployment Insurance figures and the welfare assistance figures -- because I understand that many people who

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might in other parts of Canada be eligible for Unemployment Insurance in the Northwest Territories, are getting welfare assistance in the Northwest Territories.

A Yes. All I was trying to explain is I'm not sure that I can give you an Unemployment Insurance figure. I'll certainly look for the welfare figure.

Q Now, I take it that it's -- I hate to say it's obvious because someone will tell me that it isn't -- but I would have assumed that it was obvious that the ability of a community to stand in-migration varies directly with the size of the community.

WITNESS BOORKMAN: In general terms it's true, the larger the community the less in-migration is going to have an impact, the more easily it can be absorbed.

think it can be actually added for Alaska. Alaska is so far away from the supply lines and the major communication lines of the United States that Alaskan communities in Alaska are less able to withstand large-scale in-migration than similar sized communities in the lower 48. If a town the size of Fairbanks were located in Montana, one of the most under-populated states in the United States, and they had a massive multibillion dollar project, that community would be far better able to withstand the pressures of in-migration than has Fairbanks.



to make a direct comparison, but I suggest that as a general rule that it can be said that the proposition 3 as I stated it is probably correct, leaving aside 4 cases. WITNESS BOORKMAN: 5 Leaving aside caveats. 6 And I take it it also 7 follows that the ability of a community to withstand 8 in-migration is directly related in most instances to the extent to which it has unemployment. 9 10 A Would you like to restate that? I'm not sure I understand it. 11 12 0 Well, the ability of a 13 community to withstand the adverse impacts of in-migra-14 tion, I suggest to you, varies with the extent of 15 pre-existing unemployment. 16 A You mean the more unemploy+ ment it has, the more it can absorb in-migrant workers? 17 18 Q No, the less. 19 A The less? 20 Q The more unemploym ent there is existing in a community, the less able that 21 22 community is to absorb in-migrants. 23 A Yes, I'm not sure that 24 I buy that; I mean you can argue one of two ways. 25 Depending on the matches, skills and needed -- the 26 match of jobs and skills, jobs existing in a community, 27 and skills of the in-migrants, you could, the fact that 28 there is unemployment, you could absorb a large number 29 -- I'm sorry. The fact that there's unemployment could

indicate that there is a large pool of people who can't



1 find jobs which would be exacerbated by in-migrants 2 coming. It could on the other hand simply indicate 3 that the existing population of a community is not 4 well-matched for the available jobs and that the in-5 migrants are going to be better matched. I don't think 6 you can really draw conclusions from that hypothesis. 7 Isn't that stretching 0 3 the point, to take care of a particular case founded 9 on a mismatch of occupations and people? 10 Well, but the mismatch 11 of people -- of jobs and skills in Alaska is notorious, 12 and one of the consistent things that leads to inade-13 quate filling of vital jobs in the state, despite 14 chronic unemployment. 15 The proposition I'm 16 putting to you is a general one, and there will be 17 exceptions to it; but it's simply this, that a community 18 that has let us say a 50% unemployment rate is less 19 likely to be able to endure a substantial in-migration 20 than a community that has a 10% unemployment rate. 21 Assuming no increase 22 in local employm ent opportunities. 23 0 Right. 24 Α Sure. 25 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Wein-26 stein, you wanted to add something. 27 WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN: I 28 think I'm not so sure I buy the case that he has 29

presented. A couple of points there. I mean the

exception David talked about here is not that uncommon



-- the mismatch between skills and jobs that are available. You know, you could take the San Jose area which /has a large unemployment of engineers but you'd get a lot of lower paid jobs and people can move in, a large number of people can come in and find jobs because there are industries there that need the lower skilled, lower paid workers.

A Comment of the Comm

Secondly, I think that service level is a very important consideration which seems to be lost, service level both in terms of what the private sector offers and what the public sector offers. It's something that's got to be treated in there, and the capability or capacity of a community is neither a function of an unemployment rate, neither necessarily a function of an unemployment rate nor that of size when you're talking — unless you're talking about magnitudes of size, you're talking 30,000 or 40,000, that doesn't really mean that much difference and the Alaska example is replete with that. All communities up to a certain level have to provide certain services and so science is not that much of a factor.

Alaska situation, that in 1975 or at the beginning of 1976 it had a population, let us say, of somewhere close to 400,000? Let us say 100,000 had come in in response to the false boom or the real boom. You've told us that some --

WITNESS BOORKMAN: Oh now, wait a minute, wait a minute, let's back up. The in-migration which occurred that you're talking about



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that makes it 430,000.

the entire period.

is Alyeska in-migration would be the in-migration that basically occurred within a two-year period '74-'75. The false boom is not included in the figures we've been talking about. It's logically severable, it's another boom.

All right, well then

Well that's --A

In 1970 -- I'm sorry, 0

in 1970 the population was 302,000 roughly; in 1973 it was 330,000, and let's add instead of between 70 and 80, 100,000 as in-migration up to the present time. That brings us to roughly a population in the state of 430,000. All right, you've told us that including indirect employment some 64,000 jobs have been created, 24,000 direct jobs and 36,000 secondary or indirect jobs.


WITNESS J. WEINSTEIN:

That's a peak. That doesn't necessarily mean that that would carry over

Q No, but what I'm saying is that you produce after that an unemployment rate which you fix at about 12%.



1 WITNESS BOORKMAN: In '73. All right. What is it 3 What is it in 1975? in 175. 4 What page are you on? 5 Any date you want in 0 6 autumn of 1975. 7 WITNESS D. WEINSTEIN: I can 3 answer that. What's the figure you are referring to 9 12.2%? 10 () Yes. 11 All right the January, 12 '75, is 10.8%. 13 O All right. 10.8%. Now 14 I suggest to you that that isn't -- that it's very 15 difficult to compare that situation to a situation 16 in which you have a project area with a population 17 of roughly 20,000 people "x%" and I'm betting that 13 the figure will be about 25%, are either unemployed or 19 are on welfare assistance in which 10,000 jobs are 20 going to be created directly. That is, pipeline jobs 21 plus gas field jobs and whether you apply a multiplier 22 of .2 or 1.5 which are going to produce job opportunities 23 and presumably an in-migration in response to them of 24 a thousand or two thousand or three thousand. 25 WITNESS BOORKMAN: Is that 26 a question? 27 How can you honestly 0 28 compare those two situations in any meaningful fashion? 29 I'm sorry, there were 30 so many assumptions and hypotheses buried in that



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THE COMMISSIONER: Well let us stop a minute Mr. Boorkman.

paragraph that I am not sure that I can straighten it

A O.K.

Q I don't think Mr. Scott

is asking you to really answer that yes or no, because his question was how can you compare those. But that's been running through my mind. Of course Mr. Trusty said, "Well don't assume that what happened in Alaska will happen here". But Mr. Scott was saying, "Well you started off with 300,000 people approximately, before you go into this pipeline racket, and now you've gone up to 400,000 more or less." Here we're beginning with 20,000. That may not be right. It may be more like 23, 24 thousand. The majority certainly are native people, 25% unemployed and you will bring in 6,000 pipeline workers or at least there will be 6,000 job opportunities on the pipeline.

Mr. Scott is saying, "let's assume another 4,000 to run it up to 10,000 in indirect employment.

MR. SCOTT: No sir. The

4,000 is the gas feeder lines.

THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry.
MR. SCOTT: The evidence we

have if I recall it correctly and Arctic Gas isn't directly responsible for this is that the gas plants and feeders lines will employ -- the construction of them -- will employ 4,000 persons.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, it's more



Weinstein, Weinstein Boorkman, Trusty

Cross-Exam by Scott 1,200, but let's round it off at 10,000 because of the indirect employment. 3 . WITNESS TRUSTY: May I give 4 you some estimates that are pretty firm estimates. 0 O.K. 6 Α For the total. 7 Nothing like firm 0 3 estimates. 9 A Including pipeline 10 construction, the delta development and construction 11 of the gas plants, the ongoing exploration activity, 12 the water and rail transporting, the equipment storage 13 and supply functions, O.K., which is, I would call all 14 the direct and indirect employment. 15 Yes. 16 -- but not the induced. 17 Did you add the gas 18 plants and the feeder lines? 19 A Yes, they are in there. 2) Taking all of that and putting it into man years -- in 21 other words, getting rid of the seasonality aspect. 2.2 The man years employment that would be involved, the 23 peak year -- I'm sorry, I do have the -- my .2 24 multiplier is in here too, so save re-adding the figures 25 I'll give it to you with that in. That's gives you 26 an upper number. 6,308 man years. That's equivalent 27 to 6,308 full-time jobs. 23 MR. SCOTT: The point I am 29 trying to make, obviously unsuccessfully, and that's my



WITNESS BOORKMAN:

The second of the second

A Some.

O Some of them and we have been told that the jobs that are created, applying the figure that is common in Alaska -- it may have been short-term jobs in some instances -- amounted to about

60,000 in total, direct and secondary.

fault, is that let's say 100,000 people in round figures

in-migrated to Alaska over the relevant period. We

have been told that those in-migrants included people

who ultimately became employed in the camps on the jobs.

A Yes.

Q That means, just looking at those two figures, that there is a surplus. Let's not do the direct subtraction. We'll round it out and make a surplus of 50,000 in-migrants to jobs. That's the problem that you have been 'telling us about all day.


A Yes.

Q Now, what I'm saying to you is that that is 50,000 over a total population of 400,000.

A Yes.

O I'm suggesting to you that the introduction of in-migrants without employment in the Northwest Territories to the extent of 2,000 persons will create an economic problem that is greater than the one that confronts Alaska.

A O.K. The question is the logical connector between employment increases and population increases. Now, our testimony tries to show that in Alaska, there is a history of boom related



1 in-migration which follows major economic development projects. That you can look at the past, the distant 3 past, the more recent past; you can look at the false 4 boom, you can look at Alyeska. They all tell you the 5 same thing. When you have a major production of jobs 6 in a highly visible project that has some romance about 7 it because that's an important issue, to in-migrants in 8 the lower 48, that there is going to be a relationship 9 between the creation of those employment opportunities 10 and the population in-migration. Without begging 11 the question, it seems to me the entire point of the 12 testimony and of this panel, is to raise the question, 13 does the link between employment generation and popula-14 tion increase which has so affected Alaska -- does that 15 link exist to the same degree, to a similar degree in 16 the Northwest Territories?

We should not assume that it does. It seems to me that is the question that we are here to discuss.

WITNESS TRUSTY: Mr. Scott? No, I'm asking if I may 0 to deal with a slightly different question.

Mr. Scott, I think I can, A if I may, in testimony the other day I think I attempted to answer this question. If the statistical base is small then the proposition you just put is absolutely correct. If 2,000 on a base of 10,000 is a very important change, and it seems to me that's what percentage you're driving at and may be equally as important as 50,000 on a base of 400,000 in Alaska.

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No, but Mr. Trusty can I put this proposition to you? You have told us and will detail for us later, I have no doubt, the ways you are going to control your people, that is, Arctic Gas and sub-contractors' people are all going to be hired somewhere else and flown in and flown out.

I'm not worried about any of that now. I'm afraid that there may be in southern Canada, perhaps even in the United States or perhaps even Alaska, some people who will say unwisely , "we're going to come to the Northwest Territories. That's where the next pipeline is and undoubtedly we'll be able to pick up a job". Now, they may be wrong. All the evidence is, if you'll look at your multiplier that they won't be able to pick a job.


I'm suggesting to you that if between two and three thousand of them come, you have a surplus manpower problem in the Territory that is greater proportionately than the surplus manpower problem in Alaska.

I'm trying to agree with you Mr. Scott.

That's fine. 0 That's the only point I wanted to make. So what we are talking about when we talk about measuring in the Territories the impacts of in-migrants is a critical factor of between two and three thousand people.

A I don't know what the precise number is but --

> Well, we're in there 0



somewhere.

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A Those kinds of numbers would be large for the Territories. I agree.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Trusty, let me get a word in edgewise here. Mr. Scott's point is one that I'd like you to reflect on for a moment. Mr. Boorkman has said 100,000 people seeing the romance of a pipeline in Alaska, they hitched up their campers and threw the kids into the back -- or they didn't. That's the one thing they didn't do. They didn't have any, or else they didn't take them with them.

MR. SCOTT: They abused them

and left them at home.

WITNESS BOORKMAN:
A You're a sick man Mr. Scott.

MR. SCOTT: It's not the first

time that's been said.

they went, 100,000 which means that on this continent,
-- now maybe they're all south of the 49th parallel
there are 100,000 of these people, and it's getting late
but let's call them romantics who want to start over and
make --

- A Boomers is a good term.
- O Boomers. Now, we may

not have that many in Canada but let's assume the ratio in terms of our population gives us 10,000. You have 100,000. We have 10,000, and I assume yours can't come up here without visas and a lot of other stuff that means we can forget about them.

A So you can stop the Ameri-

cans.



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have in Alaska.

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Q That's right. Yes.

They're not part of this country. But people that live within this country -- this Inquiry has given this thing enough visibility now. But apart from Arctic Gas and Foothills wrestling each other before the National Energy Board in Ottawa to the astonishment and amazement of all. But why are we just dealing with two or three thousand Mr. Trusty? Might there not be 10,000 people in this country?

They've got 100,000 in America.

10,000 in this country will come up here and that's


a much greater proportion if you take Mr. Scott's

fraction. You know, so many over so many, than you'd

WITNESS TRUSTY: Well I think there are several points that need to be put in place. First of all, the people that Mr. Boorkman's talking about come in response to the fact that the only place they can get an Alyeska job at least partly in response to that fact, is by going to Alaska.

Now, so the first thing we say is "if you can get that hiring hall out of the Northwest Territories and into the south and keep it there," and refuse to give a job to anyone who applies for a job north of the 60th parallel who does not qualify by whatever criteria government decides to establish, then that inducement is gone.

Now, I noted earlier and I will be noting in future testimony that there still may be



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people who come. I can't give a real estimate of that, but I think the experience in the Canadian north has been that they don't come in large number unlike the continuing historical experience in Alaska where they always have come in large numbers, irrespective of the project really.

That simply has not been true

in Canada.

Q But let me just ask you this. If we had hiring halls and suppose you were to get permission to built this, and we had hiring halls in Yellowknife, Inuvik and these places, do you think they would come?

A I think that's very

possible, yes.

Q Well then the thing that you say will turn them back is a hiring hall in Edmonton, and you are assuming that these are reasonable people motivated by reason. When they read in the paper that they have got to go to Edmonton and if you don't get a job there, you're dead, they will not come north.

that. I agree that there may be those who come. There may be those who attempt to come north because they think there will be other things they can do apart from working on the project. I wouldn't deny that. But what I am saying is that our experience in the Canadian north has not been that that happens in Canada and I think it partly reflects the fact that the leap to the Canadian north is a kind of continuum for Canadians in



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southern Canada. It's not the kind of leap that it is for a southern American going to Alaska. But I wouldn't deny that there is a possibility, and let's take Mr. Scott's number of two or three thousand, that could have serious impact. But then I go further to say that given the political controls and the land use and so on that's available in the north, there are policies that can be implemented.

MR. SCOTT: But you see Mr.

Trusty, the things that causes me difficulty is if you simply threw up your hands and said we haven't the faintest idea of what's go ing to happen, you'd be in the same boat with me at least. But what you're saying is, no it's not going to happen, first of all because we don't look on this as a frontier in the way the Americans do, and secondly because we've never done this before.


Now, I put it to you that for the Northwest Territories, we may not have a pattern of boom and bust, but this may indeed be our first.

A Well that's possible, yes.

I won't deny that.

O Therefore, we may anticipate if it is our first that we will begin to duplicate an experience that has become one of long-standing in Alaska.

A All I can say Mr. Scott is that that's a judgment that one could make. My judgment would be that that's not the way it would happen in the Canadian north. There isn't the infra-



structure here to attract people. People can move with their families to Anchorage or Fairbanks, those Alaskan cities and they can move into an infrastructure that is comparable to that that they left. That isn't true coming into the Canadian north.

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WITNESS BOORKMAN: You can buy a Big Mac in Anchorage.

MR. SCOTT: Well in Yellowknife you can buy an " A&W" burger which I understand is much the same.

How is the infrastructure in Yellowknife any different than the infrastructure in Medicine Hat, so that in-migrants will be driven away because they have the absence of infrastructure. I mean what does that mean?

you a specific example that exists, Fort McMurray.

Syncrude is having to engage in a national program of advertising in order to attract permanent workers to the plant, and a part of that program is to convince the potential worker that you really aren't that far from the action when get into Fort McMurray; that there is a flight a day and there is a highway and so on.

I think the difference between a Fort McMurray and a Medicine Hat is you can get to a nearby center, you really haven't left the mainstream if you like of whatever economic, cultural or social aspects of southern Canada appeal to you. The further north you come, the more you do put distance between you and those things.




In Alaska however, you can
into a modern, very large city with a full range of
facilities and services and live quite close to it.

I think there is a fundamental difference between the
two situations.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse me.

You're saying in Alaska part of the attraction is that it really isn't a frontier.

WITNESS BOORKMAN:

If I understand the

infrastructure argument. One can take a camper to Alaska and live a life that does not require them -you can take all the romance with you and you can say you're going to Alaska and that would be a very different thing in your mind. But in terms of the basic amenities that make it feasible for large numbers of people to come, there is a level of development sufficient to sustain it.

Stretched, but it's

A Yes, I mean nobody is

going to in-migrate to Kaktovik, there's no hotel in Kaktovik, there's no place to eat outside of a person's home. There are no toilets, there is no amenity level that people from the lower 48, except for a very, very few people who would probably be there very fleetingly, you're not going to come there, because it is too different. I think, you know, there's a narrow line. Alaska is different enough to be attractive, but similar enough to feel comfortable, and if I understand -- and I'm not an expert.


MR. SCOTT: Q I would have thought that that was a good description of Yellowknife. THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse me,

you see, your point is well taken, Mr. Boorkman, because Yellowknife, as Mr. Scott says, there is an awful



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1	lot of resemblances to the description you just
2	offered of Fairbanks I suppose you're thinking of.
3 }	A Well, is
4	Yellowknife a major supply centre for the entire north
5	of the Northwest Territories, as Fairbanks is for
6 1	Alaska?
7	MR. SCOTT: I don't know.
8 .	I'm asking.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, leav-
10	ing that aside, it has an awful lot of the amenities
11	of the south, and someone turning up here in a camper
12	would find that there was running water and all of
13	those other things that we regard as essential.
14	MR. SCOTT: Well, I've given
15	you, Mr. Trusty it's really not to the well a
16	friends to answer but I've given you the problem
17	that concerns me and I must say frankly that I hope
18	as we go along that there will be it will be possible
19	to develop responses to it that don't depend on our
20	predilection for romance or things of that type. It's
21	so difficult for me to deal with these.
22	Let me come to some more
23	specific
24	THE COMMISSIONER: Could I
25	ask a question?
26	MR. SCOTT: Arising out of that?
27	THE COMMISSIONER: Now that
28	we've arrived at a natural break, can you tell me
29	whether you think the U.S. unemployment rate had very
30	much to do with all of this? You were going through



a recession, and presumably North America is still bottoming out or bottoming up or something out of this thing; if you were going to build that pipeline in a year and the economic forecasts continued to be as optimistic as they have been for, say, six months, and the performance of the economy -- let's take the U.S. economy -- continued to be generally on the upswing, would you have had those 100,000 people, or was it to some extent a function of a rather high unemployment rate in the early '70s?

A

Your

implication is probably very accurate, if the economy of the lower 48 gets bad, you risk less in going to Alaska, you've got less to lose. However, the time that we're focusing on, the boom period caused by Alyeska had it's sort of a double-edged process going on. You're absolutely correct in saying that the economy of the lower 48 generally was in bad shape, there was a recession, there was very high unemployment, and that could be argued to increase the in-migration to essentially an already troublesome pattern.

On the other hand remember that the major port of entry into Alaska, Seattle has always been that major port of entry, it's always been the city that is the surrogate for Alaska and the lower 48, the place where goods and services and people go through. Interestingly enough, Seattle's recession, which was a very, very bad one, preceded the general recession of the lower 48 because of the decline of a particular industry, and at the time of



the lower 48's recession, high unemployment rate
the economy of Seattle was actually getting much better,
and so as the place where a lot of potential in-migrants
would pass through or the place from which many might
be expected to originate, it was a magnet in and of
itself, which might offset the magnet of Alaska. So
it cuts both ways and it's very hard to make any
definitive statement about it.

24.

in-migration surveys that we conducted does tend to substantiate that. The first flow of people in 1975 for the first two quarters, the greatest number came from the western states, and that included the State of Washington. Then that number, the western state residents dropped off significantly in the third quarter and it was about that time that the cumulative effects of word of mouth had sort of built in had affected the people, but also Seattle's economy and the western states' economy, especially the Seattle area, was substantially strong enough so that there was enough of a differentiation and attraction to stay in Seattle and not go to Alaska and go through the trouble.

WITNESS TRUSTY: Mr. Scott,
before you resume you wanted some numbers for 1970?

MR. SCOTT: Q Well, whatever
year you have handy.

A I can give you -- well, first let me give you the page reference, 469 to 470 of Gemini.



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THE COMMISSIONER: Which

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volume?

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A Volume 2, I believe.

I won't awear to that, sir. We're checking. Anyway it's page numbering consecutively, so --

Q Oh, I see, yes, yes, yes.

A 1968-69 for the total

region, the total study region that was defined, 495,294 of direct social assistance payments.

MR. SCOTT: Now that's

dollars, eh?

A Beg pardon?

Q That's expressed in

dollars, of course.

A I'm sorry, sir?

Q Is that expressed in


dollars?

A Yes, yes. The following year it went to somewhat over \$500,000. By '73 the year that you were comparing with, it went to one million two, roughly.

Q And that's both welfare

assistance and --

A No, that is direct social assistance payments. Now, in addition there are the various kinds of subsidies that are built into the northern system to do with housing and fuel and so on. These are direct social assistance payments which include payments to single parents whose minor children live at home; health payments to recipients



unable to provide for themselves or dependents due to health problems or age or disability; economic assist-2 3 ance paid to those who would normally provide for themselves but are unemployed or unable to hunt or 4 5 trap; and supplementary income support which is --6 Well, I shouldn't trouble 0 7 you with it any further. 3 That's the full defini-9 tion. 10 What I'm interested in 11 is measuring the number of unemployed people in the 12 Territory at a given time, and I take it that will 13 be represented conservatively perhaps by the number of 14 people drawing Unemployment Insurance plus the number 15 of people who are totally on welfare. 16 Well, I guess so, Mr. 17 Scott. 18 Q All right. But I don't think you'll 19 Α 20

A contract of the second

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get Unemploym ent Insurance numbers, I may be corrected on that, I just don't think they're available for the north.

> 0 All right.

The other thing I note if I can is that a study that was done in about 1967 or thereabouts, a Ph.D. thesis, as a matter of fact, on the economic development of the north, in talking about things like income and unemployment and employment, noted that you can readily be 50% off because of some of the problems of data collecting in the north.



A Well, there is seasonal

	Cross-Exam by Scott
1	So that any numbers are only indicators and that's
2	all. Theerror can be that great.
3	Q Well, I hope that Arctic
4	Gas, before the end of the application, will be able
5	to tell us something about unemployment in the north
6	that exists when they build their project. Well now,
7	can I turn
8	MR. STEEVES: Do you have a
9	staff?
10	MR. SCOTT: Beg pardon?
11	MR. STEEVES: Do you have a
12	staff?
13	MR. SCOTT: I don't have an
14	application.
15	Q Can I turn to pages 2
16	and 3, in the two paragraphs at the bottom of page 2
17	and in the paragraphs in the top of page 3 you
18	WITNESS BOORKMAN: Whose
19	testimony?
20	Q It's your testimony, you
21	give population increases and I want to know whether
22	there is any way that you know of relating those
23	increases to the staging of the Alyeska project? In
24	other words, can we say that the increase in population
25	occurred at this stage or was greater at that stage?
26	A Within that two-year
27	period?
28	Q For any period that you
29	can measure.
20	



1 -- one can assume, but we don't have any evidence for 2 it, except very limited evidence 'my in-migration survey 3 -- that in-migration is seasonal. As employment on 4 Alyeska was seasonal and to the extent that people 5 assume the time to go to Alaska is in the summer to 6 get jobs, one could assume (but it's an assumption) 7 that the population in-migration increased during 8 those months. Very few people in their right minds, 9 I would argue, would in-migrate to Alaska in January. 11 Well, is there any way 11 of making an estimate about whether more in-migration 12 occurred before the commencement of the project or 13 after and during its commencement? 14 I would -- there is no 15 data on that. If you're asking for an assumption or 16 an opinion about that, I'll be happy to provide it. 17 I'd like your highly 0 18 paid opinion. 19 Would a cheap opinion 20 do just as well? My opinion would be that when the 21 word got out that Alyeska was finally going to be built, 22 people who had been talking among themselves about 23 going up there and striking it rich said, "O.K., now 24 is the time, let's go." 25 That started therefore whenever 26

the pipeline, the word about the Pipeline Authorization Act got out, which I assume is around the end of 1973, beginning of '74, shortly before the major employment began. That's assuming that there is a sizeable number of in-migrants who are fairly rational about it.

27

28

29



1;	By definition, "in-migration" is somewhat an irrati	onal
4	phenomena.	
3 -	Q Is it possible to mak	e
4 1	any guestimate about the proportions that came for	
5	the second season, if I can put it that way?	
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1	A Well, as I said, we
2.	have no data. We just don't have any data. The only
3 -	data there is is our in-migration survey.
<i>C</i> ,	It would be very useful if
5	Alaska had in-migration and out-migration
6	surveys, but unfortunately they do not.
7	Q One question, while it
8	occurs to me, the way the panel has spoken of these
9.1	surges of in-migration lead me to conclude that the
, ,	in-migration in each of the four of them has been
]]	followed by an out-migration. Has that in fact been
12,	true?
13 _#	A No, it's just let's
14	distinguish between normal and abnormal in-migration.
15	As we point out in our yellow volume and have said
16	in our testimony today, Alaska has gained in population
17 .	from a basically native area into an overwhelmingly
18	white area through what one can call a normal in-migration
19	pattern. People go there as they come to California.
20:	What we're trying to isolate
21:	is not the normal in-migration, in fact we factored that
22	out of our estimates, but the spurt which is tied
2	to a particular development project at a particular
.) 4	point in time that brings a tremendous amount of
23	people into the state, following that development
26 .	project there will be some out-migration, but there
 	will be an overall, it will take them a long-term.
. :	Overall incremental growth of the state population.

Q But I take it that it appears from -- insofar as you can judge that the out-

29

3 ~



migration is relatively modest. Yes, overall, yes it is. 3 Q Now, on page number 10 4 Mr. Boorkman, of your --5 A I'm sorry I didn't hear 6 the page number. 7 Page number 10. 0 8 Α Okay. 9 You deal with public 10 safety and I just want to review it because I'm not 11 sure I understand. When the Commissioner asked you 12 this morning about whether you were of the view that 13 criminal conduct, major or minor, in the camps was 14 not being reported, what was your answer to that? 15 Α I don't know. 16 0 You don't know. 17 No. They don't tell A 18 me. 19 0 Yes. I take it if you 20 bear in mind that 24,000 people are in the camps 21 it becomes more difficult to conclude that the crime 22 rate has developed at the same rate as the population 23 rate, which includes those people. 24 Well, you're assuming A 25 a cover-up of a lot of crime that isn't occurring in 26 those statistics. If that's true, then you're right. 27 The crime rate is higher than the statistics indicate. 28 No, but that would be Q 29 so if the camps are not reporting.

A

I'm sorry.



-	Q Assuming the camps are
2 '	not reporting
3	A Crime.
4	Qminor crime for example,
5	and perhaps even some major crime.
6	A Whether crime rate
7.	statistics underestimate actual crime.
3	Q Yes, all right.
9	A By definition.
10 [Q We've been provided with
]]	a report entitled "IMpact Analysis of Construction
12	of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, on the Administration
13	of Criminal Justice in Alaska" prepared by the Alaska
14	Department of Law, Criminal Division and dated March
15	of 1976. Are you generally familiar with that report?
16	A I've seen it. I don't
17	have it with me.
18	Q Yes.
19	MR. BAYLY: Mr. Commissioner,
20	was that something that's listed or available for
21	other participants?
2.2	MR. SCOTT: Well, you can
23	write to the state of Alaska, I don't have a copy here,
24	Mr. Bayly.
25	MR. BAYLY: That's not a copy
26	you're reading from then?
27	MR. SCOTT: No.
28 ·	Q I'd like to put to you
29 	two factors that are set out in that report as being
ا د ر	or three factors that are set out in the report as being



in part responsible for whatever increase in crime, if any, there may have been. The first is increasing urbanization, as people move to communities. The second is the mobility of the native population, increased mobility as they move into urban areas and thirdly, changing social values among the native people.

observation, that those facts, if such they be, obviously have impacts, adverse impacts, for the crime rate?

A Would you review them

once more, since I don't have the report?

2)

Q Yes. Urbanization of

-- I should emphasize that the report was zeroing in,
not on any problems that in-migrants may have been
experiencing with the law, but was analyzing whether
the changing state of Alaska itself was leading to
an increase in crime, and it concluded that the increased
urbanization in Alaska led to either more crime or
more reporting of it, that the mobility of the native
population, especially their mobility into urban areas
led to either more crime or increased reporting of it
and that thirdly, the changing social values of the
native population led to more crime or more reporting
of it.

A Could you explain the third? I'm not sure I understand what that means.

Q Well, the report indicated that in the view of the writers, the social values of the native population of Alaska had, or were in the course



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of altering, and that that alteration might have led to the commission of more crime.

Altering in what way?

The altering of their 0

social structures. The altering of their domestic patterns by urbanization.

> Well --Α

And movement to wage 0 economy, rather than subsistence economy.

It really is - it's A getting very speculative. It would seem to me that it would be fairly logical when you have increased urbanization and therefore access to law enforcement officers and to the criminal justice system, generally for reporting to be much easier and we've already touched upon today, the logical -- the tenuousness of a logical argument that reporting equals crime. There is no indication in any jurisdiction or in any study that I know of that can substantiate that. So, when you're dealing,

especially with the population that may be increasingly concentrated in urban areas, coming in from the bush where there is no state trooper within hundreds of miles, there is no telephone, there is no communication of any sort, I would not be surprised that reported crime might go up and one could argue that that is no indication that actual crime is increasing.

No, no, I only raised the question because when it comes to the subject of crime, you, in your transcribed evidence say two things



A It is, to my knowledge,

given the literature on Alaska and the data that we've

1 as I understand it. First, crime may not, in fact, 2 be increasing beyond a proportionate increase in respect 3 of population. That's the first thing you say. 4 The second thing you say is 5 that crime -- more crime may be either complained about 6 or reported on because acts that were tolerable are 7 psychologically or socially no longer tolerable. 3 A I don't think that either 9 of those statements that we make are inconsistent with 11 the philosophy that you've just described. 11 Q No, but I'm suggesting 12 to you that the three propositions that are advanced 13 in the report indicate that crime, in fact, may be increasing as a result of the changes in the community 7 4 15 and social structures that occur as a development 16 progresses. 17 As I heard you a moment ago, you said crime or the reporting of crime. I think 18 13 those are very different things and that's my point, 20 I don't think that one can argue very quickly that they are equal and make the assumption that because 21 22 reporting of crime has increased in an area, in urban areas, that that's a reflection that urban areas are 23 241 cesspools of sin and anti-social behaviour. 25 0 Well, do I understand 26 then, that you're not prepared to either accept or reject or make any comment on the observations that are 27 25 in that report?

29



reviewed, a hypothesis, which may or may not be correct.

We simply don't know, nor do the authors of the hypothesis know.

Q All right. Well now, in your evidence, you have listed a number of impacts that it occurs to me may exist or might have existed in Alaska even without substantial in-migration, and I'd like to list them for you and see if you agree with my list.

in-migration of substantial proportions you might have new workers joining the work force and then going on unemployment insurance.


A Why?

Q Because it may happen

without in-migration.

saying is that the labour force is going to expand internally, not because of external in-migration and I think our experience in reviewing Department of Labour data in Alaska, there would usually be a triggering event that pulls those people who were not in the labour force into it, and without specifying what that event would be it's very hard to comment on your assumption.

Q Well you see here's the trouble I have. You list a number of impacts and deal with them. You then say the primary cause is in-migration in conjunction with three or four things like local hire union halls and so on. Then, Mr. Trusty comes on and says, "Well, isn't that lucky because we're not going



1	to have that , and therefore we don't have to be as
2	concerned that Alaska will be duplicated in the Northwes
3 4	Territories." What I'm suggesting to you is that a
4	number of the impacts that you have observed in Alaska
5	would occur even without substantial in-migration, and
6 "	that the first is the possibility that in the face of
7 !	this project, people who have not worked before might
8	come out to work, living in the Territories and then
9	go on unemployment insurance.
10	A In the face of the
11	Alyeska project?
12	Q In the face of a large
13	project like this?
14	A If you banned in-migrants,
15	yes, sure you would have pulled people out of the wood-
16	work to work on it.
17	Q All right, so that is
18	a problem that confronts the community, building a
19	pipeline, even if there isn't in-migration.
20	A Rising unemployment?
21	Q No.
22	- A But the major reason
23	for rising unemployment was not people were pulled
24	into the labour force and became, appeared on the unemplo
25	ment rolls because that's not the way it works, they
26	don't appear there unless they get a job first.
27	Q Let me put this scenario
28	to you. Let us assume that Mr. Trusty is right and
29	there is going to be no substantial in-migration that
30	isn't connected with the job. I suggest to you that



it may still very well be that people who have not traditionally worked in the Northwest Territories will come out to work, either on that project for a year or two, or on the secondary jobs that are created as a result of it and then go on unemployment insurance, as happened in Alaska.

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
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P	
1 '	A Yes, that's quite possible.
2	Q All right, and the
3	A The question is, is
4	two years of employment better than none?
5	Q No, that's not the question,
6	respectfully. The question is whether there will be
7	problems of this type
8	A The problem is what?
9	The problem is that they are eventually unemployed?
10 :	Q The problem is that they
1 1	are eventually drawing government assistance for being
12	unemployed.
13	A Theoretically, I don't
14	know your Unemployment Insurance system, but if it's
15	like ours, the money they draw out would be money
16	that they've contributed while they're working, and
17 :	they can't get to be unemployed and draw out insurance
18	until they've been employed for a period of time,
19	and supposedly paid into the pool.
20	Q Well, our system,
21 1	regretably or happily, is not that.
22	A O.K.
23 4	Q The second charac teristic
2 4 .	that may occur even without in-migration is that
25	qualified workers may be drawn from local industries
26	creating shortages of manpower in those industries.
27	A If you would have no
26	in-migration of workers and have nothing but local
29	hire, on the pipeline project, that is inevitable.
30 	O Oh, no, no, no. I'm not



	Cross-Exam by Scott
1	dealing with that question now. I'm sorry if I'm not
2	making myself clear. Mr. Trusty has told us that
3	he doesn't expect there will be any in-migration
4	except the people he calls transient
5	A Yes.
6 -	Q who are flown in and
7	flown out.
3	A Yes.
9	Q I say that even if that
10	is so, and even if that were so in Alaska, the pipeli
11	and secondary jobs associated with it would draw
12	qualified workers from low-paying industries.
13	A That may well be, yes.
14	Q And it is in Alaska,
15	isn't it?
16	A Well, it's not a
17	comparable situation opposed to hypothetical, which
18	isn't characteristic of Alaska. So don't ask me if
19	it is.
20	Q Well
21	A It could be.
22	Q yes.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Boork-
24	man you said that in villages in Alaska, people were
25	drawn from skilled occupations in those villages and
26	from positions of leadership, because often the same
27	person fills both.
28	A Yes.
29	Q Well, the villages you

have in Alaska are for the most part far from the



Weinstein, Weinstein

	Boorkman, Trusty Cross-Exam by Scott
1	
2 !	pipeline route.
3 4	A Yes.
4	Q Whereas the villages in
5	the Mackenzie Valley are right on the pipeline route,
6	so that problem (if that's the right word to use) is
7 :	one that would be very much more pronounced here, one
8	would think, on the face of it, than it's been in
9	Alaska. Let us suppose that your 15% from Tulsa
10	proposition applies here.
11	
12	A 85% comes locally.
13	Q Yes, well you only have
14	to say it to realize how absurd it is.
15	A Yes.
16	Q But let's suppose you
17	just reversed it. 85% from Tulsa, that 15% might still
13	deplete, diminish, decimate the few skilled people in
19	each of these native villages along this river.
20	A Yes, that's true.
21	Absolutely true, and it would be true of any high-
22	paying project anywhere in the world, I assume.
23	MR. SCOTT: Q And Mr. Boorkman,
24;	that would be true, would it not, that was the third
25	on my list, that would be true of a project whether

27 Yes. A

26


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or not there was in-migration.

All right. Now you've Q told us that in Alaska because people go to work on the pipeline or pipeline-related jobs, the important jobs



in governm ent and in industry are going unfilled.

Is that a fair summary of what you said, I think?

A Yes.

Q Yes. Now I take it that that would occur even without in-migration. Indeed, it might be exacerbated if there was no in-migration.

A Well, you're getting into a turf that's a little less secure because again it's the argument that we discussed this afternoon that the need for many of those jobs is because of inmigration. You take away the in-migration, and the need for the jobs or the expansion is decreased. So it's getting stickier and stickier.


Q No, but if a project is developed in the Northwest Territories, which indicates preference for local employment, local employees, is going to pay high wages, I suggest to you that important jobs then existing elsewhere in the community are going to be unfilled whether there is in-migration or not.

A Yes.

Q You also said today that one of the things observed in Alaska was that capital was drawn into the highest opportunity enterprises, and that that had certain impacts on the state.

A Yes.

Q I suggest to you that that is going to occur or would occur whether there was substantial in-migration or not.



1 In Alaska? Yes. 0 3 Yes, companies are A going to go where they can make the most money. 4 5 And the --0 With the least amount 6 Α 7 of investment. 3 And capital located in the state is going to go to the secondary or support 9 industries associated with the oil and gas because 10 they make most money there, probably, or possibly. 11 12 A Yes. So that that alteration 13 of the capital distribution patterns is going to accur 14 15 whether there is in-migration or not. 16 Yes, when you make Α 17 basic changes in the economy you have basic changes 13 in the economy. Now you also told us 19 today, particularly in relation to housing, that 2) in Alaska the existence of the project has drawn 21 private construction firms into the pipeline or 22 pipeline-related matters, and away from normal community 23 24: construction projects. 25 Α Yes. 26 And I suggest to you 0 that that's going to happen, whether there's in-27 28 migration or not. That's true; the impli-29 A

cations of that will be different, however.




1 !	Q And I suggest to you
2	that the last factor, the impact on the availability
3 =	of transportation within the project area or the
4	state are going to exist whether there is in-migration
5 ,	or not.
6	A The same thing as
7	opportunity cause, yes. The bottom line being that
3	any major development project is going to alter the
9	economy and cause both opportunities and strains,
10	and the difference in Alaska is that the in-migration
11	associated with it caused far greater strains and
12	exacerbated the simple stresses involved in any
13	change of economic structure.
14	Q Yes, but that kind of
15 j	pressure, that kind of adverse impact is likely to
16	occur even if there were no substantial in-migration
17	into Alaska.
18	A Yes.
19	Q Are there any other
20	impacts that strike you, among those you've dealt
21	with, as being likely to occur whether or not there
22	is in-migration?
23	A Any others?
24 ;	Q That would have been
25	likely to have occurred even if there was no substantia
26 1	in-migration to Alaska.
27	A I can't think of any
28	offhand, but you may well be able to refresh my memory.
29	MR. SCOTT: now, Mr. Trusty,
30	I have some other questions for you. That's all of this



1	
1	panel, Mr. Commissioner. Do you want to continue now
2	for 20 minutes?
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, Mr.
4	Bayly is shaking his head and I think those two
5	children have expressed some
6	MR. SCOTT: Some reservations.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: dis-
8	satisfaction.
9	MR. SCOTT: Well, can I ask
10	Mr. Trusty these questions in the morning before we
11	continue with the next witnesses?
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Steeves?
13	MR. STEEVES: Well, how long
14	will you be tonight, sir?
15	MR. SCOTT: 20 minutes, half
16	an hour.
17	WITNESS TRUSTY: Mr. Scott,
18	if it's possible to do it tonight, I am booked currentl
19	to go out tomorrow morning on the 10 o'clock flight
20	and 20 minutes is
21	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, all
22	right, no, I didn't realize you were leaving tomorrow.
23	A Yes.
24	MR. BAYLY: I have some
25	cross-examination of Mr. Trusty.
26	A WEll, I'll be back but
27	on subsequent panels, and I understood that Mr. Scott
23	wanted to be able to pose some of his questions
29	while we were right on this topic.
30	MR. SCOTT: Well, I haven't




'deferred and don't propose to defer my ctoss-examination of you as the others have done to a subsequent panel. 2 MR. BAYLY: Well, I thought we 3 had just foregone the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Trusty in favor of the people from 5 California this morning. I'm prepared to do that. I 6 just hadn't realized we'd done that. THE COMMISSIONER: Well, he's 3 coming back next week in any event. So the momentous 9 decision we face is whether to carry on for another 10 20 minutes. 11 I might add, sir, and 12 I don't know if this helps Mr. Scott any, but I don't 13 think there's been a topic raised in terms of this 14 exchange that's been going on that we will not be 15 leading evidence on; 16 MR. SCOTT: Well --17 Including shortages and 18 essential services in communities and so on, 19 THE COMMISSIONER: Could I ask 20 Mr. Boarkman a question before we move on? 21 WITNESS BOORKMAN: Break and 22 run, I think is the term. 23 Both Arctic Gas and 24 Foothills have said that they will ask in the case 25 of Foothills, the Government of Canada, and in the 26 case of Arctic Gas, they will ask the Governments of 27 the United States of America and the Government of 28 Canada, to guarantee repayment of the borrowings 29 on these projects. Now, that has certain implications 30



in terms of enforcement of social and environmental 2 safeguards and so on. Is the Alaska Alyeska Pipeline 3 1 project one that is proceeding without either a U.S. 4 Government subvention of one kind or another, or a 5 U.S. Government guarantee? Do you know, Mr. Trusty? 6 WITNESS TRUSTY: I don't 7 believe there is, sir, but I can't swear to that. 8 do not think so. 9 WITNESS BOORKMAN: I'm in the 10 same position. I wouldn't swear to it. 11 I know Foothills has 12 made it clear publicly and to this Inquiry that they 13 seek for a guarantee from the Government of Canada to 14 guarantee repayment of the borrowings on capital 15 and as I recall -- I don't want to be unjust about this 16 -- your company had indicated the same thing. 17 WITNESS TRUSTY: No sir, I 18 think your wording is too strong. 19 All right. 20 A I think that Arctic Gas 21 has noted that government or public involvement will 22 be required but to go to the point of saying guaran-23 teeing the repayment of capital, I think takes it too 24 far. 25 Q Oh, it was a guarantee 26 against an over-run in excess of 25% --27 Yes. A 28 -- and interruption. 29 And the cost of service

flow in the case of interruption.



Q Right. Forgive me.
That's correct.

MR. LUTES: Just for the

record and subject to something that hasn't been said that I don't know anything about, certainly Foothills' present position is that they do not and do not intend to ask the government or any other body to guarantee in any way either the repayment of the indebtedness or to guarantee against cost over-runs.

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only raised it because I wondered if Alyeska had sought the same thing. Mr. Blair last summer at the hearing in Norman Wells, I thought, made it pretty clear, and I thought he was being very frank with us, that he would seek a guarantee because of the problem you faced then (maybe you don't any longer) of proven reserves against which you could borrow from the financial community and potential reserves and you would obtain the additional capital from the financial community by getting a government guarantee. But let's not go into that now. It's not -- we're not going to sort it out.

Well, Mr. Scott, do you want to carry on with Mr. Trusty or --

MR. SCOTT: I'm prepared to.

MR. STEEVES: Could the other

members of the panel be excused? They're booked now for 10:15.

THE COMMISSIONER: Oh sure.

Yes, and thank you very much, Mr. Boorkman, Mr.



Weinstein, Mr. Weinstein. Certainly it's been a very useful day. We enjoyed it, and thank you very, very much.

(WITNESSES WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN

& BOORKMAN ASIDE)

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MR. SCOTT: First of all,

Professor Jackson has asked me to tell you sir that the movie won't be shown this week and will be shown next week. I'm afraid I'm responsble for that.

Mr. Trusty, you were dealing yesterday with the --

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Steeves just left.

MR. SCOTT: You were dealing yesterday with the importance of recognizing that different multipliers may have been selected for different purposes, always opting for a conservative one, I think was the way you put it. I noticed in that connection that in — and perhaps you did yesterday that in dealing with their employment projections, Van Ginkel used 2.5?

A Well, it was done in a more complicated fashion. I've never calculated to see what the implicit multiplier is. It wasn't done in a simple multiplier fashion but it may very well yield a 2.5 multiplier.

Q Yes, well I think it does.

Let me just read this sentence from Van Ginkel at page


32 when they're talking about the expanding economy

which of course is one of the things that the community

is told will result from this project.

A I'm sorry, could you give me the page reference again Mr. Scott?

Q It's page 32 of their volume. They're dealing here as you will see from the



	Cross-Exam by Scott
1	'title at 52 with the employment projections and the
2	variety of employment that this project will bring to
3	the communities. They say:
4	"In the expanding economy that will result from
5	pipeline construction, employment in the primary
6	and secondary sectors is expected to he approximat
7	40% of the total number of jobs available."
8	Then they refer you to Section 5.1. knowledge of the
9	"Consequently from the primary and secondary jobs,
10	the tertiary and quaternary employment can be
11	deduced and thus the total of jobs that will resul
12	after construction of the pipeline can be estimate
L 3	A Yes.
L 4	Q Now, assuming for a
L5	moment as I think that that works out to a quotient
1.6	of 2.5, may I ask why in assessing the jobs that will be
17	created as a result of construction, you have used
8	instead .2, notwithstanding Van Ginkel's advice to you?
.9	A Well, first of all, the
0	.2 was used well in advance of the time that we did
21	this more detailed calculation. That's the first
2	answer.
3	Q I'm sorry, I don't
4	understand that answer.
5	A Well at the time that the
6	.2 was selected Mr. Scott, the Van Ginkel analysis had
7	not even been contemplated.

Q I see.

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A So that we had—a detailed analysis of this nature had simply not been done up to



that date. So that's one factor. Secondly, the analysis that used .2 did not focus on the longer term growth in the full sense of the word in the communities. It focused on much more unemployment during the construction phase and the question was how much employment will be generated during the construction phase.

A RECORD TO

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The calculations that were done indicate that the employment generated in the construction phase is in excess of the available labor force. So whether you make it even more inexcess -- are you with me?

O Yes.

A Well, I'm not sure if I --

Q No, the point I make of

it, I recognize Van Ginkel was done after you did your calculations but what troubles me is when we come to the problem of in-migration, as I understand your response is, well there isn't going to be any very much for two reasons really because we're going to hire everybody in Edmonton and on the direct jobs bring them in, except for local hires.

A Let me jump ahead into our testimonial a little bit.

Q Could I just put the proposition to you first, and then you see if you can help me. The proposition is this. You have been using a multiplier of .2 during construction and what that means is that a very limited number of secondary jobs are going to be created. You say all hiring for



- construction is going to be done either by giving

 preference to local people or at Edmonton. There will

 be very limited in-migration and one of the reasons

 is because you won't be able to get on the pipeline.

 The second reason is that we're going to create very

 few secondary -- that is .2 -- jobs.
- A No. That's where I differ with your--
- Q That would be terribly difficult because Van Ginkelis creating many more isn't he?

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A Yes. But that's where I differ with you, you see. You have got to distinguish -- let me see how I can put this so that it's simpler. You, for the purposes --

Q I'm grateful.

A For the purposes of construction and let's assume that you're going to build a pipeline and never operate and never operate the gas plants. You're just going to construct it. For the purposes of construction, you could build the line as if there wasn't a single community. You could procure nothing and employ no one, north of the 60th parallel. I'm sure you'll agree with me that in that case the multiplier would be 0 for construction. Are we together?

Now, the multiplier begins to increase for that construction case only as you hire more people and procure more locally. O.K.?

Now, but the fact of life is



that you are going to operate these things and there is going to be a high permanent on-going employment base created. Not just the pipeline, but particularly in the delta region. All right?

O Yes.

A Now, for the purposes of estimating the induced effects of that employment, that longer term employment, we went to the Van Ginkel kind of analysis which has a much higher multiplier.

Q Can I stop you --

A Now that employment --

well if you just let me hold my train of thought.


That employment starts in its build up sense -- in the sense of how it induces activity, that employment can start very early in the ball game. You know, year one if you like of pipeline construction, but it's a separate matter from actually constructing these facilities.

Now, in the Van Ginkel analysis, O.K., we dealt with that permanent job creation that would have a multiplier effect and in essence said, assume that the pipeline is being built by transients who don't really spend very much in the region because you can employ policies to prevent them, but that there are things going on in the communities because of the growth phenomenon that's taking place. That's what's analyzed using a high multiplier.

The low multiplier was simply applied in the context of say, you know, what's a conservative estimate of the number of jobs that will

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
	Cross-Exam by Scott
	'be created north of 60? There we picked a low
4	multiplier and we hadn't gotten into this more detailed
د	analysis of the growth phenomenon that can take place,
4	including the potential for in-migration.
5	Q But Van Ginkel says,
6	we're talking about jobs that are going to be created
7	and he says you take 2.5 and you apply it to the
8	6,000 odd construction jobs and you get the number of
9	jobs. That's what he works out on his chart at page
0	92.
1	A Let me take a look.
12	Page what Mr. Scott?
13	Q Page 92. Have I not
4	got that right?
15	A Well, it doesn't sound
16	right to me. O.K. I am on page 92 which that can't
17	be the page you mean.
8	Q Well let me see if I
9	understand. I understand that Van Ginkel, in this
20	paragraph five that we've been dealing with is trying
21	to predict the number of jobs that will be created
22	as a result of construction.
23	A But not construction jobs
24	Q No, I understand that.
25	Secondary jobs or whatever you want to call them. Just
26	as our friends did in Alaska.
27	A Yes.
8	Q He says that the quotient

you apply is 2.5 and you apply it to the construction

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jobs.



A No, that's where we

depart I think.

Q What do you apply it to

then?

A You take the long-term

-- let me back off -- the principle applied in the Van

Ginkel analysis which results in this 2.5 is to say,

normally in Canada for every 40 jobs that you have in

the primary and secondary sectors which means natural

resource extraction and manufacturing kinds of activities,

there are 60 jobs in the tertiary and quaternary which

is services to business and so on.

That ratio does not currently prevail in the Northwest Territories. It's actually a weird ratio of 35, 65 because it's unbalanced by government which is in that tertiary quaternary sector.

Now, we assume that the Northwest Territories would move to the national average in the large communities. I shouldn't say the Northwest Territories. We assumed that in the large communities we'd get to that 40:60 ratio. Then said, all right, what are the primary and secondary jobs, not just in the hydrocarbon industry, but in other industries that are either here now or can be expected to develop. All right? Then use that to calculate -- that gives you the 40 end of the ratio -- and use that to calculate how many induced jobs there would be. Are you with me?

Q That's the 60 end of the

30 ratio?



A That's the 60 end of the ratio, but all of those jobs on the the primary secondary side were the permanent on-going jobs. They were not the pipeline construction or the gas plant construction jobs. They were the permanent on-going jobs in the region.

Now, those jobs number into the thousands -- those permanent on-going jobs.

Q I see.


A O.K.?

O So what you're saying if I understand it, is that your reading of Van Ginkel is that he applies the 2.5 only to the permanent jobs, the operational jobs if you will rather than to the construction jobs?

A Permanent jobs not just in the industry but permanent -- you see nobody in Van Ginkel of 2.5 was never applied to anything. It was calculated by saying "let's add up all the primary and secondary jobs we can find or we think will develop and then use a 40:60 ratio to make an estimate of how many tertiary and quaternaryjobs there will be." No one ever took a base number of jobs and just multiplied it by 2.5. It was rather done in this more complex manner that I'm describing.

Do you follow?

Q But what I'm asking you at base I suppose, is does Arctic Gas accept the caluclations that Van Ginkel has made about the jobs that will be created in the community?



A Yes, we think it's a pretty good estimate. I might add that for the community of Inuvik for example it was done on a community specific basis, and for the community of Inuvik it's almost dead on what Stanley and Associates have found using a totally different approach.

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1 Could I ask you to turn Q to page 92 now. A 42? 92, where he's worked this Q out, that's the table that he refers to. € Well, page 92 in my A book, Mr. Scott, is to do with the delta and the 7 remainder of the area, is that --91 Q Yes, well, that's one part of it. I take it, if you look at the delta, which 10 is Inuvik and Aklavik and so on, that indicates that 11 according to Van Ginkel, 3,590 jobs will be created. 12 13 That sounds about right, A 14 yes. 15 Am I right? Q 16 A Yes. 17 And in the remainder of the area, and I presume he's talking about the 18 project area, 4,235 jobs will be created. 19 , 20 A I have to back off for a minute, because it's the delta and it's talking 21 about jobs in the delta, not just in Inuvik. 22 23 I understand that. Q 24 ; A Okay. 25 But what he's saying is that the construction and operation of this project, 25 . taken in total will create in the delta 3,590 jobs 27 5 and in the remainder of the project area, 4,235 jobs. 28

A Well, that's almost right but not quite, and the not quite is as I tried to explain.



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It takes into account all primary and secondary jobs
that could be foreseen and some of those don't have
anything to do with the fact the pipeline's being
built or not being built. For example there was
an agricultural factor in there and you know. So, it's
not specifically things related to the pipeline because
the objective was to say, how much are these communities
going to grow and of that growth, what of it is related
to the industry.
Q And none of those jobs
are construction jobs?
A They are not construction
jobs, no.

Q Do you think that --

A Not pipeline or gas plant construction. It certainly includes jobs in the building industry in the community.

Q Yes, I meant pipeline, your pipeline construction.

A It's not pipeline and it's not gas plant.


Q Do you think that if anybody in southern Canada read the Van Ginkel report he'd consider in-migrating with that kind of promise?

A Do I think that if any--

Q Yes, isn't that an

inducement to major in-migration?

A I think it will be an inducement to some in-migration. Certainly you have to have in-migration to fill those jobs and that's the



whole point of the report.


Q Yes.

A But that's not the kind of in-migration we've been addressing here today.

I mean we're not for a moment saying there won't be in-migration to the region, and in fact one of the concerns we have and one of the areas that when we come to be testifying about this particular material is that methods be developed to pace that growth and that growth is an in-migration phenomenon. It's just that it's different than the kind of in-migration we're talking about with respect to construction of the pipeline.

other matter. On the first page of your transcribed evidence, at the very bottom, as you begin to explain why, in your view, the problems of Alaska are not as likely to occur in the same form here. You say that "we believe that in veiw of the basic differences between the two regions", and you go on to spell them out, "and the projects themselves". Could you just pinpoint for me in point form, the differences between the projects that make what happened in Alaska unlikely to happen here?

A Yes, let's start in Valdez. In Valdez you have — and this is a combination of regional differences and project differences. You have a bay with a narrow table of land around one side and a much larger table at the end, and a huge port facility being built, literally on the mountain face on the other



side of the bay.

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The community is wedged

on a narrow little shelf of land on the opposite side of the bay and in addition, a double joining facility was put in there and it was the end of the haul road and it was a place for delivery of pipe for double joining. There is no comparable piece of activity associated with the Arctic Gas project, where you have that much concentrated activity and it's substantial, with a relatively small community sitting right next door. So that's one difference.

THE COMMISSIONER: Excuse

me, I follow all of that and I've been to Valdez so

I have in my mind what you're saying, but prior to

your revision, the revision of your construction plans

to move to Axe Point, you had, at Hay River, the

place for trans-shipment of pipe from rail to barge.

A Yes.

Q You had a double jointing situation there. In some respects it certainly did then and still does bear a resemblance to Valdez, doesn't it?

A I agree sir, and in relative terms it does, and I think there's two sides to the Hay River coin. On the one side, we think that is the community that is most likely to be impacted in a variety of ways, including the place where in-migrants are liable to go, who are looking for opportunities.

On the other hand it's one of the communities most capable of absorbing impact.



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The thing I would note, however, is that there is an order of magnitude difference between Valdez and the activity at Hay River that is very extreme. If you recall Mr. Williams testimony, it was that the employment at the staging area was in the order of 500 -- 400 I think. If it was in the original version.

alone, as I recall, is employing in excess of a thousand people. Just on that port construction, not counting double joining, not counting the facts that the trucks are coming and going and have a terminus point there. All right?

Q Fine.


A Going up the line then,
Mr. Scott, after you get through the mountain range -MR. SCOTT: We're dealing

now with differences in the project that make the Alaska experience unlikely to occur here.

A That's right. Well, we're dealing with the point that's captured by that sentence that you referred me to.

Q All right.

A You go up the line, out of Valdez, you go through some mountain passes where you're in very similar kinds of circumstances in terms of relative isolation, but then you break out into the flat land, south of the Yukon river, where there is highways criss-crossing the area, I guess with their main junction point being Glenallen and the pipeline



project is operating there in an environment that's very accessable to communities. You get into Fairbanks and you have the major -- the entire focus of the project, if you like, right in an existing community and I mentioned this morning the fact that the military base is being used not only as a spread camp, I think it's for spread camp -- spread 3 on the line, but also as the processing center for personnel.

We have nothing comparable, and it's only when you get into the northern part of Alaska that you start to get into a relative isolation kind of operation that is comparable to what we will have in the Northwest Territories.

0 Are there any other differences in the project, in the two projects in which you rely in that sentence?

A Yes sir, there's no The haul road has had an effect. It prohaul road. vides a mobility factor and it's a different character. I mean, first of all it's a construction project in and of itself, with the bridges and so on, and secondly, it means that things are moving in a different way than they will be for this project with it's dependence on the river.

Any other differences? A Well, then there are matters of policy, which are matters that I'd prefer to go into in the sequence as we -- you know, have the appropriate people here and present the testimony.

> Yes, but you've covered now Q

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
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
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2	A But those are the main physical features.
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4	Q All right.
5	A One more, I'm sorry.
6	One more, Mr. Scott and that's this question of infra-
7	structure in the two regions and therefore the project
3	ability to depend on the infrastructure and in particu
9	lar, and I noted in this testimony, the linkage with
10	Edmonton in the case of this area as opposed to the
11	dependence on Anchorage and Fairbanks in Alaska. That
12 !	not really a feature of the project so much as it is
ì	a feature of the region.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: What about
14	numbers of men employed, that's
15	A Well, they're greatly
16 [different, they're greatly different.
17 (Q Yes, you would add that
18	to your consideration.
19	A Yes, I would.
20	MR. SCOTT: The numbers,
21	actually, Mr. Trusty, work against you, don't they?
2.2	Because the proportionate size of your work force to
23 ;	the population is substantially greater.
24	A Oh, in that sense, yes.
2.5	
26	y under all sales sa
27	THE COMMISSIONER: The numbers
28 '	work for and against you, right?
29	A That's right. They always
20	do sir.
.	MR. SCOTT: Now, on page 5,



paragraph one, and tell me if you're going to deal with this later because I don't want to trouble you with it now. I'm really troubled by how you are going to apply the policy that is stipulated there which creates two hiring centers. One in Edmonton and one in the Northwest Territories, for two different types of workers. That is one, an outside worker and the other a native worker. Will this be dealt with in your panel four?

A We are going to deal
with it in panel three, but I can just briefly capsulize.

First of all, we are not going
to have two hiring centers, one in the south and one
in the north. We would hope to have one in the south,
or more, and I can't comment on whether there'd be

the north to serve the communities on individualistic basis.

more in the south, and as many as are necessary in

In other words, we would expect in most of the communities to have some sort of local hiring function performed right there, but that is -- I can't go so far as to say that in a very tiny community we'd have that done.

Q Will you, in panel three be bringing forward proposals related to the creation of the mechanisms that our American friends told us were so essential when local preference is offered?

- A Yes sir, we will.
- Q All right. Well now,

one other thing that I didn't understand in your evidence

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and there are only two items to be dealt with, but this is the first, is this, how is it that you say that the strong centralized federal government, control of planning for northern development represents a significant safeguard against the risks of large scale development.

A What page are you on,

Mr. Scott?

this -- I'm sorry.

Q Well basically it begins on page six when you talk about the role of government contrasting the government, I presume of the Northwest Territories and the government of the nation, on the one hand, to the government mechanisms that exist in Alaska.

A Well, I think one evidence of that statement is already in place, and that is that if you took the amount of planning material that's been generated in anticipation of this project and compared it to that that was generated in Alaska, you would find an astronomical difference in volume of paper if nothing else.

Q Well, let me ask you

A So that's one factor.

We have, for example, if you take the community of

Inuvik, the planning process has gone to the stage of

developing the infrastructure, putting in buildings

and so on. The preparation has been going on, as a

result of the focus on planning in the Northwest

Territories already, which had not been true in Alaska.



concept is that the strong, fairly centralized government controls of the Northwest Territories and the machinery that they represent will be able to -- or should be able to effectively plan and control the development so that nothing will get out of hand. Is that the theory?

I'm not saying they are the total answer. But, for example, you have a situation where -- my understanding is that the municipal planning group in the Territorial Government can, if they see fit override a zoning by-law in a community. They can say, "no, in our judgment even though the zoning allows for that development, we are going to stop it."

That's typical of the amount of control which is exercised here which is not exercised in Alaska.

Q So that the big powers of -- I shouldn't say the big powers but the extensive powers of the central government and the Northwest Territories Council are our assurance that the impacts of Alaska are less likely to occur.

Well assurance is your word Mr. Scott. I think they are very important and very helpful factors.

THE COMMISSIONER: The power

exists.

A The power exists. The land is by and large under control of authorities who can

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plan and regulate its use. That is not true in
Alaska to nearly the same extent. The extensiveness
of private property — the extensiveness of private
business. You're very hard pressed in the Northwest
Territories to start anything without an agreement with
government. That simply is not true in Alaska.

MR. SCOTT: So that in sum
then, when you're building in the Northwest Territories,
the fact that the government machinery is in place,
the government owns or controls most of the land,
constructs most of the housing, is responsible for most
of the land transfers, is really what you're referring to?

A Yes. That's right.

Q Well now, the thing that troubles me about that is, does not the assurance that you've given us in these paragraphs of that kind of scheme not confirm the very fears that the native people in the community hearings have expressed about the development of a pipeline and the settlement of their land claims? As I understand them just to set it out so we can have your reaction, that they fear the commencement, the issuing of permits and the commencement of construction will entrench and further require the growth of centralized government — controlling the major aspects of their life — if those impacts are to be held within acceptable limits.

They say, as I understand them,
"That's why we want a land claims settlement first before
these mechanisms of control are established and entrenched".

Doesn't that make a certain amount of sense to you?

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that with that the controls will be in place. I'm not sure I go with the full thrust of what you're saying. It seems to me that you're saying that once these controls are used to modify or ameliorate impacts or prevent impacts, that they're 1. irreversible and, 2. they somehow affect the ability to have a land claims settlement. I just —

Q Let me put it to you this way. You see as one of the solutions to our Alaskan problem the existence of this kind of government machinery with this kind of control. Right?

A Yes.

O Isn't that the very problem that the native people see to which land claims is a solution?

A Well, it can also be a solution. You see, that's why I have a problem with what you're saying in terms of the native people. For example, I would think and I can't testify to this with full knowledge, but I would think that should the government choose to do so, they could make it a regulation that there be no hunting, trapping or fishing by other than residents of the Territories within some great swath down each side of the pipeline.

You can argue therefore that that kind of control in fact preserves the land to the maximum extent possible and therefore is ultimately beneficial in settlement terms. I think that's true if you go through a number of circumstances. You can



argue that if these controls are used to make sure that pipeline workers and the pipeline project does not impact in any way on a native settlement that that preserves whole, if you like, the situation. Do you see my difficulty in responding easily to what you are suggesting?

Q Well I am not concerned about hunting and trapping per se so much. I am concerned that you look to the all pervasive control of government as a solution to the problems of Alaska.

I don't look to all pervasive control. I look to these kinds of things. A construction camp is located at a certain spot. The government can, if that's government land and in most cases it is, under at least the control of the Crown, can say, "There shall be no development within a certain radius of that camp outside the camp fence". They can put in a land use control if you like. It's a very specific. It can also be removed.

O I understand that.

A Well my point though

Mr. Scott is you're using the word "control" as if it's

something other than what I mean it to be. I mean it

to be appropriately structured regulations applied in

the appropriate places for the appropriate reasons.

Q Yes, but don't I understand you correctly to say that the assurance in the Northwest Territories is that we have a government that can do extensive land useplanning, that can control the size and placement of communities, that can control the future

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development of communities, that can build housing in place "x" rather than in place "y", and that the presence of those powers is the assurance that the project and its impacts will not get out of hand?

A That's part of it, yes.

Q Well now isn't that the very thing, for what it's worth, that the native people, if their views in the settlements are typical, are concerned about? That all that planning will be done before their land claims are settled?

THE COMMISSIONER: The point is I think that a government establishment even more pervasive than that which exists at present will become entrenched, which will make it all the more difficult for the native people to work out a settlement which enables them to achieve self-determination and that could only be reflected in a different kind of institutional arrangements.

A That sort of point I can go with much more easily, because that goes to the question of government dominance increasing. My problem is with this "control". But the point you've just raised sir, I can readily see.

MR. SCOTT: Well Mr. Trusty,

I'm still not happy about the multiplier. Can you and

I think about it and deal with it on the subsequent

panel?

A Yes. I should mention

Mr. Scott that I'll be going through this Van Ginkel

analysis step by step in the subsequent panel and maybe



	nh.
1.	at that point it'll sort itself out.
2	Q Well maybe you'll bring
3 .	one of the Van Ginkels with you next time. We can
4 .	discuss it with them.
5 .	Those are all the questions
6.	I have, and I want to thank you very much Mr. Trusty.
7 :	THE COMMISSIONER: Well thank
3	you Mr. Trusty and it's good of you to accomodate us
9	by sitting late in the evening. We'll see you next
10	week.
11	We will adjourn now and see
12	you all at 10:00 a.m.
13	(WITNESS ASIDE)
14	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO JULY 8, 1976)
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